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Abstract
Chapter 1 shows how blockholder disclosure thresholds regulate market trans-
parency and, in turn, hedge fund activism. We characterize how disclosure thresh-
olds structure the complex interactions between (a) initial investors in a firm—who
value the value-enhancing disciplining effects of activism on management, but in-
cur costs trading with activists who know their own value-enhancing potential; (b)
activists–who value higher thresholds when establishing equity stakes, but incur
costs if high thresholds reduce real investment or discourage managerial misbehav-
ior; and (c) firm managers—who weigh private benefits of value-reducing actions
against potential punishment if activists intervene. When managerial behavior is
sufficiently unresponsive to threats of activism, initial investors and society value
tighter disclosure thresholds than activists whenever the costs of activism tend to
be low, making the probability of activism insensitive to the level of activist trading
profits. In contrast, activists value tighter thresholds when managerial behavior is
responsive to potential activism.
In Chapter 2 we model a novel coordination problem between the sharehold-
ers of a company receiving a takeover offer. The willingness of a Board to defend
itself from a takeover bid is reduced the greater the proportion of shareholders who
sell-out early. Sophisticated shareholders therefore face a coordination problem;
and their actions generate a novel feedback loop between the volume of shareholder
sales and takeover outcomes. We use global games to derive and analyse the unique
threshold- equilibrium. We show that rules which strengthen Boards’ discretion to
vii
make takeover judgments, or which weaken new shareholders’ voting power, encour-
age shareholders to sell early; and that incentives to politically pressure Boards are
greatest in jurisdictions with the greatest respect for shareholder rights.
Chapter 3 recognizes that firms’ debt capacity affects their ability to compete
in the product market, and the competitiveness of firms in the product market deter-
mines their ability to secure debt. I model the endogenous relation between product
market competition and financial constraints by characterizing a trade credit trans-
action where a competitive retailer has incentives to not honour the debt extended
by its supplier. With linear input prices, credit rationing arises endogenously in
equilibrium if competitive pressure is strong enough. I show that a financially con-
strained retailer faces a lower price, and it can make higher profits due to its own
financial constraints. With non-linear prices, the retailer might never be constrained,
even though contractual frictions affect market outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Blockholder disclosure
thresholds and hedge fund
activism
1.1 Introduction
Hedge fund activism mitigates agency problems that affect governance in publicly-
traded companies with dispersed owners. An extensive empirical literature estab-
lishes that activist funds generate gains to their targets in terms of performance
and stock prices (Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2009; Boyson and
Mooradian 2011; Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al. 2015). However, their financially-
driven incentives (Brav et al. 2010; Burkart and Dasgupta 2015; Back et al. 2017)
and the relative short-termism of their strategies (Brav et al. 2010) often generate
controversy. In particular, activist hedge funds are, by nature, informed traders that
profit from trading on their information advantages at the expense of uninformed
shareholders. As a result, activists can impair real investment, destroying value
(Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995).
Our paper models the inter-linkages between real investment, hedge fund
1
activism and managerial behavior, showing that hedge fund activism creates value
when sufficiently limited, but that it can harm both uninformed investors and society
otherwise. Our analysis contributes to the regulatory debate about the levels of op-
timal blockholder disclosure thresholds, when these thresholds limit trading profits
of activist funds and hence their incentives to engage in costly, value-enhancing in-
terventions. We determine how disclosure thresholds structure complex interactions
between (a) initial investors in a firm—who value the direct and indirect value-
enhancing disciplining effects of activism on management, but may incur costs trad-
ing with activists who are privately-informed of their value-enhancing potential; (b)
activists—who value higher thresholds when establishing equity stakes, but incur
costs if high thresholds deter real investment or discourage managerial misbehavior
that is the source of their profits; and (c) firm managers—who weigh private benefits
of malfeasance against potential punishment if activists intervene. We character-
ize how the optimal disclosure thresholds vary with economic primitives from the
perspectives of uninformed investors, activists and a welfare-maximizing regulator.
When managerial behavior is sufficiently unresponsive to threats of activism, initial
investors and society value tighter disclosure thresholds than activists when the costs
of activism tend to be low, so that the probability of activism is relatively insensi-
tive to the level of activist trading profits. In contrast, when managerial behavior
is responsive to potential activism, activists value tighter thresholds.
In 2011, senior partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (WLRK), a
prominent law firm specializing in corporate and securities law and corporate gover-
nance, submitted a rulemaking petition—henceforth the WLRK (2011) Petition—to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) advocating that rules governing the
disclosure of blocks of stock in publicly traded companies be tightened.1 WLRK
argued that the US disclosure threshold of 5% allows activist investors to secretly
1The WLRK (2011) Petition asks the SEC to update Schedule 13D reporting requirements to
reduce a 10-day window between crossing the 5% threshold and the initial filing deadline, and to
broaden definitions of beneficial ownership. External link to the WLRK (2011) Petition here.
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accumulate enough stock to control target companies. Empirical evidence shows
that while activist funds create fundamental changes in targeted companies (Brav
et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009), they typically own only about 6% of shares and
only hold positions for short periods of time (Brav et al. 2010). This, WLRK argued,
undermines the original purpose of Section 13(d) and damages market transparency
and investor confidence. Academics responded, questioning the desirability of the
proposed measures (Bebchuk and Jackson 2012; Bebchuk et al. 2013). They argued
that a crucial incentive for activist funds is the ability to purchase stock at prices
that do not yet reflect the value of their actions, and that tighter disclosure rules
would discourage hedge fund activism. In turn, they argued that discouraging such
activism would harm small investors, who would then not glean the value-enhancing
benefits of hedge fund activism on corporate behavior.
Despite the importance of blockholder disclosure thresholds and the heated
debate,2 there has not yet been a comprehensive analysis to provide a rationale for
this rule or guidance for potential adjustments. Why a threshold of 5%? When
and how do interests of uninformed investors and activist hedge funds conflict? Can
activists benefit from disclosure thresholds? Our paper sheds light on these issues.
It presents a model of hedge fund activism and shows how disclosure thresholds
affect (i) incentives of activist funds to engage in costly managerial disciplining; (ii)
real investment of small uninformed investors; (iii) choices by managers of whether
to pursue potentially value-destroying activities.
Activist funds profit from secretly acquiring undervalued stock and selling it
2The debate is built around interventions by leading academics and important figures in the
industry. Examples of law experts promoting reductions in disclosure thresholds include the fol-
lowing interventions in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation: “Section 13(d) Reporting Requirements Need Updating” and “13(d) Reporting In-
adequacies in an Era of Speed and Innovation” by David A. Katz of WLRK in 2012 and 2015
respectively; “Activist Abuses Require SEC Action on Section 13(d) Reporting” and “Proposed
Revisions to 13(d) Beneficial Ownership Reporting Rules” by Theodore N. Mirvis of WLRK in
2014 and 2016 respectively. Letters of both the Managed Funds Association and the Alternative
Investment Management Association in (2013) to the Canadian Securities Administrators contain
arguments by hedge funds against such proposals (external link here). Academic work against the
WLRK Petition includes Bebchuk and Jackson (2012) and Bebchuk et al. (2013).
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at higher prices after they intervene. Share prices typically rise sharply when an ac-
tivist’s presence is revealed because the market anticipates subsequent intervention,
and Bebchuk et al. (2015) provide evidence that these post-disclosure spikes in share
prices reflect the long-term value of intervention. Accordingly, the main source of
rents for activist funds is the price change caused by their own interventions, and the
value of the shares acquired prior to revealing themselves is key to their profitability
(WLRK 2011 Petition, Bebchuk and Jackson 2012). A disclosure threshold limits
the equity position that can be secretly acquired, reducing incentives to intervene.
Importantly, the expected levels of activism affect the expected profitability of real
investment by uninformed investors. In turn, this real investment affects the value
of activist interventions, creating a feedback effect on the incentives of activists
to participate. The optimal disclosure threshold policy for each party reflects the
tensions faced with regard to the preferred level of market transparency.
Consider the tradeoffs faced by uninformed investors. Higher transparency (a
lower disclosure threshold) reduces their trading losses, but it also reduces the will-
ingness of hedge fund activists to intervene. In turn, this encourages management to
pursue its own interests at the expense of shareholders. Uninformed investors value
binding disclosure thresholds when the expected trading losses saved outweigh the
disciplining benefits. They gain from the reduced shares that activists acquire when
those shares are not needed to induce activism, but they are harmed when the share
limit discourages activism. Their optimal disclosure threshold, when interior, trades
these considerations off. In particular, uninformed investors value binding disclosure
thresholds whenever the profit elasticity of activism is sufficiently small.
Despite the long-term value of hedge fund activism (Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk
et al. 2015), researchers have found that activist funds tend to have short investment
horizons,3 and that they acquire stock after targeting a firm.4 We model this by
3Brav et al. (2010) finds that the median duration of investment from when the Schedule 13D is
filed until divestment is about nine months. Brav et al. (2008) and Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
provide more details on the duration of activist hedge funds investment in target companies.
4Bebchuk et al. (2013) find that much of an activist’s position is built on the day they cross the
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considering a large informed (potential) activist fund that is external to the firm,
and whose incentives to incur the cost of intervention are provided by the increase
in the value of the stock that he acquires. That is, the activist’s sole source of rents
is the increase in stock value due to intervention relative to the acquisition price,
making activism directly related to block size.5
The activist endogenously determines how many shares to acquire. We de-
velop a static dealership model (see e.g., Kyle 1985) in which the activist trades along
with a random, uniformly-distributed measure of shareholders (initial investors) who
receive liquidity shocks that force them to sell their shares. A competitive market
maker sets price given the net order flow from the activist and initial sharehold-
ers. The activist’s order trades off between the benefits of a larger block size and
the costs of the information revealed. This formulation is related in spirit to that
in Edmans (2009), who introduces exponentially-distributed liquidity trade. This
allows Edmans to solve for informed trade and expected profits in closed form.
Here, uniformly-distributed liquidity trade serves the same purpose, delivering sim-
ple closed-form solutions. What matters for our analysis and findings are how an
activist’s ex-ante expected trading profits are affected by disclosure thresholds at
the moment the activist decides to intervene. In that sense, our qualitative insights
extend naturally to a dynamic setting along the lines of Back et al. (2017), who
focus on the dynamics of the stock acquisition process and the endogenous relation
between block size and incentives for costly intervention.
The second key tension in our model is that the activist’s trading profits de-
pend on the value of intervention, which is directly related to real investment—value-
enhancing actions in larger companies have bigger impacts. When the expected
losses of initial shareholders to the activist are too high relative to the benefits of
5% disclosure threshold.
5Shleifer and Vishny (1986) are the first to recognize the positive relation between monitoring
incentives and block size, showing that large minority shareholders can alleviate free-riding in the
disciplining of corporate management. Edmans and Holderness (2016) review the large literature
that follows.
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disciplining management, the ability to secretly acquire too many shares reduces real
investment, reducing the profits that an activist can extract. The activist does not
internalize the investment feedback effect in his trading because he participates only
after initial investment has been sunk. A disclosure threshold can serve as a com-
mitment device for an activist to limit his trade, and thereby raise real investment.
Surprisingly, we establish the activist never wants a binding disclosure threshold
just because it boosts real investment. That is, as long as managerial malfeasance is
sufficiently insensitive to the threat of investor activism, we prove that this tension
is always resolved against the investment feedback effect—the activist never wants
to face a binding disclosure threshold.
The negative effect of market opacity on real investment captures the origi-
nal concerns of the Williams Act (1968), which was designed to “alert investors in
securities markets to potential changes in corporate control and to provide them
with an opportunity to evaluate the effect of these potential changes”.6 Trading
is a zero-sum game in which the activist’s expected trading profits represent ex-
pected trading losses to uninformed investors. When trading losses outweigh the
benefits of monitoring, i.e., when the profit elasticity of activism is small, hedge
fund activism harms uninformed investors, causing them to reduce investment. The
opposite happens when the profit elasticity of activism is high. By regulating these
trading transfers, disclosure thresholds affect real investment. This link between
market efficiency and economic efficiency was first made in Bernhardt et al. (1995).
Here, we identify twin real effects of informed trade by hedge fund activists: (i) it
encourages activists to create value by intervening in underperforming companies,
and (ii) it affects real investment.
The third strategic agent is the firm’s management. The manager can take
6Quote of the case resolution Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365-66 (2d. Cir. 1982),
citing GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
(External link here ). Used in “Section 13(d) Reporting Requirements Need Updating” by David A.
Katz of WLRK in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
2012.
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a value-destroying action to obtain private benefits, but she incurs a reputation
cost if disciplined by the activist. Improvements in the performance and gover-
nance achieved by activists often come at the expense of managers and directors
who see sharp reductions in compensation and a higher likelihood of being replaced
(Brav et al. 2010; Fos and Tsoutsoura 2014). Keusch (2017) finds evidence that
following activist campaigns, companies dismiss underperforming CEOs. As a con-
sequence, the threat of being disciplined by an activist improves managerial perfor-
mance (Gantchev et al. 2017). We capture this mechanism, recognizing the ex-ante
disciplining role of hedge fund activists in discouraging managerial malfeasance.
Since higher trading transfers make an activist more willing to act if management
misbehaves, they also induce better behavior by management. We call this the
managerial feedback effect.
The managerial feedback benefits uninformed investors, but, paradoxically,
by reducing the likelihood that a manager pursues actions that benefit himself at the
expense of shareholders, it reduces an activist’s opportunities to extract profit from
its business of disciplining management. When managers are sensitive to the threat
of activism, initial shareholders are happy to increase the block disclosure threshold,
as their trading losses are only realized when the activist intervenes, so they are con-
ditional on managers’ malfeasance. Raising the disclosure threshold both increases
activists’ intervention rates (ex-post disciplining) and discourages malfeasance (ex-
ante disciplining). The same mechanism represents a tension for an activist fund,
which trades off higher conditional trading profits against a lower probability of
profiting. When the activism elasticity of malfeasance is sufficiently large, i.e., when
managerial feedback is strong, activist hedge funds benefit from tighter disclosure
thresholds. Indeed, we establish that whenever activists value a binding disclosure
threshold, it is always lower than that preferred by uninformed investors. In effect,
the willingness of an activist hedge fund discourages excessively—from its perspec-
tive, but not shareholders—the desire of management to pursue its own interests
7
at the expense of shareholders. Shareholders gain from the activist’s willingness to
engage without having to pay in terms of trading costs.
We also characterize the socially-optimal disclosure threshold and show that
it rarely coincides with the preferred policies of uninformed investors or activists.
Society (a regulator) does not internalize the transfer of trading profits from un-
informed investors to the hedge fund, caring only about the expected value of the
firm net of the cost of capital and the cost of activism. Intuitively, society is not
directly concerned about trading in financial markets, but only the indirect real
effects of such trading. We show that the socially-optimal disclosure threshold is
always weakly between the thresholds preferred by shareholders and the activist
hedge fund.
We next relate the paper to the literature. Section 2 studies a simple model
of hedge fund activism in which managerial behavior is exogenous. Section 3 in-
troduces blockholder disclosure thresholds and derives the optimal policies for the
different parties. Section 4 endogenizes managerial behavior. Section 5 concludes.
An Appendix contains all proofs.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing body of research on hedge fund activism.
The seminal work of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) introduced the role of blockholders
as monitors of corporate management. More recently, research has focused on the
relation between financial markets and the monitoring incentives of blockholders (see
Edmans and Holderness 2016 for a review).7 The literature on hedge fund activism,
including our paper, reflects that disciplining management often is the business
of blockholders. The key role of financial markets follows from the strategies of
blockholders, which consist of acquiring stock in target companies before the price
7Broadly, this can be classified as “exit” (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans
and Manso, 2011); “voice” literature in shareholder interventions; and the interaction between the
two (Levit, 2017; Back et al., 2017).
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reflects the value of their actions.
We motivate our main modelling assumptions using findings from the vast
empirical literature on hedge fund activism. Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) and
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) provide evidence that hedge fund activists exploit
liquidity sales to purchase stock in target companies. A host of papers document
that activist funds enhance the value of these companies by disciplining management
(Brav et al., 2008;Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011;
Brav et al., 2015; Bebchuk et al., 2015) through costly interventions (Gantchev,
2013). Brav et al. (2010), Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) and Keusch (2017) provide
empirical foundations for our assumption that managers in target companies are
penalized when disciplined by activist funds. Our paper endogenizes firm value by
assuming that investors react to the expected value of the company, which is deter-
mined by corporate governance. While this relation has not been established in the
literature on hedge fund activism, La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008)
find evidence of higher investment in markets with more legal investor protection.
Some of our predictions have empirical support, while others remain to be
tested. The model predicts that the stock price reaction that follows disclosure of
an activist fund captures the value of their actions (Bebchuk et al., 2015), and that
disclosure thresholds constrain their acquisitions (Bebchuk et al., 2013). Gantchev
et al. (2017) provides evidence of the ex-ante disciplining effect of hedge fund ac-
tivism.
Few papers have formally studied hedge fund activism. Most notably, our
paper recognizes the role of financial markets on the incentives of activists to take
positions in a target company and intervene. This property is shared with Back
et al. (2017), who characterize the dynamic trading of an activist investor. As in
our paper, they follow Kyle (1985) by introducing exogenous market uncertainty
(liquidity trading) that provides camouflage for a blockholder’s trades. Back et al.
(2017) revisit the classic question of the relationship between liquidity and economic
9
efficiency, and show how the intervention cost function affects outcomes. Our paper
simplifies the trading process (static) and the cost of intervention (fixed) in order to
endogenize investment and study the role of market transparency, i.e., of blockholder
disclosure thresholds. In this way, the two papers complement each other.
Market liquidity also plays a key role in our model. The activist fund is
initially external to the target company, so liquidity camouflages its purchases of
shares and diminishes adverse price impacts, making intervention more profitable.
This positive relationship was first formalized by Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton
(1998) in the context of general blockholder interventions, and Kyle and Vila (1991)
in the context of takeovers.8
Other analyses of hedge fund activism share with our paper the essential
trade-off between the financial benefit of increasing a target company’s value (and
hence share price) and the cost of intervention. Burkart and Lee (2015) compare
hedge fund activism with hostile takeovers in a complete information setting, and
show that they can be regarded as polar approaches to the free-riding problem of
Grossman and Hart (1980). Burkart and Dasgupta (2015) model hedge fund ac-
tivism as a dual-layered agency model between investors, activists and managers.
Activist funds compete for investor flows, and this affects their governance as block-
holders. In their paper, funds inflate short-term performance by increasing payouts
financed by leverage, which discourages value-creating interventions in economic
downturns due to debt overhang. Brav et al. (2016) recognize the complementarity
of costly interventions by distinct funds in the same target and model the resulting
coordination problem.
Our paper is also related to the insider trading literature. In our model, the
hedge fund activist is an informed trader that profits from trading with uninformed
investors. This reduces the profitability of uninformed investors, who then reduce
8In contrast, Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) argue that liquidity facilitates exit when manage-
ment underperforms, and therefore discourages intervention. In the dynamic analysis of Back et al.
(2017), the relationship between liquidity and intervention depends on the structure of the cost
function.
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their investments. Leland (1992) and Bernhardt et al. (1995) first model this mech-
anism to study the welfare effects of insider trading. This literature focuses on the
informational role of prices for investment and anticipation of future trading by un-
informed agents with informed traders; our current paper combines this anticipation
of future trading with how such informed trading provides incentives for managerial
disciplining. A more direct link to the insider trading literature concerns the impact
of mandatory disclosure rules for insiders (see Huddart et al. 2001).
Our paper is motivated by a regulatory debate that has been largely over-
looked by the finance literature. Many calls for revisions of blockholder disclosure
rules have been made by prominent lawyers, hedge funds and academics.9 Bebchuk
and Jackson (2012) provide a comprehensive analysis in corporate law of the law and
economics of blockholder disclosure thresholds, and Bebchuk et al. (2013) empiri-
cally analyse pre-disclosure accumulations of hedge fund activists. In line with their
findings, our paper shows that lower disclosure can increase investor value. This
is against a widely-held view that higher transparency must provide more investor
protection,10 a view that ignores investor protection from activists.
1.2 Hedge Fund Activism
In this section we model hedge fund activism and characterize the inter-linkage with
real investment. We consider a firm that raises capital for a project whose value
depends on the initial investment by uninformed investors and a business plan that
may be either good or bad. The manager can deliberately adopt the bad business
plan in order to obtain private rents at the expense of shareholders. The bad plan
reduces value for shareholders unless an outside activist hedge fund intervenes to
discipline management and implement the good plan. All agents are risk neutral.
9 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation contains a
discussion of interventions by different parties.
10See Schouten and Siems (2010) and references therein for the corporate law literature; and see
La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) for papers in the economics literature that use
ownership disclosure rules in an index of investor protection.
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There are four dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3. There is no discounting.
At t = 0 a continuous of dispersed investors invest capital k in a project,
which is expected to pay off
V = f(k)
[
1− δ · 1{m=0}
]
(1.1)
at t = 3. Here, f is a standard production technology with f ′ (·) > 0, f ′′ (·) < 0,
f ′ (0) → ∞. The indicator function accounts for the business plan m ∈ {0, 1}
implemented by the manager at t = 1. The good plan (m = 1) yields cash flows
f(k) to investors. The bad plan (m = 0) yields nothing with probability δ ∈
[0, 1]. Equivalently, the bad plan destroys a proportion δ of the project’s value.
Investors are uninformed, unable to distinguish between the good and bad business
plans. We initially assume that the manager adopts the bad business plan (m = 0)
with exogenous probability z. Section 4 endogenizes managerial malfeasance. The
marginal cost of capital is r > 0. Initial investors become shareholders that receive
claims to terminal project payoffs that they may trade at date 2. We normalize the
measure of shares outstanding to one.
At t = 2, some initial investors receive liquidity shocks and must sell their
shares in a competitive dealership market. These investors sell l shares, where l
is uniformly distributed on [0, b]. We let x(l) denote the associated density, and
observe that b ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of market liquidity. Also possibly present in
the market is an activist, who is an outsider to the firm. The activist identifies
managerial malfeasance when it occurs with probability λ. The activist can disci-
pline management by incurring a fixed cost c, forcing the firm to shift from the bad
business plan to the good one. The activist privately observes this cost c. Other
market agents share a common prior that c is distributed on [0, C] according to a
strictly positive and weakly decreasing density g and associated cumulative function
G. The activist chooses how many shares α ∈ [0, 1] to acquire, which we term his
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position. A competitive market maker observes the net order flow ω = α−l from the
activist and initial investors, but not its components, and sets a price that equals
expected project payoffs given ω, i.e., the market maker breaks even in expectation
as in Kyle (1985).
To ease presentation, we assume that (i) the activist cannot act as a mere
inside trader, only intervening when m = 0; and (ii) the activist disciplines manage-
ment whenever he takes a position in the firm; i.e., he does not “cut-and-run” by
selling his shares before engaging with management. We show in Appendix B that
neither of these assumptions qualitatively affects the results.11
At t = 3, the project delivers cash flows f(k) if the manager implemented
the good plan or if the activist disciplines the manager. Otherwise, expected cash
flows are (1− δ) f(k). Figure 1.1 summarizes the sequence of events.
Shareholders
invest k
t = 0
Manager implements
business plan
m ∈ {0, 1}
t = 1
Activist acquires α ∈ [0, 1] if ob-
serves m = 0, and incurs cost c
to implement m = 1 if α > 0;
Liquidity traders
sell l ∼ U [0, b];
Market maker observes ω = α− l
and sets price P = E[V |ω]
t = 2
Cash flows
realize
t = 3
Figure 1.1: Time line
The parameters δ and z capture the severity of the agency problem between
management and ownership. If δ = 0, both business plans yield cash flows f(k),
11Appendix B.1 allows the activist to acquire stock when the business plan is good (m = 1) and
there is no need for him to intervene. This increases his information rents without affecting the
net value of the project. This hurts uninformed investors reducing their investment. Appendix B.2
introduces a new liquidity shock to allow the activist to sell shares after the price increase that
follows disclosure, and shows that an equilibrium with “cut and run” does not exist unless binding
disclosure thresholds are very low. In reality, while activists may “cut-and-run”, empirical evidence
shows that hedge fund activism increases the value of target companies via costly disciplining
(see Gantchev (2013) for the costs of activism, and Bebchuk et al. (2015) for evidence on the
value of hedge fund activism). Cutting and running becomes even less attractive when it impairs
the reputation of activist funds, which Johnson and Swem (2017) find to be important for their
profitability.
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so there are no frictions between investors and the manager, and thus no room
for managerial disciplining; and if z = 0 the manager always implements the good
business plan. In contrast, δ > 0 and z > 0 imply that the manager may destroy
shareholder value to obtain private benefits, creating a potential role for hedge fund
activism. In Section 4 we endogenize the probability z that the manager implements
the bad business plan to study the effects of a strategic manager.
We assume that the activist correctly identifies the good business plan and
can discipline management at cost c,12 and that the activist buys shares in the
target company at a single time where shareholders (investors) face liquidity shocks.
In practice, these processes are dynamic,13 with uncertain costs and outcomes.14
We abstract from these mechanics to study the incentives provided by financial
markets. What matters for our analysis are the expectations that the activist forms
about these costs and outcomes at t = 2 when deciding whether to attempt to
discipline management. The decision is based on the balance between expected
financial benefits and engagement costs, and the likely dynamic price impacts of
trading—and not the particular paths that can be realized given a decision to move
forward.
The static trading setting preserves the fundamental property that there is
an adverse price effect via trading that reveals information to the market (see, e.g.,
Bebchuk and Jackson, 2012). The continuum of random liquidity sales l allows us
to endogenize the activist’s position α; and the uniform distribution yields a sim-
ple closed-form solution for this position. These properties facilitate our analysis
of blockholder disclosure thresholds. The continuum of liquidity shocks differen-
12In practice, the intervention cost c depends on factors such as an activist’s ability to coordinate
with other shareholders and managerial entrenchment. See Back et al. (2017) for how different
functional forms for intervention costs affect the incentives to intervene in a dynamic setting.
13The dynamics of stock acquisition have been studied in the insider trading literature (see Collin-
Dufresne and Fos 2016 and references therein). With regard to hedge fund activism, Collin-Dufresne
and Fos (2015) find evidence that activist funds select times of higher liquidity when they trade,
while Back et al. (2017) analyse the incentives of “exit” versus “voice” during the trading process.
14For an analysis of the engagement process see Gantchev (2013), who builds a sequential decision
model to estimate the costs of proxy fights and other stages of shareholder activism. See Becker
et al. (2013) for details on the costs of launching a proxy fight.
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tiates our model from most corporate finance models that feature simple discrete
(typically binary) levels of liquidity trade. Our trading environment is similar in
spirit to Edmans (2009), who assumes exponentially distributed liquidity purchases
to characterize the sales of an informed blockholder.
1.2.1 Market Equilibrium
We solve recursively for the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this model. At
t = 2 real investment has been sunk by uninformed investors and is observable
to all parties, the manager adopted the bad business plan with probability z, and
the activist observes malfeasance with probability λ. Uninformed investors receive
liquidity shocks and trade simultaneously with the activist in the dealership market
with pricing by the risk neutral market maker. At t = 0 investors anticipate the
subsequent events and invest capital.
Trading
Proposition 1 summarizes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the subgame at date
2. The activist participation and trade is optimal given the market maker’s pricing
function, and the market maker’s pricing function earns it zero expected profits
given the activist’s decisions.
Proposition 1 At t = 2 real investment k is sunk and observable to all parties. If
the activist observes managerial malfeasance (m = 0), and the cost of activism is
sufficiently small, c ≤ c∗t where
c∗t = z [1− λG (c∗t )]
b
4
δf(k); (1.2)
he takes a position
α∗ =
b
2
(1.3)
and engages in managerial disciplining. Otherwise the activist does not participate.
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The market maker, upon observing net order flow ω, sets the following prices
P (ω) = Pl ≡
[
(1−z)+z(1−λG(c∗t ))(1−δ)
1−zλG(c∗t )
]
f (k) if ω < b+ α∗
P (ω) = Pm ≡ [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ] f (k) if ω ∈ [b+ α∗, 0]
P (ω) = Ph ≡ f (k) if ω > 0.
(1.4)
A full proof is in the Appendix; here we provide the key intuition. After
observing the net order flow, the market maker updates beliefs according to Bayes
rule and sets prices in (1.4). Letting a1 denote activism and a0 denote the absence
of activism, the market maker’s pricing rule satisfies
P = E [V |ω] (1.5)
=
[
Pr [a1|ω] Pr [V = f (k) |a1] + Pr [a0|ω] Pr [V = f (k) |a0]
]
f (k) .
When the net order flow is sufficiently negative, the market maker knows with
certainty that the activist did not buy shares, i.e., Pr [a1|ω < −b+ α∗] = 0. The
market maker infers that either (a) there was no malfeasance (which happens with
unconditional probability 1 − z), in which case the project pays f(k); or (b) there
was malfeasance, and either the malfeasance was not discovered, or the cost of in-
tervention was too high (which collectively happen with unconditional probability
z[1−λG(c∗t )]), in which case expected project payoffs are (1−δ)f(k). Similarly, a pos-
itive net order flow reveals that the activist took a position with certainty, in which
case the project is sure to pay off f(k): Pr [a1|ω > 0] = 1 and Pr [V = f (k) |a1] = 1.
In contrast, intermediate net order flows ω ∈ [−b + α∗, 0] are consistent with both
the presence and the absence of activism, and allow the activist to extract informa-
tion rents from uninformed investors. Given a net order flow of ω ∈ [−b + α∗, 0],
the market maker knows that either liquidity trade was l = −ω, or that liquidity
trade was l = −ω+α∗. With the uniform distribution, these densities cancel out of
the numerator and denominator of the conditional probability of activism, causing
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the market maker to set price equal to the unconditional expected project payoff
regardless of the level of net order flow ω ∈ [−b + α∗, 0]. It is this feature of the
uniform distribution that simplifies analysis.
When the activist participates and liquidity shocks outweigh the number of
shares that he buys, i.e., l ≥ α∗, the activist acquires the stock below its true value at
Pm < f (k). If, instead, l < α
∗, then the activist pays Ph for each share and makes
no profit. The probability that the activist camouflages his share purchase with
liquidity sales is
∫ b
α
1
bdl =
b−α
b . It follows that his expected gross profits conditional
on buying α shares are
E[ΠA|a1] =
(
b− α
b
)
α [f(k)− Pm] . (1.6)
Inspection of (1.6) reveals that the activist faces a trade-off between the number
of undervalued shares that he may acquire α and the expected cost of information
revelation b−αb . This captures adverse price effects by which the expected stock price
paid by the activist rises as he buys more shares. The activist’s expected trading
profits in (1.6) are maximized by a share purchase of α∗ = b/2. Greater liquidity b
makes it easier for the activist to camouflage his trade, encouraging him to acquire
a larger position.15
If the activist observes managerial malfeasance, he disciplines management
when doing so is expected to be profitable, i.e., when E[ΠA|a1] ≥ c. This relation
pins down the activist’s cost participation cut-off in equilibrium:
ct = z [1− λG (ct)]
(
b− α
b
)
αδf(k), (1.7)
which takes the form in (1.2) when evaluated at the optimal position of α∗ = b/2,
15The positive relation between informed trading and market liquidity has long been studied in
the literature. See Bond et al. (2012)’s review of the role of liquidity in the real effects of financial
markets, and the review by Edmans and Holderness (2016) of the effect of liquidity in the context
of blockholder interventions.
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i.e., c∗t ≡ ct(α∗).16 The cut-off ct is unique and maximized for α = α∗. In equilib-
rium, the activist employs a threshold strategy such that, conditional on observing
malfeasance, he buys α∗ shares and disciplines management if and only if c ≤ c∗t .17
The endogenous cut-off c∗t captures two key equilibrium features. First, it
represents the activist participation threshold, and thus the extent of managerial
disciplining. The probability that the activist intervenes to discipline the man-
ager after observing the manager taking an action that reduces shareholder value is
G (c∗t ). Thus, a higher c∗t implies superior governance. Second, c∗t captures the ac-
tivist’s expected conditional trading profits. In equilibrium, the activist’s expected
trading profits equal the expected trading losses of uninformed investors because
trading is a zero-sum game in which the market maker expects to break even. Thus,
c∗t represents the expected transfer of trading profits from uninformed investors to
the activist conditional on the activist intervening.
These conditional trading transfers c∗t increase with investment k. The
greater is real investment, the greater is the project value, and hence (i) the more
valuable is managerial disciplining, and (ii) the more profitable it is for the activist
to intervene. Two assumptions drive this result. First, the cost of activism is in-
dependent of the company’s value, so the incentives for disciplining are positively
related to stock ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).18 Second, because the value
enhanced by the intervention is multiplicative, rather than additive, the relevant
measure of incentives is the activist’s dollar ownership, not its share ownership
(Edmans and Holderness 2016).19
Conditional trading transfers c∗t also rise with market liquidity b. High liquid-
16To obtain (1.7) set ct = E[ΠA|a1] using the expression in (1.6) substituting for the price Pm
using (1.4).
17To verify uniqueness note that the left-hand side of (1.7) increases in ct and the right-hand side
decreases.
18Brav et al. (2016) argue that it can be harder for activists to intervene in larger companies due
to credit constraints. Our model can be modified to provide a similar prediction in the presence of
financial constraints.
19In the related context of CEO incentives, Baker and Hall (2004) and Edmans et al. (2009)
show theoretically that a CEO’s dollar ownership and not percentage ownership is relevant when
the CEO has a multiplicative effect on firm value.
18
ity increases activist trading profits and thus the probability G (c∗t ) that the activist
finds it profitable to discipline management. In line with Kahn and Winton (1998)
and Maug (1998), higher liquidity allows the activist to increase his position with
a reduced risk of discovery, thereby encouraging intervention. Back et al. (2017)
model the dynamics of position building by activist funds and show the potentially
positive effects of liquidity. Consistent with this, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) and
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2017) provide evidence that activist funds camouflage
their purchases with liquidity trades by other parties.
Investment
At t = 0 uninformed investors anticipate trading outcomes and activism levels, and
invest capital so as to maximize expected profits. In addition to the investment
decision, Proposition 2 characterizes the expected project payoffs and how they are
split among market participants in expectation at t = 0. This sets the ground for
the analysis of the main interacting forces in the model and the introduction of
blockholder disclosure thresholds.
Proposition 2 The expected value at t = 0 of the project given investment k is
E [V ] = [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ]f(k) ≡ piV f(k). (1.8)
The expected gross profits of the activist are:
E[ΠA] = zλG(c
∗
t )
c∗t
f(k)
f(k) ≡ piAf(k). (1.9)
The expected gross profits of uninformed investors are:
E[ΠI ] = (piV − piA)f(k) ≡ piIf(k). (1.10)
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The investment k by uninformed investors solves
piIf
′ (k)− r = 0. (1.11)
Total expected cash flows are the product of f(k) and the probability that
the project succeeds piV ∈ [0, 1]. Proposition 2 reveals that expected total rents are
split between the activist and uninformed investors in proportions piA/piV and piI/piV
respectively. This follows because the market maker earns zero expected profits,
which means that activist trading profits are extracted one-for-one from uninformed
investors. More formally, the expected gross profits of the activist are captured by
the product of the unconditional probability that he participates zλG(c∗t ) and the
expected trading profits from participating c∗t . Uninformed investors obtain, in
expectation, the rest of the “pie”, (piV − piA) f(k). Real investment, characterized
by (1.11), maximizes expected profits of uninformed investors at date 0.
Proposition 2 shows that activism has an impact on real investment via its
effect on the expected profits of uninformed investors. Investors face a tension as to
their preferred extent of activism, where the extent of activism is captured by G(c∗t ).
Higher transfers of trading profits c∗t increase the proportion of cash flows taken by
the activist in expectation piA, reducing the investors’ portion piI . However, higher
trading transfers also incentivize activist participation, and the increased managerial
discipline raises total expected cash flows piV f(k). As a result, greater trading
transfers c∗t to activists need not hurt uninformed investors. In particular, activism
fosters real investment when investor gains from managerial disciplining outweigh
the associated trading losses, and it discourages real investment otherwise.
This mechanism underscores the investment feedback effect faced by the ac-
tivist. The value of activism is directly related to the size of the project—the
profitability of the activist grows with real investment, i.e., c∗t grows with k. But,
expected levels of activism affect investment. Therefore, expected activism affects
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real investment, which, in turn, affects the extent of activism. Crucially, the activist
does not internalize this investment feedback in his trading decision because this is
taken at t = 2, when real investment has already been sunk. Thus, when the activist
participates, he takes a position α∗ to maximize conditional expected profits (1.6),
i.e., for a given k, rather than unconditional expected profits (1.9).
Our analysis identifies novel strategic interactions between uninformed in-
vestors and activist funds. The linkage between investment and trading profit
transfers is similar to that found in papers studying the real effects of informed
trading (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995). We incorporate a new element: the
informed trader is an activist fund who can increase investment value by alleviating
agency problems between owners and managers (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur
2009, Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al. 2015). The effect of hedge fund activism
on real investment is thus twofold: Informed trading reduces the profitability of
uninformed investors who respond with lower investment; but it also encourages
the intervention of activist funds that discipline management, thereby incentivizing
investment.
1.3 Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds
Blockholder disclosure thresholds are rules that require a shareholder to disclose
stock holdings when they reach a certain fraction of the overall voting rights in a
publicly traded firm. In recent years, hedge fund activism has led some market
participants and commentators to call for an expansion of these rules, and policy
makers are now contemplating how to respond. We next briefly describe the insti-
tutional framework. We then contribute to the regulatory debate by deriving the
optimal threshold policies for investors, hedge fund activists and society.
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1.3.1 Institutional Framework and Regulatory Debate
A key concern for financial regulators is the protection of minority shareholders
against dominant shareholders. Ownership disclosure rules are considered to be one
such protection mechanism. The OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance of
2004 advocate that “one of the basic rights of investors is to be informed about the
ownership structure of the enterprise” (OECD, 2004). In the US, the disclosure of
“beneficial ownership” is regulated by the Williams Act of 1968, passed in response
to a wave of hostile takeover attempts, mostly through tender offers.20 In Europe,
the EU Transparency Directive of 2004 claims that the disclosure of major holdings
in listed companies should enable investors to acquire or dispose of shares in full
knowledge of changes in the voting structure (EC, 2004). Along with other cor-
porate transparency rules, blockholder disclosure thresholds are set to prevent the
expropriation of rents by large shareholders that gain influence or control of their
companies at the expense of uninformed investors.21
Investor protection is key to increasing confidence and encouraging real in-
vestment. For instance, the EU Transparency Directive belongs to a range of mea-
sures that aim, among other things, to enable issuers to raise capital on competitive
terms across Europe (Schouten 2010). La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al.
(2008) provide evidence that greater legal protection of investors is associated with
more developed financial markets. Both studies construct protection indices that
include ownership disclosure rules. Our paper captures the link between investor
protection and investment, but it challenges the extended view on the relationship
between corporate transparency and protection. Our earlier analysis shows that the
ability to secretly acquire stock encourages activist funds to discipline management,
alleviating agency problems between uninformed investors and managers, consis-
tent with the empirical evidence that hedge fund activists enhance the value of their
20See Nagel et al. (2011) for a more extensive analysis and more detailed arguments.
21See Edmans and Holderness (2016) for a review of the literature on the costs imposed by
blockholders that pursue their own private benefits.
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target companies.
Blockholder disclosure thresholds differ across financial systems. For ex-
ample, investors that intend to introduce corporate changes in US publicly-listed
companies must fill a 13(d) file when their holdings reach 5% of voting rights. In
Canada, equivalent disclosure of ownership is not required until a 10% stake is ac-
quired. In the EU, Germany recently reduced the threshold to 3%, which is also the
cutoff in the UK, while the threshold in France remains at 5%. Regulation across
jurisdictions also differs in such elements as the time window to report acquisitions,
the information that must be disclosed, and the types of securities subject to dis-
closure.22 Schouten and Siems (2010) identify a historical trend and convergence
towards greater ownership disclosure, i.e., towards lower thresholds. Yet, despite the
vast potential impacts of small differences in these rules, it remains unclear what
brings regulatory bodies to set a disclosure threshold of, for instance, 5% rather
than 2% or 10%; and Edmans and Holderness (2016) ask why regulators (and re-
searchers) tend to focus on measures of percentage ownership and neglect those of
absolute ownership.
The increasing importance of hedge fund activism has altered the regulatory
debate. Broadly, ownership disclosure rules were set to inform investors about stock
acquisitions that can result in takeovers or proxy fights. The WLRK (2011) Petition
argued that these rules no longer serve their purpose because activist funds can gain
control of target companies with small positions. Several academics opposed the
petition arguing that hedge fund activism increases the value of target companies
and hence has positive externalities for other investors. According to Bebchuk and
Jackson (2012) this was at the heart of the Williams Act, which considered that
outside investors who acquire large blocks of stock “should not be discouraged, since
they often serve a useful purpose by providing a check on entrenched but inefficient
22“Stakebuilding, mandatory offers and squeeze-out comparative table” by Practical Law, of
Thomson Reuters provides a synthesis of ownership disclosure rules in financial systems. External
link to the table here.
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management.” The debate is not confined to the US. For instance, in Canada, a
recent proposal to reduce the disclosure threshold from 10% to 5% was opposed
by two major associations of investment funds that argued “the lower threshold
will make share acquisitions by engaged investors more expensive and, in many
circumstances, too costly to justify the resources, time and effort for such activity.
This, in turn, will chill the market for engaged investing, and erode the benefits
of the value creation that results from having shareholder engagement” (MFA and
AIMA 2013).
1.3.2 Optimal Policies
We now extend our model to show how blockholder disclosure thresholds can reg-
ulate the level of hedge fund activism, deriving the optimal policies for investors,
activist and society.
Ownership disclosure rules may limit the number of undervalued shares that
the activist can acquire, reducing his incentives to participate. If a legal disclosure
threshold α is implemented, an activist must publicly announce his position when
it crosses the threshold. Then the activist has no incentive to establish a larger
position because doing so would reveal his presence causing the stock price to rise
to Ph = f(k), which would eliminate his information rents, rendering intervention
unprofitable.23 Corollary 3 follows immediately:
Corollary 3 A disclosure threshold α is binding if and only if α < α∗. In equilib-
rium, when a disclosure threshold binds the activist sets α = α.
The activist’s conditional trading profits ct (α) in (1.7) increase with his
position for α < α∗. Thus, when the activist participates, he acquires a position
α = min {α, α∗}. The mechanism implies that for a given firm characterized by f (k),
a binding threshold necessarily reduces both the profits and extent of hedge fund
23This price reaction is consistent with evidence by Bebchuk et al. (2015) that the stock-price
spike that follows disclosure reflects the long-term value of the intervention.
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activism. To see this, let ct represent the trading profits, and hence participation cut-
off, associated with a position determined by a binding threshold α < α∗. Because
trading profits increase in α, activism is now less profitable, i.e., ct < c
∗
t , making
the activist less likely to participate, i.e., G (ct) < G (c
∗
t ).
24 A direct consequence
is that managerial malfeasance is more likely to destroy value. This mechanism is
consistent with arguments against expanding ownership disclosure rules (see Section
3.1). However, our paper shows that they only comprise part of the overall effect.
The argument is incomplete because it neglects the effects of a disclosure
threshold on real investment. Changes in expected levels of activism at t = 2
also alter real investment at t = 0, which, in turn, affects the activist’s incentives
to participate. A binding disclosure threshold reduces the conditional transfer of
trading profits from investors to the activist, which may incentivize real investment,
creating a positive investment feedback that can increase activism.
Proposition 4 derives the consequences of blockholder disclosure thresholds
by characterizing the ordering of the optimal disclosure threshold policies for in-
vestors, the activist and a welfare-maximizing regulator representing society. We
denote these policies αI , αA and αR respectively. We present our results as a func-
tion of the profit elasticity of activism,
εa(ct) =
∂G (ct)
∂ct
ct
G(ct)
.
Here, εa captures the responsiveness of activism to informed trading: the higher
is εa, the bigger is the increment in the probability that the activist intervenes
G(ct) in response to a marginal increase in expected trading profits ct. Absent a
binding disclosure threshold, when the activist participates he buys α∗ shares, earns
expected gross profits c∗t , and the profit elasticity of activism is εa (c∗t ) ≡ ε∗a.
Proposition 4 There exists cutoffs ε∗Ra ≡ −
(
c∗t
δf(k)−c∗t
)[ df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
]
and ε∗Ia ≡
(
c∗t
δf(k)−c∗t
)
,
24It follows from the analysis in Section 2 that ct = z [1− λG (ct)]
(
b−α
b
)
αδf(k) < c∗t .
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on the profit elasticity of activism where ε∗Ra < ε∗Ia such that
1. No one benefits from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit elasticity of
activism is sufficiently high: ε∗a ≥ ε∗Ia ⇒ α∗ ≤ {αI , αA, αR}.
2. Only investors benefit from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit elasticity
of activism is intermediate: ε∗Ra ≤ ε∗a < ε∗Ia ⇒ 0 < αI < α∗ ≤ {αA, αR} .
3. Both investors and society gain from a binding disclosure threshold if the profit
elasticity of activism is low, with investors gaining more: ε∗a < ε∗Ra ⇒ 0 <
αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the results; a full proof is in Appendix A. Optimal
disclosure threshold policies are characterized by the first order conditions (FOCs)
of net profit functions with respect to the activist position α. Corollary 3 implies
that when the optimal position is less than α∗, it can be achieved in equilibrium by
a binding disclosure threshold.
αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA
ε∗Ra
αI < α
∗ ≤ {αR, αA}
ε∗Ia
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR, αA}
ε∗a
Figure 1.2: Optimal Disclosure Thresholds
Uninformed investors maximize piIf(k) − rk. The associated FOC reveals
that they benefit from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if
g(c∗t ) [δf(k)− c∗t ] < G(c∗t ), (1.12)
which can be rearranged to ε∗a < ε∗Ia . The left-hand side (LHS) represents the
marginal benefits to uninformed investors of increasing the transfer of trading profits
to the activist when α = α∗, i.e., for c∗t . Higher transfers cause the probability that
the activist participates conditional on observing managerial malfeasance to rise
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by g (c∗t ). The associated benefit for investors is the difference between the total
value enhanced by the activist δf(k) and their trading losses c∗t . The right-hand
side (RHS) captures the conditional loss from marginally higher transfers: with
probability G(c∗t ) the activist would have participated anyway, even if expected
trading profits had not increased.
A binding disclosure threshold α reduces transfers of trading profits, ct(α) ≡
ct < c
∗
t . (1.12) shows that this raises the marginal benefits to investors of activism
(LHS) and reduces the associated losses (RHS), increasing marginal profitability.
Equivalently, a binding threshold increases the profit elasticity of activism εa, and
it requires less trading transfers from investors to encourage higher activism. Trans-
fers of trading profits are the cost that investors incur in exchange for managerial
discipline, and this cost rises with the extent of activism.
The optimal extent of activism for investors solves this FOC: αI solves εa =
ct/ [δf(k)− ct] when ε∗a < ε∗Ia . Full disclosure is never optimal. If the activist
cannot acquire stock secretly, trading profits and hence transfers vanish, i.e., if
α → 0 then ct → 0. But then the activist never participates. Then, the marginal
benefits of discipline for investors outweigh the corresponding trading losses, i.e.,
g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] > G(ct). Thus, uninformed investors always benefit from some
degree of market opacity, i.e., αI > 0: the marginal profitability to uninformed
investors of activism is always positive whenever αI is sufficiently small.
The optimal extent of activism can be achieved by a disclosure threshold
when the corresponding trading transfers are lower than those in the unconstrained
equilibrium, i.e., when (1.12) holds, but not otherwise. The mechanism highlights
the asymmetric role of disclosure rules, which can only limit, but not foster, informed
trading. If, absent regulation, the marginal profitability of activism for investors is
positive, i.e., if (1.12) is not satisfied, the desired extent of activism cannot be
achieved and the optimal policy is non-binding, i.e., αI ≥ α∗. We discuss below
the role of market liquidity, which determines α∗ and thus whether a particular
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disclosure threshold is binding.
Our argument builds on the result that transfers of trading profits increase
with the activist’s position, i.e., dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗. It follows that restricting α
reduces ct. This is not immediate. We earlier established that the activist faces an
investment feedback effect that he does not internalize. In particular, the activist’s
position at t = 2 influences initial investment k, and this determines the trading
profits from a given position α. A binding disclosure threshold regulates the number
of shares that the activist buys in equilibrium. We have
dct
dα
=
∂ct
∂α︸︷︷︸
mg. net trading transfer
+
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
investment feedback
(1.13)
Net trading transfers capture the effect of the activist’s position on transfers
at t = 2 for a given investment k. (1.7) revealed that ∂ct∂α > 0⇔ α < α∗, leading the
activist to take a position α∗ in the absence of a disclosure threshold (Proposition
1). The investment feedback effect captures the impact of the activist’s position
on real investment ∂k∂α , and the effect that it has, in turn, on trading transfers
∂ct
∂k .
Real investment always raises trading transfers, and thus the extent of activism, i.e.,
∂ct
∂k > 0. However, the activist position α might be large enough to hurt investors,
who respond by reducing investment. That is, if α > αI then
∂k
∂α < 0, and the effect
of a larger position on trading transfers is determined by the balance of two opposing
forces: positive net transfers and a negative investment feedback. We show that,
surprisingly, the tension is always resolved against the investment feedback effect,
so dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗.
This result reflects the subordinated nature of investment feedback with re-
spect to the direct impact of trading transfers. Intuitively, these transfers lead the
activist to take a position α∗, which, in turn, affects investment. If the reduc-
tion of investment from increasing α was strong enough to reduce the activist’s
trading profits, i.e., if dctdα < 0, it would also increase investor profits because
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g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] < G(ct) when ∂k∂α < 0. But then investors would increase invest-
ment, not reduce it, benefiting activists. Since trading transfers are the activist’s
sole source of income, this mechanism explains why he never benefits from a binding
disclosure threshold:
Corollary 5 Negative investment feedback reduces the positive impact of increasing
the activist position on trading profits ct and thus on the extent of activism G (ct).
However, it does not alter the sign of the impact, i.e., dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗: the
activist never benefits from a blockholder disclosure threshold just because it boosts
investment.
Thus, when investors seek a binding disclosure threshold αI < α
∗, a conflict
of interest arises between them and the activist. An activist position that exceeds
αI harms investors, reducing real investment. This, in turn, reduces the profitability
of activism and the levels of managerial discipline (negative investment feedback).
Nonetheless, the investment response is never strong enough to outweigh the net
positive effect of additional shares on activist profits. Therefore, the activist never
wants a binding disclosure threshold to increase investment.
Society maximizes total expected value net of the costs of capital rk and
the expected costs of activism zλG (ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]. Society gains from a binding
disclosure threshold if
zλg (c∗t ) [δf(k)− c∗t ]
dc∗t
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
< 0, (1.14)
which can be rearranged to ε∗a < ε∗Ra .25 The condition reveals that society cares
about both the value-enhancing effects of activism and real investment. The first
term in (1.14) captures the impact of the activist’s equity position on project value
via managerial discipline. This is positive for all α < α∗. In particular, Corollary
5 shows that the extent of activism is directly related to the activist’s position
25See Appendix A. Rearrangement of (1.14) to obtain ε∗a < ε
∗R
a uses
df(k)
dα
= f ′(k) ∂k
∂α
.
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regardless of the investment feedback, i.e., dctdα > 0. Moreover, greater managerial
discipline always creates value. Here, g (ct) δf(k) is the conditional increase in gross
value, and g (ct) ct is the corresponding increase in expected cost of activism. The
second term in (1.14) represents investment feedback that is not internalized by
investors. More specifically, real investment solves piIf
′ (k)− r = 0, but the optimal
investment for society sets (piI + piA)f
′ (k)− r = 0,
Society only benefits from a disclosure threshold if investors also do so, but
the converse is not true. For ε∗a < ε∗Ra to hold, the investment feedback must
be negative, i.e., ∂k∂α < 0, implying that ε
∗
a < ε
∗I
a . Intuitively, society only cares
about the real economy, and not about secondary markets (trading transfers). The
only social cost of increasing managerial disciplining is the potential reduction in
investment. If this is sufficiently strong, then (1.14) holds and the regulator wants to
set a binding disclosure threshold. Still, this threshold always exceeds the optimal
threshold from the perspective of investors who do care about trading transfers.
That society’s preferred disclosure threshold lies (weakly) between those pre-
ferred by investors and activists also arises in models of insider trading where real
investment is endogenous (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995). The social cost of
increasing activism is a potential reduction of real investment due to lower market
transparency. Thus, a regulator only considers implementing a disclosure threshold
when this also benefits investors. Yet, while investors incur trading losses society
does not, so the socially optimal level of market transparency is lower. Therefore,
when the regulator seeks a binding threshold, it always exceeds the preferred thresh-
old of investors, and sometimes they disagree on the need for a binding policy.
The role of liquidity and the cost of activism
Results in Proposition 4 are influenced by the interaction of two opposing forces: (i)
market liquidity and (ii) the cost of activism. We discuss and interpret their role.
Corollary 6 Let a cost distribution function g be such that no one benefits from
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a binding disclosure threshold, i.e., ε∗a ≥ ε∗Ia . Reduce the cost of activism with a
transfer of probability mass min {g (c) , τ} from each realization c ∈ (0, C] to c = 0.
There exist cutoffs τ I(b) < τR(b) such that
1. Investors gain from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if τ > τ I(b).
2. Society gains from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if τ > τR(b).
Both cutoffs decrease with market liquidity, i.e., τ I′(b) < 0 and τR′(b) < 0.
Corollary 6 considers the effect of a reduction in the cost of activism con-
sisting of an even decrease in the probability of any positive cost. Transformation
τ > 0 scales down density g, reducing both the expected cost and profit elasticity of
activism εa. As a result, the marginal profitability of trading transfers for investors
is less at any given ct, and they benefit from a binding disclosure threshold when the
cost reduction is large enough. In particular, ε∗a = ε∗Ia when τ = τ I(b), and a larger
τ tightens the optimal threshold. Analogous intuition holds for society. At the
limit, as τ grows arbitrarily large, activism becomes almost costless, and investors
do not need to incentivize activist participation with higher trading profits. Then,
the optimal policy for both investors and society approaches full transparency, i.e.,
{αI , αR} → 0.
Both cutoffs τ I(b) and τR(b) decrease with the extent of market liquidity b
because this makes activism more profitable: α∗ and c∗t both rise. All else equal,
this reduces the profit elasticity of activism, and may make a binding disclosure
beneficial for investors. In (1.12), the LHS decreases and the RHS increases. It
follows that the cost reduction that leads investors to gain from a binding policy
falls as market liquidity rises.
These results are intuitive. The activist requires market liquidity to establish
an equity stake and profit from intervention (Maug 1998; Kahn and Winton 1998).
Disclosure thresholds operate against liquidity by increasing market transparency
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and limiting the activist’s position (Bebchuk et al. 2013). Greater liquidity reduces
the marginal profitability of activism for investors, making a disclosure threshold
more desirable. The cost of activism operates in the opposite direction. When the
cost of managerial discipline is likely to be high, investors want to concede further
trading transfers to incentivize activism, and they do not benefit from a disclosure
threshold. In particular, with high costs, i.e., big g, the profit elasticity of activism is
large for relatively opaque markets, and investors do not want to limit the potential
trading profits of activists.
The cost of activism is often related to managerial entrenchment. Staggered
boards make it harder to gain control of a company in a proxy contest, discouraging
activism. Our model is consistent with Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005), who find evidence of a negative correlation between firm value and
management-favouring provisions. In such instances, relaxing disclosure thresholds
can benefit investors by alleviating the negative effect of these provisions at the
expense of market opacity and investor trading losses.
1.4 Managerial Feedback
We next endogenize the probability of managerial malfeasance to characterize the
complete inter-linkage between investment, hedge fund activism and corporate man-
agement, and the consequences for optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies.
We extend our model by assuming that if the manager implements the good
business plan (m = 1) at t = 1, she receives a payoff that is normalized to zero at
t = 3. If, instead, the manager adopts the bad plan (m = 0), her payoff depends
on whether she is disciplined by the activist. When the activist does not inter-
vene, adopting the bad business plan gives the manager a fixed benefit ϕ. If the
activist disciplines the manager, she does not receive the private benefit and incurs
a privately-observed reputation cost ρ > 0. Other market agents share a common
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prior that ρ is distributed on [0, R] according to a strictly positive density h and as-
sociated cumulative function H. We assume that private benefits from malfeasance
are not too high: ϕ ≤ 4R.26
Both private benefits from malfeasance ϕ and the reputation costs of be-
ing disciplined by an activist ρ allow for multiple interpretations.27 For instance,
managerial benefits from acting against shareholders might be related to increasing
executive compensation or empire-building mergers and acquisitions that managers
value but harm firm value. The costs of being disciplined by an activist may reflect
career prospects. For example, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) report that facing a di-
rect threat of removal is associated with $1.3-$2.9 million in foregone income until
retirement for the median incumbent director in their sample; and Keusch (2017)
finds that in the year after activists intervene, internal CEO turnover rises 7.4%.
1.4.1 Market Equilibrium
The manager employs a threshold strategy, implementing the bad business plan if
and only if ρ ≤ ρt. At the cut-off, the expected private benefits from malfeasance
equal the expected loss due to punishment, (1− λG (ct))ϕ = λG (ct)ρt, which we
solve for:
ρt = ϕ
[
1− λG (ct)
λG (ct)
]
. (1.15)
The probability of managerial malfeasance is H(ρt). The equilibrium analysis is
analogous to Section 2.1, where both Propositions 1 and 2 extend by directly setting
z ≡ H(ρt).
The solution for ρt reveals that malfeasance declines with the conditional
probability of activism G(ct): the more likely the activist is to participate after ob-
serving malfeasance, the less likely is the manager to misbehave. We call the man-
26We use this upper bound on the private benefits from malfeasance ϕ to ease establishing that
second-order conditions hold in the derivation of optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies.
27Because the firm’s manager only cares about the net benefit of malfeasance, one could al-
ternatively assume that the benefits of malfeasance are random, and that the reputation cost is
fixed.
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agers’ response to the threat of activism, the managerial feedback effect. This effect
is negative, reflecting that the threat of activism deters managers from destroying
shareholder value. Activism disciplines management through two complementary
channels: (i) ex post, the activist intervenes to change the business plan when it is
bad; (ii) ex ante, it discourages the adoption of the bad plan.
The mechanism is consistent with anecdotes suggesting that executives of
firms that are yet-to-be-targeted by activist funds feel threatened and proactively
work with advisors and lawyers to evaluate firm policies that minimize the vulner-
ability to attacks by activist funds.28 More formally, Gantchev et al. (2017) find
evidence that non-target firms, observing that their peers are being targeted by ac-
tivists, perceive a higher risk of becoming a future target, and change their policies
to mitigate this risk.
1.4.2 Optimal Policies
We study optimal blockholder disclosure threshold policies when the probability of
managerial malfeasance is endogenous. Managerial feedback raises new policy ques-
tions. For example, additional trading profits increase the conditional profitability
of activism (Proposition 4) and reduce activists’ opportunity to profit (managerial
feedback). Do investors still benefit from a disclosure threshold? What are the im-
plications for real investment, and thus for society? How does managerial feedback
affect the reluctance of hedge fund activists to support ownership disclosure rules?
Could activist funds seek lower thresholds than investors?
Proposition 7 answers these questions, characterizing the ordering of optimal
disclosure policies for market participants. We define an elasticity measure that
28See, for instance, “Key Issues for Directors in 2014” by Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
and Katz, The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
December 16, 2013; “Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist Investors”, The New York
Times, November 11, 2013.
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allows us to present results intuitively: the activism elasticity of management,
εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G (ct)
G (ct)
H(ρt)
.
Here, εm < 0 captures a manager’s reaction to the threat of activism. The bigger is
εm (in absolute value), the larger is the reduction in the probability of managerial
malfeasanceH(ρt) in response to a marginal increase in the conditional probability of
activism G(ct). In the absence of a binding disclosure, when the activist participates
he buys α∗ shares and has expected gross profits c∗t . Moreover, the manager adopts
the bad business plan if and only if ρ ≤ ρt(c∗t ) ≡ ρ∗t and the activism elasticity of
management is εm (c
∗
t , ρ
∗
t ) ≡ ε∗m. In the proposition below, we assume that second-
order conditions are well-behaved for investors and activists; the Appendix shows
that this will be so when the costs of intervention for the activist and the reputation
costs of management have uniform distributions.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the net expected profits of investors and activists are
quasiconcave in α for α ≤ α∗. Then there exist cutoffs on the activism elasticity of
management, ε∗Am ≡ − 1ε∗a
(
c∗t
c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
)
, ε∗Im ≡ −
(
∂piA/∂H(ρ
∗
t )
∂piI/∂H(ρ
∗
t )
) [
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
− 1ε∗a
]
and
ε∗Rm ≡
[
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
+ 1ε∗a
(
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
)][
− ∂piI/∂H(ρ∗t )∂piA/∂H(ρ∗t ) −
c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
c∗t
]−1
, where ε∗Am < ε∗Im <
ε∗Rm such that
1. If the activism elasticity of management is sufficiently high, then only the
activist benefits from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗m < ε∗Am ⇒ 0 < αA <
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR}.
2. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately high, then no one ben-
efits from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Am ≤ ε∗m ≤ ε∗Im ⇒ 0 < α∗ ≤
{αI , αA, αR} .
3. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately low, then only investors
benefit from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Im < ε∗m ≤ ε∗Rm ⇒ 0 < αI < α∗ ≤
35
{αA, αR} .
4. If the activism elasticity of management is low enough, then investors and
society gain from a binding disclosure threshold, but activists do not: ε∗Rm <
ε∗m ⇒ 0 < αI < αR < α∗ ≤ αA.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the results. When the activism elasticity of managerial
malfeasance is high, both the regulator and investors want more activism because
they gain from deterring malfeasance—neither wants a binding disclosure threshold:
ε∗m < ε∗Im . In contrast, the activist is harmed by reduced malfeasance and can gain
from a threshold that limits his capacity to intervene if management is sensitive
enough to the profitability of intervention, i.e., if ε∗m < ε∗Am . When, instead, this
elasticity is low enough, the ordering of optimal policies is reversed, and the con-
siderations of Proposition 4 dominate for the three parties. Then, investors gain
more from a tighter threshold than the regulator (ε∗m > ε∗Im ) because they incur
the trading losses that society does not internalize; the regulator wants a tighter
threshold than the activist (ε∗m > ε∗Rm ) because the negative investment feedback
harms society; and while lower investment hurts the activist, it does not modify
his optimal position (Corollary 5). Investors, activist funds and society can only
agree on disclosure thresholds for intermediate activism elasticity levels m, where
everyone believes that disclosure thresholds should not bind.
αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA
ε∗Rm
αI < α
∗ ≤ {αR, αA}
ε∗Im
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR, αA}
ε∗Am
αA < α
∗ ≤ {αI , αR}
|ε∗m|
Figure 1.3: Optimal Disclosure Thresholds with Managerial Feedback
The full proof is in the Appendix. Here, we develop the main intuition.
Setting
{
ε∗Am , ε∗Im , ε∗Rm
}
= 0 and rearranging terms with respect to ε∗a yields the
cutoffs in Proposition 4. Proposition 7 then reveals how those findings are altered
when management’s behavior is sensitive to the possibility of hedge fund activism.
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The activist benefits from a binding disclosure threshold when
H(ρt)λG (c
∗
t ) +MA < 0 (1.16)
where MA ≡ dH (ρ
∗
t )
dct
λG (c∗t ) [c
∗
t − E [c|c ≤ c∗t ]] < 0.
The condition can be rearranged to ε∗m < ε∗Am . Here, MA represents the managerial
feedback effect, which hurts the activist—well-behaving management destroys the
raison deˆtre of activists. Higher trading profits c∗t increase the conditional profitabil-
ity of activism, and the extent of activism upon managerial malfeasance G (c∗t )—
Proposition 4. However, it also deters management from acting against uninformed
investors, reducing the activist’s opportunity to profit. As a result, increasing a
binding disclosure threshold, α¯, and hence increasing trading profits, need not in-
crease the activist’s unconditional expected profits.
dH(ρ∗t )
dct
= h(ρ∗t )
dρ∗t
dct
captures the responsiveness of management to the threat
of activism. A large h implies a high activism elasticity of management εm, and a
large reduction in malfeasance in response to a marginal increase in the conditional
profitability of activism. Then, the activist benefits from a disclosure threshold that
serves to commit the activist to reducing intervention rates, thereby encouraging
managerial malfeasance. In contrast, when h is very small,29 activism does not
meaningfully deter managerial malfeasance, and the activism elasticity of manage-
ment goes to zero. With minimal managerial feedback, MA → 0, so (1.16) never
holds and predictions reduce to those in Proposition 4: the activist is hurt by a
binding disclosure threshold.
The cut-off ε∗Am increases with ε∗a—the higher is the profit elasticity of ac-
tivism, the more the activist values a disclosure threshold. When higher trading
profits greatly increase the extent of activism, they may also strongly deter man-
agerial malfeasance. Then, the responsiveness ε∗a of the activist to its potential trad-
29When the second-order conditions hold, local statements about h hold globally for all ct asso-
ciated with binding disclosure thresholds.
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ing profits harms it—so that the activist gains from a binding disclosure threshold
that restrains its responsiveness. In those circumstances, neither investors nor the
regulator want a binding disclosure threshold. This reflects that the activist’s gains
from a binding disclosure threshold are due to the increased managerial malfeasance
that it causes, malfeasance that destroys surplus directly when the activist does not
intervene and indirectly when the activist incurs costs of intervention. But then,
investors and the regulator value the extensive discouragement effect of potential
activism on managerial malfeasance. In particular, when the marginal value to the
activist of tightening the disclosure threshold is positive, it is negative for investors
and the regulator; and vice versa.
Proposition 7 shows that there exists a range of values ε∗m ∈
[
ε∗Am , ε∗Im
]
such
that no market participant gains from a binding disclosure threshold. If ε∗m ≥
ε∗Am , managerial feedback is small enough from the activist’s perspective not to
outweigh the benefits of higher conditional profits from participating. Moreover,
if ε∗m ≤ ε∗Im then the benefits to uninformed investors from deterring managerial
malfeasance exceed the associated trading losses of activism, which they incur only
if management misbehaves. Thus, investors, too, do not want to limit an activist’s
trading profits, even though those profits come at their expense. In particular,
investors gain from a binding disclosure threshold if
H(ρ∗t )λ
f(k)
[
g (c∗t ) (δf (k)− c∗t )−G (c∗t )
]
+MI < 0 (1.17)
where MI ≡ dH(ρ
∗
t )
dct
∂piI
∂H(ρ∗t )
> 0,
which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε∗Im .
Comparing equations (1.12) and (1.17) reveals the effect of managerial feed-
back for investors, MI . Equation (1.12) in Section 3 shows that, absent manage-
rial feedback, investors’ preference over disclosure thresholds only reflects the di-
rect marginal costs and benefits of activism encapsulated in the first term. When
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management responds to the threat of activism, the positive effects of activism to
investors become twofold: it increases managerial discipline, ex post, and it deters
managerial malfeasance, ex ante. Thus, managerial feedback reduces the desirability
of disclosure thresholds to investors. When h(ρ) is tiny for ρ associated with ct ≤ c∗t ,
feedback vanishes, so MI → 0, and (1.17) reduces to (1.12). When h is higher, man-
agement’s actions become more sensitive to the extent of activism. As a result,
investors may find a binding disclosure threshold undesirable even if the conditional
marginal profitability of activism is negative, i.e., even if g (c∗t ) (δf (k)− c∗t ) < G (c∗t ).
It follows that if investors find a binding disclosure threshold desirable with manage-
rial feedback, then they also do so in the absence of managerial feedback: ε∗a < ε∗Ia
is necessary for ε∗Im < 0, and hence for (1.17) to hold.
Society does not internalize management’s private gains from malfeasance,
but is affected by the destruction of project value. A regulator wants a binding
disclosure threshold when
[
H(ρ∗t )λg (c
∗
t ) (δf(k)− c∗t ) +MR
]dc∗t
dα
+ piAf
′(k)
∂k
∂α
< 0 (1.18)
where MR = MIf(k) +MA > 0,
which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε∗Rm . MR captures the social impact of managerial
feedback. Society does not care about transfers of profits between investors and
the activist caused by managerial feedback, but only about the aggregate effect,
MR = MIf(k) + MA. Further expanding MR reveals that the social benefits of
managerial feedback consist of the sum of two elements, weighted by the response of
management dH(ρt)dct to the threat of activism.
30 The regulator wants greater poten-
tial activism and hence weaker ownership disclosure rules when managers respond
by more to the threat of discipline. The first element in the expansion is the value
enhanced by deterring malfeasance: δf(k) [1− λG(ct)]. Here, δf(k) is the difference
30In particular, MR = − dH(ρt)dct
[
δf(k)[1− λG(ct)] + λG(ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]
]
.
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in firm value under good and bad business plans; and 1− λG(ct) is the probability
that the activist does stop a bad plan when it is implemented. The second ele-
ment is the expected cost incurred by the activist when it disciplines management,
λG(ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]. Deterring malfeasance means that those costs are not incurred.
The sole social cost of activism is a potential reduction in investment. Thus,
the regulator must gain from a nonbinding disclosure threshold if it benefits in-
vestors: we can only have ε∗Rm < ε∗m if investment is reduced by the transfer of
trading profits from investors to the activist, i.e., if df(k)dα = f
′(k) ∂k∂α < 0.
31 The
profit elasticity of activism ε∗a reduces the harmful effects of negative investment
feedback, raising the optimal disclosure threshold.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Hedge fund activism has generated a regulatory debate about the desirability of
revising blockholder disclosure thresholds. These rules were set to protect small
investors from abusive tactics of blockholders. We identify the tradeoffs. Disclosure
thresholds may discourage activist funds from intervening to protect small investors
from corporate managers that can take actions that benefit themselves at the ex-
pense of firm value; but activist funds are also informed traders who profit from
trading on their information advantage about their value-enhancing actions at the
expense of uninformed investors. While managerial discipline creates value and in-
centivizes real investment, the associated trading rents extracted from uninformed
investors reduce their profitability and impair investment, destroying value.
We show that the preferences for binding disclosure thresholds of investors,
activist funds and society are never aligned. Whenever activists gain from a binding
31To satisfy ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m, the cutoff ε
∗R
m must be negative. The denominator is positive because
− ∂piI/∂H(ϕ∗t )
∂piA/∂H(ϕ
∗
t )
> 1 whereas
c∗t−E[c|c≤c∗t ]
c∗t
< 1. Thus, ε∗Rm < 0 if and only if
δf(k)−c∗t
c∗t
+ 1
ε∗a
(
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dc∗t /dα
c∗t
)
<
0.
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threshold—which commits them to intervening less frequently, encouraging man-
agerial misbehavior—investors and society are harmed. Managerial discipline in-
creases investment value without the need for investors to incur further trading
losses, and the increased investment benefit society. When, instead, investors gain
from a binding threshold, they benefit more than regulators, and activists are nec-
essarily harmed even when the excessive trading losses cause investors to reduce
their investments. We only find scope for agreement when all market participants
gain from non-binding disclosure thresholds. This requires that the willingness of
activists to intervene be sufficiently sensitive to the degree of market opacity, but,
in turn, that firm management not be too sensitive to the threat of activism in its
choices of whether to take actions that benefit itself at the expense of shareholders.
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1.6 Appendix A: Proofs
1.6.1 Proof Proposition 1
Market maker. Let α̂ be the market maker’s conjecture about the activist trade.
Denote ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) the corresponding conjecture about his cost participation thresh-
old.
The market maker observes net order flow ω. This is either due to (i)
the activist did not take a position and l = −ω; (ii) the activist participates
and l = −ω + α̂. The activist does not participate when the business plan is
good, and when the business plan is bad and either he does not observe it and/or
the cost to discipline management is too high. The unconditional probability is
[1 − zλG(ĉt)]x(−ω). The activist participates if he observes the bad business plan
and the cost to discipline management is sufficiently small, which has unconditional
probability zλG (ĉt)x(−ω + α̂). Thus, the expected value of the project is
E[V ] =
[
x(−ω)(1− z) + x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt)
x(−ω)(1− z) + x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) + x(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
f(k) (1.19)
+
[
x(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
x(−ω)(1− z) + x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) + x(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
(1− δ)f(k)
Suppose the market maker observes ω < −b + α̂. Then x(−ω + α̂) = 0,
implying that the activist does not participate and P (ω) = Pl. Similarly, suppose
that ω > 0. Then x(−ω) = 0, and the activist participates with certainty so P (ω) =
Ph. Finally, suppose that some ω ∈ [−b+ α̂, 0] is observed. Then, the market maker
does not know whether the activist participates, and x(−ω + α̂) = x(−ω) = 1/b,
cancelling out of the numerator and denominator. The denominator becomes one
and the conditional expected value of the project simplifies to P (ω) = Pm.
Activist. The activist position α∗ = b/2 is derived in the main text, and the
market maker’s conjecture is correct in equilibrium, i.e., α̂ = α∗. Uniqueness of
ct follows from the fact that the left-hand side of (7) increases with ct, whereas
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the right-hand side decreases with ct. To study ct as a function of α and k, define
F
∆
= ct − z[1 − λG (ct)]
(
b−α
b
)
αδf(k). From the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂ct∂q =
− ∂F/∂q∂F/∂ct . Thus, we have
∂ct
∂α
=
zδ [1− λG (ct)] (b− 2α) f(k)
b+ λg (ct) zδ(b− α)αf(k) ; (1.20)
∂ct
∂k
=
zδ [1− λG (ct)] (b− α)αf ′(k)
b+ λg (ct) zδ(b− α)αf(k) .
So ∂ct∂α > 0↔ α < α∗ = b2 and ∂ct∂k > 0.
1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Gross expected profits. For a full characterization of the gross profit functions
at t = 0 consider an arbitrary position α. The unconditional project value E[V ]
in Proposition 2 weighs cash flows f(k) with the probabilities that (i) the manager
implements the good business plan, 1 − z; (ii) the manager implements the bad
plan but is disciplined by the activist, zλG(ct); (iii) the manager implements the
bad plan and is not disciplined by the activist but the project succeeds anyway,
z[1− λG(ct)](1− δ).
The activist’s gross profits are obtained by weighting his conditional profits
E[ΠA|a1] with the probability of participation zλG(ct);
E[ΠA] = piAf(k) (1.21)
with piA = zλG(ct)z[1− λG(ct)]
(
b− α
b
)
αδ.
By construction, expected investors’ profits are the residual E[ΠI ] = [piV − piA] f (k),
E[ΠI ] = piIf(k) (1.22)
with piI = (1− z) + zλG(ct)
[
1− z[1− λG(ct)]
(
b− α
b
)
αδ
]
+z[1− λG(ct)](1− δ).
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Proposition 2 provides expressions for expected profits in equilibrium, incor-
porating α = α∗ = b/2. We rearrange piA as a function of ct to show that α affects ex-
pected profits only through trading transfers ct and capital, i.e., E[ΠA](ct(α), k(α))
and E[ΠI ](ct(α), k(α)).
Real Investment. The first-order condition for investors’ net profits piIf(k)− rk
characterizes real investment. Note that while piI is function of both activism and
investment, small investors are price takers and do not internalize the effects of their
own investment.
1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Investors. We derive the optimal disclosure threshold for investors. Their net
expected profits are piIf (k)− rk. We differentiate with respect to α to characterize
how their marginal profits vary with the activist’s position:
d
dα
{piIf(k)− rk} =
[
∂piI
∂ct
dct
dα
+
∂piI
∂k
∂k
∂α
]
f (k) +
[
piIf
′ (k)− r] ∂k
∂α
(1.23)
We show that (1.23) is strictly positive at α = 0, implying that investors always
benefit from some degree of market opacity, i.e., αI > 0. We then prove that (1.23)
decreases in α for α < α∗. Therefore, if (1.23) is negative at α = α∗, then the
optimal disclosure threshold αI solves (1.23) = 0 and αI < α
∗. If, instead, (1.23) is
positive at α = α∗, then the optimal threshold is non-binding, i.e., αI ≥ α∗.
Analysis of (1.23) simplifies because of two properties. First, Proposition
2 shows that in equilibrium piIf
′ (k) − r = 0, so the last term of (1.23) vanishes.
Second, any interior maximum of piIf (k)− rk satisfies ∂k∂α = 0 because the activist
position that maximizes investor profits, also maximizes investment.32 Using these
two features and the expansion dctdα =
∂ct
∂α +
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α , it follows from (1.23) that any
32From the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂k
∂α
= −
∂piI
∂ct
∂ct
∂α
f ′(k)
piIf
′′(k) , where the denominator is negative.
The proof of Proposition 4 continues by showing that the numerator in this expression characterizes
the sign of (1.23). Therefore, ∂k
∂α
> 0 if and only if d
dα
{piIf(k)− rk} > 0.
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interior solution αI < α
∗ solves ∂piI∂ct
∂ct
∂α f (k) = 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that ∂ct∂α > 0 ↔ α < α∗ = b/2 with
∂ct
∂α = 0 for α < α
∗. Therefore, if there is an interior solution αI < α∗, it must be
characterized by ∂piI∂ct = 0, where
∂piI
∂ct
=
zλ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] . (1.24)
Because g(c) is decreasing in c, (1.24) decreases with ct.
At α = 0 activist trading profits are zero, i.e., ct = 0. It follows that if α = 0
then (1.24) > 0, and thus (1.23) > 0. Therefore, investors always benefit from some
degree of market opacity, i.e., from αI > 0. We prove below that trading transfers
increase with the activist’s position α < α∗ despite investment feedback, i.e., that
dct
dα > 0 for α < α
∗—see the activist section of the proof. Hence, (1.24) decreases
with α for α < α∗, and the same is true for (1.23). A binding optimal threshold
exists if and only if (1.23) < 0 for α = α∗. Moreover, it satisfies (1.23) = 0. The
condition (1.23) < 0 can be rearranged as ε∗Ia < ε∗a.
Activist. We derive the activist’s optimal disclosure threshold. His net expected
profits are
piAf (k)− zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] = zλG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] , (1.25)
where the right-hand side uses the expression for piA in Proposition 2. Here, zλG (ct)
is the probability that the activist participates, i.e., the probability that (i) the man-
ager adopts the bad business plan, (ii) the activist observes it, and (iii) his cost of
intervention is sufficiently small. Conditional on intervention being optimal, his ex-
pected profits are the difference between trading profits ct and the cost of disciplining
management, which is expected to be E [c|c ≤ ct] =
[∫ ct
0 cg (c) dc
]
/G (ct).
Differentiating with respect to α yields the marginal profitability to the ac-
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tivist of increasing his position:
d
dα
{zλG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]} = zλG (ct) dct
dα
(1.26)
The result follows because
dE [c|c ≤ ct]
dα
=
∂E [c|c ≤ ct]
∂ct
dct
dα
(1.27)
=
g (ct)
G (ct)
[
∂
∂ct
{∫ ct
0 cg (c) dc
}
g (ct)
− E [c|c ≤ ct]
]
dct
dα
=
g (ct)
G (ct)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] dct
dα
where the last line uses ∂∂ct
{∫ ct
0 cg (c) dc
}
= g (ct) ct.
The sign of (1.26) is determined by dctdα =
∂ct
∂α +
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α . The Proof of Proposi-
tion 1 shows ∂ct∂α > 0↔ α < α∗ = b2 and also that ∂ct∂k > 0. Hence, for the activist to
gain from a binding disclosure threshold it must be that ∂k∂α < −∂ct/∂α∂ct/∂k for α < α∗,
i.e., that the negative investment response to activism by investors is strong enough
to outweigh the positive marginal net trading transfers. We prove that this cannot
be so by contradiction.
If ∂k∂α < 0, a marginal increase in the activist’s position must hurt investors,
implying that ∂piI∂ct < 0. Suppose that the investment feedback satisfies
∂k
∂α < −∂ct/∂α∂ct/∂k
and thus that dctdα < 0. By assumption increasing α reduces ct, so it must increase
investor profits because ∂piI∂ct < 0. But this higher profitability leads investors to
increase capital when the activist increases his position ∂k∂α > 0, a contradiction. It
follows that dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗.
This argument establishes that αA ≥ α∗ in the absence of managerial feed-
back and yields Corollary 5. This result was also used in the derivation of the
optimal disclosure threshold for investors, above.
Regulator. We derive the optimal disclosure threshold for society. The regulator
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maximizes the project value net of both cost of capital and expected cost of activism,
maximizing
piV f(k)− rk − zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] , (1.28)
where piV is described in Proposition 2. Differentiating (1.28) with respect to α
yields the marginal benefit to the regulator of increasing the activist’s position:
d
dα
{piV f(k)− rk − zλG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]} (1.29)
=
∂piV
∂ct
dct
dα
f(k) + piV f
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
− r ∂k
∂α
− zλ
[
g (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] +G (ct) dE [c|c ≤ ct]
dct
]
dct
dα
=
∂piV
∂ct
dct
dα
f(k) +
[
piV f
′ (k)− r] ∂k
∂α
− zλg (ct) ctdct
dα
(1.30)
=
[
∂piV
∂ct
f(k)− zλg (ct) ct
]
dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
. (1.31)
where the second equality (1.30) uses (1.27); the third equality (1.31) rearranges
(1.30) using both equilibrium relationships piIf
′ (k)− r = 0 (optimal investment by
the investors) and piV = piI + piA from Proposition 2. Next, in (1.31) substitute for
∂piV
∂ct
= zδλg (ct) obtained by differentiating the expression for piV in Proposition 2,
and use piA = zλG (ct)
ct
f(k) to obtain
(1.29) = zλg (ct) [δf(k)− ct] dct
dα
+ zλG (ct)
ct
f (k)
f ′ (k)
∂k
∂α
(1.32)
=
sign
g (ct) [δf(k)− ct] dct
dα
+G (ct) ct
f ′ (k)
f (k)
∂k
∂α
.
The first line of (1.32) corresponds to the condition in (14). The second line of (1.32)
can be rearranged to obtain the expression for ε∗Ra in Proposition 4 by noting that
df(k)
dα = f
′ (k) ∂k∂α .
It has been shown that dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗; from (7) it follows that δf(k)−ct >
0. Thus, ∂k∂α < 0 is a necessary condition for a binding disclosure threshold to be
optimal for the regulator, and ε∗Ra < ε∗Ia .
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1.6.4 Proof of Corollary 6
We prove Corollary 6 in three steps.
1. A transfer τ > 0 always reduces g(ct) and increases G(ct). A transfer τ > 0
creates both a direct and an indirect effect on g(ct). The direct effect reduces g(ct)
and increases G(ct) for any given ct ∈ (0, C]. The indirect effect reduces ct. In
particular, from both (7) and the Implicit Function Theorem, ct decreases in G.
Thus, the increase in G caused by the direct effect diminishes ct. The two effects
have opposite effects on g(ct), but the direct effect always outweighs the indirect
effect, so the transfer unambiguously reduces g(ct) and increases G(ct). To see this,
suppose that a transfer τ > 0 leads to a bigger g(ct), so the decrease in ct outweighs
the reduction of g. It follows that G(ct) is smaller, and therefore ct is larger, a
contradiction.
2. There exist cutoffs τ I and τR such that ε∗a < ε∗Ia if and only if τ I > τ , and
ε∗a < ε∗Ra if and only if τR > τ . Moreover, τ I < τR. We showed that any transfer
τ > 0 reduces both ct and g(ct), and increases G(ct). From the characterizations
provided in Proposition 4, it follows that ε∗a, ε∗Ia and ε∗Ra decrease with a transfer
τ > 0. Consider now the biggest possible transfer τ = sup {g}, so that all probability
mass accumulates at c = 0. Then, for any ct > 0, we have g(ct) = 0 and G(ct) = 1.
From the characterizations of cutoffs ε∗a, ε∗Ia and ε∗Ra in Proposition 4, it follows that
a transfer τ = sup {g} yields ε∗a = 0, and ε∗Ia > ε∗Ra > 0. By continuity, there exist
cutoffs
{
τ I , τR
} ∈ (0, sup {g}]. Since ε∗Ra < ε∗Ia , these thresholds satisfy τ I < τR.
3. Both cutoffs τ I and τR decrease with market liquidity b. Everything else
equal, higher liquidity b increases ct, and decreases the marginal profits of investors
g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] − G(ct). Thus, a smaller transfer τ I is required for ε∗Ia < ε∗a.
When g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] < G(ct), an increase in trading transfers ct makes investors’
marginal profits more negative, and increases the negative investment feedback
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∂k
∂α < 0. From (1.32) it follows that eventually marginal profits for society become
negative.
1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We derive the critical cutoffs {εIm, εAm, εRm} in an analysis that mirrors that in the
proof of Proposition 4 incorporating z ≡ H
(
ϕ
[
1−λG(ct)
λG(ct)
])
. The proof continues to
compare the cutoffs and derive the implications for the optimal disclosure thresh-
olds of market participants. Finally it shows that second order conditions hold for
uniformly distributed cost of activism and reputation cost.
As a preliminary step, we verify that the partial effects of α and k on the trading
transfers ct preserve the same sign. From the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂ct
∂α
=
H (ρt) [1− λG (ct)] (b− 2α) δf(k)
b+
[
H (ρt)λg(ct)− h (ρt) dρtdct [1− λG(ct)]
]
(b− α)αδf(k)
(1.33)
∂ct
∂k
=
H (ρt) δ [1− λG (ct)] (b− α)αf ′(k)
b+
[
H (ρt)λg(ct)− h (ρt) dρtdct [1− λG(ct)]
]
(b− α)αδf(k)
where dρtdct = −
ϕ
λ
g(ct)
G(ct)
2 . Therefore,
∂ct
∂α > 0↔ α < α∗ = b2 and ∂ct∂k > 0.
Investors. The derivative of investors’ net profits with respect to α is given by
(1.23). If no interior solution exists, then investors do not benefit from a disclosure
threshold, i.e., αI ≥ α∗.
In equilibrium, piIf
′ (k)−r = 0 and ∂k∂α = 0 at an interior maximum, αI < α∗.
Use dctdα =
∂ct
∂α +
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α to simplify (1.23) to
∂piI
∂ct
∂ct
∂α f (k). We have
∂ct
∂α > 0 ↔ α <
α∗ = b/2 and ∂ct∂k > 0. Hence, an interior maximum αI < α
∗ is characterized by
∂piI
∂ct
= 0, where
∂piI
∂ct
=
H (ρt)λ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] + dH (ρt)
dct
∂piI
∂H (ρt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MI
(1.34)
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Here,dH(ρt)dct = h (ρt)
dρt
dct
= g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
and ∂piI∂H(ρt) = −
[
δ (1− λG (ct)) + λG (ct) ctf(k)
]
.
Because MI > 0, managerial feedback raises the marginal profitability of a higher
cutoff to investors.
At α = 0, activist trading profits are zero, so ct = 0, and hence (1.34) > 0
and thus (1.23) > 0: investors always benefit from some degree of market opacity,
i.e., αI > 0. To characterize ε
I
m, rearrange (1.34) = 0 as:
0 =
H (ρt)λ
f (k)
[g (ct) (δf (k)− ct)−G (ct)] + g (ct) ∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
. (1.35)
Substituting εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
into (1.35), we next divide by H(ρt)
and successively rearrange to obtain:
0 =
λ
f (k)
[
εa
(
δf (k)− ct
ct
)
− 1
]
+ εm
g (ct)
G(ct)2
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
; (1.36)
=
λ
f (k)
[
εa
(
δf (k)− ct
ct
)
− 1
]
+ εmεa
1
G(ct)ct
∂piI
∂H (ρt)
;
⇒ −
(
λG (ct)
ct
f(k)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
)[
δf (k)− ct
ct
− 1
εa
]
= εm.
The expression for εIm then follows directly from λG (ct)
ct
f(k) =
∂piA
∂H(ρt)
. When in-
vestors value a binding disclosure threshold, i.e., when αI < α
∗, it satisfies εm = εIm.
Activist. The activist’s expected net profits are given by (1.25). Differentiating
with respect to α yields
d
dα
{H (ρt)λG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]} (1.37)
=
H(ρt)λG (ct) + dH (ρt)dct λG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MA
 dctdα .
where dctdα =
∂ct
∂α +
∂ct
∂k
∂k
∂α was derived in the proof of Proposition 4. Because MA < 0,
managerial feedback reduces the marginal profits from increasing α to the activist.
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Since (1.37) > 0 at α = 0, the activist always benefits from some degree of
market opacity, i.e., αA > 0. If no interior solution exists, then the activist does not
benefit from a disclosure threshold, i.e., αA ≥ α∗. Set (1.37) = 0 to derive εAm, and
recall that dctdα > 0 for α < α
∗. Thus, (1.37) = 0 implies
H(ρt) +
dH(ρt)
dct
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] = 0. (1.38)
Substitute dH(ρt)dct = g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
and the expressions for elasticities εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and
εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
into (1.38) and divide by H(ρt) to obtain:
0 = 1 + g(ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
1
H(ρt)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] (1.39)
= 1 +
g (ct)
G (ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G(ct)
G (ct)
H(ρt)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]
= 1 + εmεa
[
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]
.
The characterization of εAm follows directly.
Regulator. The regulator’s net expected payoff is given by (1.28). Differentiat-
ing with respect to α yields the marginal payoff to the regulator of increasing the
activist’s position:
dpiV
dct
dct
dα
f(k) + piV f
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
− r ∂k
∂α
− dH(ρt)
dct
λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
(1.40)
−H(ρt)λg (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
−H (ρt)λG (ct) g (ct)
G (ct)
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] dct
dα
.
Substitute the equilibrium relationship piIf
′ (k) − r = 0 and piV = piI + piA to
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rearrange the regulator’s marginal payoff from increasing α as:
(1.40) =
dpiV
dct
dct
dα
f(k) + piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
(1.41)
−dH(ρt)
dct
λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] dct
dα
−H (ρt)λg (ct) ctdct
dα
= −dH(ρt)
dct
[
δf(k) [1− λG (ct)] + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
]dct
dα
+H (ρt)λg (ct) [δf(k)− ct]dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
where the second equality follows from dpiVdct = H (ρt) δλg (ct)−
dH(ρt)
dct
δ [1− λG (ct)].
Rearranging yet again yields:
(1.40) =
[
H (ρt)λg (ct) [δf(k)− ct] +MR
]dct
dα
+ piAf
′ (k)
∂k
∂α
, (1.42)
where MR ≡ −dH(ρt)
dct
[
δf(k)[1− λG (ct)] + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
]
.
This equation corresponds to the characterization in (1.18). Since MR > 0, man-
agerial feedback increases the marginal profitability to the regulator of increasing
the activist’s position.
To ease exposition, we define Ψ ≡ − ∂piV∂H(ρt)f(k) + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] so that
MR = −dH(ρt)dct Ψ. Moreover, recall that
dH(ρt)
dct
= g (ct)
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
. Substituting, rewrite
(1.42) as:
0 =
[
−∂H (ρt)
∂G (ct)
g (ct) Ψ +H(ρt)λg (ct) (δf(k)− ct)
]
dct
dα
+ piA
df(k)
dα
(1.43)
= g (ct) (δf(k)− ct)− g (ct)
G (ct)
∂H (ρt)
∂G (ct)
G (ct)
H (ρt)
Ψ
λ
+
piA
H (ρt)λ
df(k)/dα
dct/dα
= εa
(
δf(k)− ct
ct
)
G (ct)− εmεa Ψ
λct
+
piA
H (ρt)λ
df(k)/dα
dct/dα
= εa
(
δf(k)− ct
ct
)
− εmεa Ψ
λG (ct) ct
+
df(k)/dα
f(k)
dct/dα
ct
= −εm + λG (ct) ct
Ψ
δf(k)− ct
ct
+
1
εa
 df(k)/dαf(k)
dct/dα
ct
 ,
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where the third line uses εa =
g(ct)
G(ct)
ct and εm =
∂H(ρt)
∂G(ct)
G(ct)
H(ρt)
. To derive εRm note in
the last line of (1.43) that using piV = piI + piA we obtain
λG (ct) ct
Ψ
=
[
−
∂piI
∂H(ρt)
f(k)
λG (ct) ct
−
∂piA
∂H(ρt)
f(k)
λG (ct) ct
+
E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]−1
(1.44)
=
[
− ∂piI/∂H (ρt)
∂piA/∂H (ρt)
− ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
ct
]−1
.
Cutoff relation. The analysis above rearranges the marginal payoffs to market par-
ticipants of increasing α. When second order conditions hold, (i) activist marginal
profits are decreasing at α∗ when ε∗m < ε∗Am ; (ii) investors’ marginal profits are de-
creasing at α∗ if ε∗Im < ε∗m; (iii) the regulator’s marginal payoff is decreasing at α∗
when ε∗Rm < ε∗m.
Next we show that εAm < ε
I
m < ε
R
m. Since marginal profits of all market
agents are positive at α = 0, εm ∈ (εAm, εIm) when α = 0. It follows that if second
order conditions hold, when investors want a binding disclosure threshold, activists
do not and vice versa. Moreover, and no party wants a binding disclosure threshold
if ε∗m ∈ [εA∗m , εI∗m ].
To see that εAm < ε
I
m, note that the relation is equivalent to
1
εa
(
−∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
− ct
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
)
< −
(
∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
)[
δf (k)− ct
ct
]
.
(1.45)
The left-hand side of (1.45) is negative because
−∂piA/∂H (ρt)
∂piI/∂H (ρt)
= −
λG (ct)
ct
f(k)
−
[
[1− λG (ct)]δ + λG (ct) ctf(k)
] ∈ (0, 1)
whereas ctct−E[c|c≤ct] > 1. The right-hand side of (1.45) is positive because ∂piA/∂H (ρt) >
0 whereas ∂piI/∂H (ρt) < 0, so we have ε
A
m < ε
I
m.
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To see that εIm < ε
R
m, note that a necessary condition for ε
R
m < 0 is that
investment decrease with α, i.e., df(k)dα = f
′(k) ∂k∂α < 0, which implies that activist
marginal profits decrease and thus εIm < εm. Hence, if ε
R
m = 0, then ε
I
m < εm < 0.
That is, the sole cost to society of increasing trading transfers is a reduction in real
investment, while the benefits exceed those for investors. Thus, for εRm < εm, it is
necessary, but not sufficient, that εIm < εm, which implies ε
R
m < ε
I
m.
The uniform-uniform case
We show that when both c and ρ are uniformly distributed, second-order conditions
hold.
Investors. We rewrite the first-order condition for investors in (35), first substi-
tuting in the uniform distribution of the manager’s cost of reputation, and then the
uniform distribution of the activist’s cost of intervention. Substituting H(ρt) =
ρt
R
and h(ρt) =
1
R , (35) becomes:
0 =
ϕ
R
[
1− λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(ρt)
λ
f(k)
[g(ct)(δf(k)− ct)−G(ct)] (1.46)
+
ϕ
R
[
g(ct)
λG(ct)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∂H(ρt)/∂ct
[
δ(1− λG(ct)) + λG(ct) ct
f(k)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−∂piI/∂H(ρt)
.
Multiplying (1.46) byRϕ
[
λG(ct)
1−λG(ct)
]
f(k)
λ yields an equivalent condition
0 = g(ct)(δf(k)− ct)−G(ct) +
[
g(ct)
λG(ct)
] [
δf(k) +
λG(ct)
1− λG(ct)ct
]
, (1.47)
which we multiply yet again by 1g(ct) and rearrange to obtain
0 = δf(k)
[
1 + λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
+ ct
[
λG(ct)
1− λG(ct)
]
− G(ct)
g(ct)
. (1.48)
Substituting G(ct) =
ct
C and g(ct) =
1
C , the first-order condition (1.48) for investors
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becomes
0 = δf(k)
[
C + λct
λct
]
+ ct
[
λct
C − λct
]
− ct (1.49)
We prove that there is a unique solution to the first-order condition for
investors by showing that the right-hand side (RHS) of (1.49) decreases in ct. Dif-
ferentiating yields
d
dct
RHS(1.49) =
(
C
C − λct
)2
− δf(k)C
λc2t
− 2, (1.50)
which is negative for ct → 0 and increasing in ct. We derive an upper bound for
ct and show that
d
dct
RHS(1.49) < 0 for such trading transfers, establishing that
the solution to the first-order condition is unique. Trading profits ct are maximized
by the optimal conditional trade α∗ = b/2 with the highest liquidity shock b = 1.
Substituting into the expression for ct yields an implicit upper bound on ct:
ct ≤ H(ρt)[1− λG(ct)]δf(k)
4
=
ϕ
R
[
C − λct
λct
] [
C − λct
C
]
δf(k)
4
, (1.51)
or equivalently, (
C
C − λct
)2
=
ϕ
R
C
λc2t
δf(k)
4
.
Plugging the last expression in (1.50) reveals that ddctRHS(1.49) < 0 for ϕ < 4R.
Activist. Substitute H(ρt) =
ρt
R and h(ρt) =
1
R to rewrite the activist’s first-order
condition (38) as:
0 =
ϕ
R
[
1− λG(ct)
λG(ct)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(ρt)
+
(
−ϕ
R
g(ct)
λG(ct)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂H(ρt)/∂ct
[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] (1.52)
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Multiplying (1.52) by Rϕ
[
λG(ct)
1−λG(ct)
]
yields a simpler, equivalent condition
0 = 1−
[
g(ct)
G(ct)
](
ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]
1− λG(ct)
)
. (1.53)
Substitute G(ct) =
ct
C and g(ct) =
1
C and note that ct − E [c|c ≤ ct] = ct2 . It
follows that the activist’s first-order condition satisfies
0 = 1− 1
2
(
C
C − λct
)
. (1.54)
The right-hand side decreases in ct, implying a unique solution.
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1.7 Appendix B: Robustness
1.7.1 Allowing for pure informed trading
We relax the assumption that the activist can only take a position when the man-
ager implements the bad business plan and show that it does not alter our results
qualitatively. We reproduce the analysis of the market in Section 2.1 assuming that
at t = 2, if the activist observes the company, which occurs with probability λ, he
can take a position, regardless of the business plan implemented by the manager at
t = 1.
Proposition 8 At t = 2, if the activist either (a) observes managerial malfeasance
(m = 0) and the cost of activism is sufficiently small, c ≤ c∗t where
c∗t = z [1− λG (c∗t )]
b
4
δf(k); (1.55)
or (b) observes that the manager behaves (m = 1); he takes a position
α∗ =
b
2
(1.56)
and engages in managerial disciplining in situation (a).
The market maker, upon observing the net order flow, sets prices
P (ω) = Pl ≡
[
(1−z)(1−λ)+z[1−λG(c∗t )](1−δ)
(1−λ)+λz(1−G(c∗t ))
]
f(k) if ω < −b+ α∗
P (ω) = Pm ≡ [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ] f(k) if ω ∈ [−b+ α∗, 0]
P (ω) = Ph ≡ f(k) if ω > 0
. (1.57)
We provide the full proof at the end of this section; here we discuss the
differences with the model in the main text. Case (a) is equivalent to the setting
studied in Section 2.1 and results are equal. The activist intervenes to discipline
management if the conditional trading profits of doing so (weakly) outweigh the cost
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of intervention, i.e., if c ≤ c∗t . Trading profits equal those of the benchmark setting,
and the corresponding cost cutoff (1.55) is the same. The position that maximizes
trading profits is not altered by the new assumption α∗ = b/2.
Case (b) captures the difference with respect to the original model, and
highlights that the activist can acquire stock when the manager behaves (m = 1).
It reveals an intuitive result:
Lemma 9 Pure informed trading occurs if and only if the activist observes that
the manager implemented the good business plan. Therefore, it has unconditional
probability (1− z)λ.
When the activist observes the good plan, he can profit from his information ad-
vantage (trading profits) without the need of incurring any cost. Thus, he always
takes a position. Moreover, the activist would never act as a mere informed trader
after observing the bad plan. This would imply acquiring overvalued stock, and has
negative expected profits.
Notably, when the activist acts as a mere informed trader, he takes the same
position α∗ = b/2. Whether he intends to discipline management or not, a position
of b/2 maximizes trading profits. If management misbehaves, the activist only
participates if these trading profits outweigh the cost of intervention. If management
behaves, he always participates (upon observing management’s action).
A positive net order flow ω > 0 reveals the activist, and activist participation
is associated to certain cash flows f(k) —as in the benchmark model. This is
because additional participation only occurs if the business plan is good —case
(b). An intermediate order flow ω ∈ [−b + α∗, 0] does not provide any information
about activist participation, and the conditional value of the project equals the
unconditional value. For a given k, the new assumption does not change the value
of the project, so the expression for Pm is unchanged from Proposition 1. Price Pl
is lower than in the benchmark model. This is because when the absence of the
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activist is revealed, i.e., if ω < −b+ α∗, it is more likely that the bad business plan
was implemented. This is because if the activist had observed a good plan, he would
have taken a position.
Proposition 10 The expected value at t = 0 of the project given investment k is
E [V ] = [1− z(1− λG(c∗t ))δ]f(k) ≡ piV f(k). (1.58)
Expected gross profits of the activist are:
E[ΠA] = [(1− z)λ+ zλG(c∗t )]
c∗t
f(k)
f(k) ≡ piAf(k). (1.59)
Expected gross profits of uninformed investors are:
E[ΠI ] = (piV − piA)f(k) ≡ piIf(k). (1.60)
Investment by uninformed investors k solves
piIf
′ (k)− r = 0. (1.61)
The proof follows directly from that of Proposition 2 in the main text and
the following discussion. Given initial investment, the project has the same value
E[V ] than in the benchmark setting - Proposition 2. The new assumption alters the
distribution of revenues between investors and the activist. Equation (1.59) reveals
that the activist obtains the same trading profits c∗t but with higher probability. In
particular, trading transfers are realized if either (a) the activist disciplines man-
agement, which occurs with probability zλG(c∗t ); (b) the activist acts as a mere
informed trader, which has probability (1 − z)λ. It follows that piI is smaller than
in Proposition 2 and therefore investment levels captured by (1.61) are lower too.
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Proof of Proposition 9
Market maker. The market maker’s conjecture about activist position is α̂, and
ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) the corresponding conjecture about the trading transfers.
The net order flow ω either (i) equals liquidity trade because the activist
did not take a position, i.e., l = −ω; or (ii) is the difference between liquidity sales
and the activist position, i.e., l = −ω + α̂. The activist does not participate when
either he does not observe the company, or he observes that the bad business plan
is implemented but it is too costly to intervene. The unconditional probability
is [(1− λ) + zλ(1−G (ĉt))]x(−ω). The activist participates when he observes the
company and either the manager implemented the good business plan, or she imple-
mented the bad business plan but the cost of intervention is sufficiently small. The
unconditional probability of taking a position is [(1− z)λ+ zλG (ĉt)]x(−ω+ α̂). It
follows that the expected value of the project is
E[V ] =

x(−ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(−ω + α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) x(−ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(−ω + α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt)
+x(−ω)z(1− λ) + x(−ω)zλ(1−G (ĉt))


f(k) (1.62)
+

x(−ω)z(1− λ) + x(−ω)zλ(1−G (ĉt)) x(−ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(−ω + α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt)
+x(−ω)z(1− λ) + x(−ω)zλ(1−G (ĉt))


(1− δ)f(k)
Consider the case where the market maker observes ω < −b + α̂. Then
x(−ω + α̂) = 0 and x(−ω) = 1/b, implying that the activist does not participate
and P (ω) = Pl if α̂ = α
∗. Similarly, suppose that ω > 0. Then x(−ω) = 0 and
x(−ω+ α̂) = 1/b, and the activist participates with certainty so P (ω) = Ph. Finally,
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consider the case where ω ∈ [−b+ α̂, 0]. Then x(−ω) = x(−ω + α̂) = 1/b and the
market maker does not know whether the activist participates. The conditional
expected value of the project is P (ω) = Pm.
Activist position. When the activist takes a position α, with probability
∫ 0
−b+α
1
bdl =
b−α
b the net order flow satisfies ω ∈ [−b+ α, 0] and he obtains gross profit f(k) −
Pm > 0 for each share he ordered. With the remaining probability
α
b , the net or-
der flow is ω > 0 and he pays Ph = f(k), thereby making zero profits. His gross
expected profit conditional on participating reads
E [ΠA|a11] = E [ΠA|a10] =
(
b− α
b
)
α [f(k)− Pm] (1.63)
and it is maximized for a position α∗ = b/2.
Consider now an arbitrary α ≤ α∗. Upon observing m = 0, the activist
participates if and only if c ≤ E [ΠA|a1], implying that the intervention cut-off
satisfies ct = E [ΠA|a1]. Plugging Pm into E [ΠA|a1] yields
ct = z [1− λG (ct)]
(
b− α
b
)
αδf(k). (1.64)
If, instead, the activist observes m = 1, he acts as an informed trader and does not
incur any cost. Therefore, he takes a position α = α∗ regardless of the realization
of c.
1.7.2 Allowing for cut-and-run
We relax the assumption that the activist must incur the cost to discipline manage-
ment whenever he takes a position in the company and show that it does not affect
our results qualitatively. After acquiring stock, the activist discloses his position
and this leads to a price increase that makes his intervention profitable. We intro-
duce a new liquidity shock that allows the activist to abandon his position by selling
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stock without incurring the cost of intervention, i.e., to cut-and-run. We assume
that cut-and-run has a fixed cost of reputation and this is privately known to the
activist.
We enrich the original setting so that t = 2 has four subperiods, from t = 2.1
to t = 2.4. At t = 2.1, the activist observes the business plan that the manager
implemented with probability λ. Upon observing the business plan, the activist can
take a position α ∈ [0, 1], regardless of whether the plan is good or bad (i.e., we
allow for pure informed trading) in a dealership market where there is also liquidity
trade of l1 ∼ U [−b, b]. At t = 2.2, the activist can disclose his position if it was not
previously disclosed by his stock purchase. At t = 2.3, if the activist has a position
in the company, he can exit by selling shares µ ≤ [0, α] in a dealership market that
also has liquidity trade of l3 ∼ U [−b, b]. At t = 2.4, the activist decides whether to
discipline management and incur the cost c, which is privately observed. Unwinding
a position without trying to discipline management after disclosure, i.e., cutting and
running, has a privately known reputation cost ς. Other agents have the prior that
ς is distributed on [0,Σ] according to a strictly positive density s and associated
cumulative function S. We assume that s is weakly decreasing and satisfies the
monotone hazard ratio property. Figure 1.4 details the sequence of events.
We allow liquidity shocks to be positive or negative to provide the activist
an opportunity to camouflage stock sales after revealing his position, preserving
the key role of liquidity for informed trading. For simplicity we assume that the
distributions of liquidity trade at t = 2.1 and t = 2.3 to be the same. In reality,
the activist likely has a better opportunity to conceal his trade when he takes a
position (t = 2.1) than when he abandons his position after disclosure (t = 2.3).
This is because other market participants may pay closer attention when they know
that the activist has a position, making cutting-and-running less profitable. Our
setting can be viewed as providing an upper bound on the profits of a cut-and-run
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Shareholders
invest k
t = 0
Manager implements
business plan
m ∈ {0, 1}
t = 1
Activist can acquire α ∈ [0, 1]
shares if observes m;
Liquidity traders
sell/buy l1 ∼ U [−b, b];
Market maker observes ω = l+α
and sets price P = E2.1[V |ω]
t = 2.1
Activist discloses
position, if any
t = 2.2
Activist can sell µ ∈ [0, α] shares;
Liquidity traders
sell/buy l3 ∼ U [−b, b];
Market maker observes ω = l−µ
and sets price P = E2.3[V |ω]
t = 2.3
Activist can incur cost
c to implement m = 1
when m = 0
t = 2.4
Cash flows
realize
t = 3
Figure 1.4: Time line with cut-and-run
strategy.33 Despite this, we show that a cut-and-run strategy is never profitable in
our benchmark setting.
The assumption that cutting-and-running damages reputations is consistent
both with anecdotes and with more systematic evidence by Johnson and Swem
(2017). Intuitively, cutting-and-running harms an activist’s credibility in subsequent
interventions. If the market believes that a fund is unable to discipline management,
it will be harder for it to convince shareholders in a proxy fight, increasing the cost
of actual discipline. Formally, the reputation cost provides an additional degree of
market uncertainty that allows us to overcome a discontinuity in the profitability of
cut-and-run when blockholder disclosure thresholds bind.
We consider pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and obtain the follow-
ing result:
33If at t = 2.3, liquidity trade was l3 ∼ U [−yb, yb] with y < 1 then the information rents from
selling stock would be reduced, making cutting-and-running less profitable.
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Proposition 11 In equilibrium, if the disclosure threshold does not bind, the ac-
tivist does not cut-and-run.
A formal proof is provided at the end of this section; here we develop the
intuition. The activist is time consistent, so our analysis compares the expected
profits of each strategy at t = 2.1. We denote E[ΠIA] the gross expected profits of
intervention at t = 2.1 and E[ΠRA] the gross expected profits of cut-and-run at the
same period. To establish Proposition 12, we show that E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA]. Thus,
the activist takes a position and disciplines management if and only if c ≤ E[ΠIA],
and he never cuts-and-runs.
To ease exposition and analysis, we set δ = 1 so that the bad business plan
destroys all value, and normalize firm size to one, i.e. f(k) = 1. Neither assumption
affects the result. Moreover, the reputation cost is irrelevant for Proposition 12
because 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] implies that it also holds when cutting-and-running has no
reputation costs. For simplicity, we temporarily set Σ = 0. Next, we argue that
when prices are consistent with E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA], the activist has no incentives
to deviate, so it is an equilibrium. This equilibrium rules out the other equilibrium
candidate, E[ΠIA] ≥ E[ΠRA] > 0, and therefore it is unique.34
Consider E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] to be an equilibrium candidate. At t = 2.1, if
the activist takes a position, then α∗ = b (recall now that l1 ∼ U [−b, b], not U [0, b]).
The position is optimal given the tension between positive share value and the cost
of information revelation, and therefore it is independent of the subsequent strategy,
i.e., (i) act as a mere informed trader, (ii) discipline management, (iii) deviate to
cut-and-run. The activist trade is such that with probability 0.5 he conceals and
pays Pm1 = 1− z[1− λG(ct)] for each share. With equal probability the activist is
observed and he pays Ph1 = 1 because the market maker believes that either he is
acting as a mere informed trader or he will discipline management.
34Deviating to cutting-and-running when prices are consistent with E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] is more
profitable than cutting and running when prices are consistent with E[ΠIA] ≥ E[ΠRA] > 0. Thus,
the two equilibrium candidates are mutually exclusive.
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At t = 2.2 the activist always reveals his position if it was not involuntarily
disclosed at t = 2.1. If the activist intends to intervene, then disclosure is inherent
in his strategy.35 If, instead, the activist were to deviate and cut-and-run, he must
disclose his position to generate the price increase that can make selling the stock
prior to intervention potentially profitable.
At t = 2.3 the activist may deviate from the equilibrium path and cut-and-
run, i.e., to sell stock and not discipline management at t = 2.4. The rents from
cut-and-run are maximized by selling all stock, i.e., µ∗ = α∗, reflecting that l1
and l3 have the same distributions. With probability 0.5 the activist conceals and
obtains Ph3 = 1 per share. This follows because the market maker believes that the
activist kept his position, indicating that either the business plan is good or that he
will intervene to discipline management. With equal probability, the market maker
observes the activist’s sale and then sets a price Pl3 = 0: the market maker now
knows with certainty that the business plan is bad and the activist will not discipline
management, making the firm worthless.
It follows that the net expected profit per share from deviating to cutting-
and-running is 12 [Ph3 + Pl3 − Ph1 − Pl1] < 0, and therefore it is not a profitable
deviation. That E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] reflects the asymmetry in the activist’s cost
of revealing information when taking a position and when abandoning the position.
While the absence of the activist does not imply that the project delivers zero cash
flows, cutting-and-running does. More specifically, the revenues from secretly selling
stock equal the cost of being revealed when acquiring it, i.e., Ph3 = Ph1. However,
the price paid when acquiring stock secretly outweighs the revenues when cut-and-
run is revealed, i.e., Pm1 > Pl3 (Pl3 = 0 is only used in this weak way).
The activist’s profitability of both intervening E[ΠIA] and cutting-and-running
E[ΠRA] is crucially determined by the opportunity to camouflage trade during liq-
35If disclosure was not necessary for intervention, it would still be weakly dominant. In partic-
ular, conditional on intervention, the activist is indifferent about disclosing his position. See, e.g.,
Gantchev (2013), Jiang et al. (2016) or Levit (2017), for work on hedge fund activism that considers
activist pressure “behind doors ”.
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uidity shocks. Binding blockholder disclosure thresholds limit the activist position
(Corollary 3) and thus increase the likelihood of camouflaging trade. We study
the effect of disclosure thresholds when the activist can cut-and-run and obtain the
following result:
Proposition 12 There exists a binding disclosure threshold cutoff αr < α
∗ such
that, in equilibrium,
- if a disclosure threshold is weakly higher, i.e., α ≥ αr, the activist does not
cut-and-run;
- if a disclosure threshold is lower, i.e., α < αr, the activist cuts-and-runs when
the associated reputation cost ς is sufficiently small.
A binding disclosure threshold reduces the activist’s position and thus the
probability that his presence is revealed to the market maker. While the threshold
yields lower trading profits (Corollary 5), it also reduces information revelation
costs and makes cutting-and-running relatively more profitable. In line with the
discussion of Proposition 12, a binding threshold increases the probability of both
acquiring stock at a low price Pm1 and selling it at a high price Ph3. The cutoff αr
satisfies E[ΠRA] = 0, with E[Π
I
A] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] as a unique equilibrium for α > αr
and E[ΠIA] ≥ E[ΠRA] > 0 as a unique equilibrium for α < αr.
The activist’s privately-observed reputation cost ς smoothes out best re-
sponses. The activist cuts-and-runs when the associated net profits are both pos-
itive, i.e., E[ΠRA] > ς, and higher than the net profits of intervening to discipline
management, i.e., E[ΠRA]− ς > E[ΠIA]− c. Without ς, an inherent discontinuity in
activist behavior arises, with resulting consequences for prices, leaving an interval of
binding disclosure thresholds for which there is no market equilibrium. This reflects
that if the market maker does not believe the activist will cut and run, then absent
net order flow below −b, the market maker will set a price of 1; but this can make
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cutting and running profitable. If the market maker, instead believes that cutting-
and-running may occur (then absent ς), the price set when cutting-and-running is
concealed will not make it worthwhile.
Beyond the paradox that tight disclosure thresholds can induce the activist
to ‘miss-behave’ by cutting-and-running, the results in Proposition 13 do not affect
qualitatively the conclusions drawn from the analysis in the main text. The possi-
bility to cut-and-run hurts investors, but benefits the activist for sufficiently tight
disclosure thresholds, i.e., α < αr. If cutting-and-running is profitable, the activist’s
incentives to discipline management are reduced, and investors must concede further
trading transfers to encourage intervention. Thus, the optimal disclosure threshold
policy for investors is higher, and investment is reduced. In contrast the activist can
gain more from tighter disclosure thresholds.
Proof of Proposition 12
Assume that there is no reputation cost for cut-and-run—if the result holds when
Σ = 0, it must hold for any Σ > 0. We consider E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] an equilibrium
candidate, and show that the activist has no incentives to deviate. This rules the
other equilibrium candidate. In particular, if E[ΠIA] ≥ 0 ≥ E[ΠRA] is an equilibrium,
then E[ΠIA] > E[Π
R
A] > 0 cannot be an equilibrium because the corresponding
market prices make the activist strictly worse off. Moreover E[ΠRA] ≥ E[ΠIA] can
never be an equilibrium because expected prices from cutting-and-running at t = 2.3
must be strictly lower than the secure cash flows from discipline, which have been
normalized to one. We solve recursively.
Intervention (t = 2.4). Liquidity shocks at t = 2.1 and t = 2.3 have the same
distribution so we conjecture and later verify that if the activist cuts-and-runs he
sells all stock, i.e., µ ∈ {α∗, 0}. If the activist has α∗ shares and the business plan
is bad (m = 0), he intervenes to discipline management if and only if α∗ − c ≥ 0.
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Exit (t = 2.3). If the activist has a position and the business plan is good, he does
not sell stock —he acts as a standard informed trader. If the business plan is bad,
he cuts-and-runs if and only if c > ct(2.3), where ct(2.3) is derived below. Given the
equilibrium candidate E[ΠIA] > 0 > E[Π
R
A], the market maker conjectures µ̂ = 0
and his pricing rule is
P (ω) = Pl3 ≡ 0 if ω < −b
P (ω) = Ph3 ≡ 1 if ω > −b
. (1.65)
Here, Ph3 captures the equilibrium path given the activists presence, which is either
due to the good business plan, or because the plan is bad and he plans to discipline
management. Pl3 accounts for a potential deviation where the activist cuts-and-runs.
A net order flow ω < −b would reveal activist sales and indicate with certainty that
the project yields zero cash flows—the plan is bad and that the activist will not
intervene.
If the activist deviates to cut-and-run, then with probability
∫ b
−b+µ
1
2bdl =
2b−µ
2b he camouflages his sales µ and obtains Ph3 for each share. Thus, cut-and-
run has expected payoff
(
2b−µ
2b
)
µ, which is maximized for µ = b. Therefore, µ∗ =
min{b, α∗}. We conjecture and verify that α∗ = b. If the conjecture is correct, then
cut-and-run is such that µ∗ = b, the activist conceals stock sales with probability
0.5, and obtaining expected revenues b/2.
It follows that when the business plan is bad, the activist decides whether
intervene in the next period and obtain α − c or deviate cut-and-run, which has
expected payoff b/2. The activist deviates to cut-and-run if and only if c > ct(2.3),
where ct(2.3) = α− b2 = b2 .
Disclosure (t = 2.2). The activist always discloses his position. It is necessary in
the case of intervention. If, instead, he plans to cut-and-run, disclosure yields the
increase in price that can make this strategy profitable.
Entry (t = 2.1). The market maker’s conjecture about activist position is α̂. The
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net order flow ω either (i) equals liquidity trade because the activist does not acquire
shares, i.e., ω = l; or (ii) it is the combination of liquidity trade and the activist
position, i.e. ω = l + α̂. The activist acquires shares when either he observes the
good business plan, or he observes the bad business plan and intervention profitable,
i.e. c ≤ ct where ct is derived below. The expected value of the project is
E2.1[V ] =
x(ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(ω − α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(ω − α̂)zλG(ct) x(ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(ω − α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(ω − α̂)zλG(ct)
+x(ω)z(1− λ) + x(ω)zλ(1−G(ct))

If the market maker observes ω < −b + α̂, then x(ω − α̂) = 0 and x(ω) =
1/2b. If ω > b, then x(ω − α̂) = 1/2b and x(ω) = 0. If ω ∈ [−b + α̂, b], then
x(ω − α̂) = x(ω) = 1/2b. The market maker’s pricing rule satisfies
P (ω) = Pl1 ≡ (1−z)(1−λ)(1−λ)+zλ(1−G(ct)) if ω < −b+ α̂
P (ω) = Pm1 ≡ 1− z(1− λG(ct)) if ω ∈ [−b+ α̂, b]
P (ω) = Ph1 ≡ 1 if ω > b
. (1.66)
With probability
∫ b−α
−b
1
2bdl =
2b−α
2b the activist camouflages his position α.
The gross expected profits from intervention read
(
2b−α
2b
)
α[1 − Pm1] and are max-
imized for α∗ = b. This verifies our two previous conjectures: α∗ = µ∗ = b. It
follows that with probability 0.5 the activist camouflages his stock purchase, and
the expected gross payoff from taking a position and intervene if the business plan
is bad reads E[ΠIA] = z[1− λG(ct)] b2 .
The activist takes a position after observing the bad business plan if and
only if c ≤ ct, where ct = z[1− λG(ct)] b2 . The relation ct < ct(2.3) confirms that the
activist is time consistent. Put differently, if the activist takes a position at t = 2.1
with the intention to discipline, he does not cut-and-run at t = 2.3.
Last, the discussion of Proposition 12 shows that cut-and-run is unprofitable
at t = 2.1.
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Proof of Proposition 13
We introduce binding disclosure thresholds α < α∗ = b and show that there exists
αr such that (i) cut-and-run is never profitable for α ≥ αr; (ii) cut-and-run can be
profitable for α < αr. The analysis for periods t = 2.2 and t = 2.4 mirrors that
in the proof of Proposition 12, so we focus on equilibrium outcomes at t = 2.1 and
t = 2.3, i.e., the trading periods.
i) There exists αr such that cut-and-run is not profitable for α ≥ αr. We
show that E[ΠRA] ≤ 0 ←→ α ≥ αr, so suppose there is no reputation cost, i.e.
Σ = 0. In line with the proof of Proposition 12, we consider E[ΠIA] > 0 ≥ E[ΠRA]
as an equilibrium candidate and show that there are no incentives to deviate. From
that proof, we also know that a disclosure threshold α binds if and only if α < b,
and that the most profitable deviation involves selling all stock at t = 2.3. Thus,
deviating when a disclosure threshold binds implies µ = α = α < b.
Exit (t = 2.3). The market maker sets prices in (1.65). If the activist deviates to
cut-and-run he sells α shares and camouflages with probability
∫ b
−b+α
1
2bdl =
2b−α
2b .
Thus, the expected payoff of deviating to cut-and-run is
(
2b−α
2b
)
α. The payoff of
intervention at t = 2.3 is α− c, so the activist cuts-and-runs if and only if c > ct(2.3)
where ct(2.3) =
α2
2b .
Entry (t = 2.1). The market maker sets prices in (1.66). With probability
∫ b−α
−b
1
2bdl =
2b−α
2b the activist camouflages his position α. The expected gross profits from inter-
vention are E[ΠIA] = α
(
2b−α
2b
)
[1− Pm1] . The characterization of Pm1 in (1.66) and
the relation E[ΠIA] = ct pin down the intervention cost cutoff ct = z [1− λG(ct)]
(
2b−α
2b
)
α.
The expected gross profits from cut-and-run are
E[ΠRA] = α
(
2b− α
2b
)
Ph3 − α
(
2b− α
2b
)
Pm1 − α
(
α
2b
)
Ph1, (1.67)
where prices are given by both (1.65) and (1.66). Using Ph3 = Ph1, algebra confirms
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that E[ΠRA] ≤ 0 if and only if α ≥ αr(i), where
αr(i) =
2b(Ph3 − Pm1)
2Ph3 − Pm1 . (1.68)
Note that ct(2.3) ≥ ct if α ≥ αr(i), which verifies time consistency.
ii) Cut-and-run might be profitable for α < αr. We now show that E[Π
I
A] >
E[ΠRA] > 0 is the unique equilibrium for disclosure thresholds such that α < αr(ii),
where αr(ii) = αr(i) when E[Π
R
A] = 0 and αr(ii) < αr(i) for E[Π
R
A] > 0. The
reputation cost is now relevant for the activist’s strategy, so we consider Σ > 0.
To ease exposition, we define the following probabilities:
PrI ≡ Pr
[
E[ΠIA]− c ≥ E[ΠRA]− ς
∣∣∣E[ΠIA]− c ≥ 0]× Pr [E[ΠIA]− c ≥ 0]
PrR ≡ Pr
[
E[ΠRA]− ς > E[ΠIA]− c
∣∣∣E[ΠRA]− ς > 0]× Pr [E[ΠRA]− ς > 0]
Here, P I is the probability that the activist intervenes to discipline management
after observing the bad business plan (m = 0), i.e., when intervention is both
profitable and more profitable than cut-and-run. Analogously, after observing the
bad business plan, cut-and-run is optimal with probability PR. The probability
that the activist does not take a position after observing the bad business plan is
1− P I − PR.
Exit (t = 2.3). Suppose the activist has a position in the company. Let µ̂ be the
market maker’s conjecture about the activist’s sales if he cuts-and-runs. The net
order flow ω either equals liquidity trade because the activist does not cut-and-run,
i.e., ω = l3; or it is the sum of liquidity trade and activist sales, i.e. ω = l3−µ. The
expected value of the project is
E2.3[V ] =
x(ω)(1− z) + x(ω)z PrI
x(ω)(1− z) + x(ω)z PrI +x(ω + µ̂)z PrR .
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If the market maker observes ω < −b, then x(ω + µ̂) = 1/2b and x(ω) = 0.
If ω > b − µ̂, then x(ω + µ̂) = 0 and x(ω) = 1/2b. If ω ∈ [−b, b − µ̂], then
x(ω + µ̂) = x(ω) = 1/2b. Accordingly, pricing is given by
P (ω) = Pl3 ≡ 0 if ω < −b
P (ω) = Pm3 ≡ (1−z)+z Pr
I
(1−z)+z[PrI + PrR] if ω ∈ [−b, b− µ̂]
P (ω) = Ph3 ≡ 1 if ω > b− µ̂
. (1.69)
From the proof of Proposition 12, the profits from cut-and-run are maximized
by selling all shares—and hence, given the binding disclosure threshold, µ = α =
α. The activist camouflages his sales with probability
∫ b
−b+α
1
2bdl =
2b−α
2b , so the
expected gross payoff from cut-and-run is
(
2b−α
2b
)
αPm3 where Pm3 is given by (1.69).
Entry (t = 2.1). The market maker’s conjecture about the activist’s trade is α̂. The
net order flow ω either equals liquidity trade l1 = ω; or it is the sum of liquidity
trade and the activist’s purchases, ω = l1 + α̂. The activist acquires shares when
either he observes the good business plan, or he observes the bad business plan and
wants to intervene or cut-and-run. Thus,
E2.1[V ] =
x(ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(ω − α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(ω − α̂)zλPrI x(ω)(1− z)(1− λ) + x(ω − α̂)(1− z)λ+ x(ω − α̂)zλPrI
+x(ω − α̂)zλPrR +x(ω)zλ [1− PrI −PrR]+ x(ω)z(1− λ)

.
If the market maker observes ω < −b + α̂, then x(ω − α̂) = 0 and x(ω) =
1/2b. If ω > b, then x(ω − α̂) = 1/2b and x(ω) = 0. If ω ∈ [−b + α̂, b], then
x(ω − α̂) = x(ω) = 1/2b. Thus
P (ω) = Pl1 ≡ (1−z)(1−λ)(1−z)(1−λ)+z(1−λ)+zλ[1−PrI −PrR] if ω < −b+ α̂
P (ω) = Pm1 ≡ (1− z) + zλPrI if ω ∈ [−b+ α̂, b]
P (ω) = Ph1 ≡ (1−z)+z Pr
I
(1−z)+z[PrI + PrR] if ω > b
, (1.70)
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where Pm1 < Ph1.
With probability
∫ b−α
−b
1
2bdl =
2b−α
2b the market maker camouflages his posi-
tion and pays Pm1 for each share. Thus, the gross payoff from cut-and-run is
E[ΠRA] = α
(
2b− α
2b
)
Pm3 − α
(
2b− α
2b
)
Pm1 − α
(
α
2b
)
Ph1. (1.71)
Algebra manipulation when Pm3 = Ph1 reveals that E[Π
R
A] > 0 if and only if α <
αr(ii), where
αr(ii) =
2b(Pm3 − Pm1)
2Pm3 − Pm1 ,
where the prices are given in (1.69) and (1.70).
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Chapter 2
Takeover resistance: a global
games analysis
2.1 Introduction
In 2009 Kraft Foods, a US company, launched a hostile bid for Cadbury, the UK-
listed chocolatier. Cadbury’s managerial board declared the offer “unattractive”
even though it offered a premium on market prices. The British government and
some unions publicly stood against the takeover, with the business secretary warning
Kraft that it could meet “huge opposition” from the British Government. Despite
the political distaste for the deal, Kraft eventually won the Cadbury’s board’s bless-
ing. The agreement was acknowledged to be unpopular amongst many Cadbury’s
shareholders, but nonetheless the board’s approval led to the takeover succeeding.
Sir Roger Carr, Cadbury’s Chairman, admitted that the high shareholder turnover
during the takeover negotiations led him to close the deal:1
“In the final analysis of the deal, it was the shift in the shareholder
1Press coverage includes: Wiggins, J. (2010). The inside story of the Cadbury takeover.
Financial Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1e5450d2-2be5-11df-8033-
00144feabdc0.html [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016]; or Moeller, S. (2012). Case Study: Kraft’s takeover
of Cadbury. Financial Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1cb06d30-332f-
11e1-a51e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xVfEY4Dk [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016]
78
register that lost the battle for Cadbury.” Roger Carr, former Chairman
of Cadbury (emphasis added).2
Managerial resistance is acknowledged to play an important role in the mar-
ket for corporate control. While takeover resistance might be motivated by man-
agerial entrenchment, the fiduciary duty to act on behalf the shareholders’ interests
gives credibility to Boards that recommend against a takeover. The ability of a
Board to resist an offer by arguing that it undervalues the company is tempered
however by share sales during the offer period for at least three reasons. Firstly
shareholder sales can be regarded as a vote with their feet against corporate man-
agement (Edmans 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer 2009). Board’s recommendations
opposing takeover bids are often challenged in courts, and it would be hard for Di-
rectors to argue the offer was derisory when shareholders are selling not only for
less than some future promised price, but typically for less than the takeover price
offered. Secondly a substantial amount of this stock is acquired by institutional
investors such as risk-arbitrageurs (Cornelli and Li 2002) and hedge fund activists
(Jiang et al. 2016; Corum and Levit 2017) that exert additional pressure on the
Board for the takeover to go through. Finally, not all shareholders are equally so-
phisticated, and so prominent or institutional shareholders that sell are sending a
negative signal to other owners which will make these shareholders in turn less likely
to support a Board’s rejection of the offer. Given that it is damaging to directors’
careers to suffer a rebellion of shareholders, this once again makes it less likely the
takeover will be rejected.
All of these channels act to lower the willingness of a Board to reject a
takeover as a function of the volume of existing shareholders who sell up; and this
effect remains unexplored. Shareholders therefore have a strategic role to play in
the success or otherwise of takeovers via the pressure they create on the Board.
2‘UK takeover threshold should be raised, says ex-Cadbury chairman Roger Carr,’ Daily Tele-
graph, 10 February 2010.
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The extent of takeover resistance is often reinforced by external pressure exerted by
the political system, labour, the media and other stakeholders whose interests are
aligned with those of the incumbent managers (Hellwig, 2000). Governments in par-
ticular use coercion of Boards as a tool of industrial policy when formal approaches,
such as nationalisation or the purchasing of a controlling stake, are deemed too
expensive or unjustifiable.3
This paper formally analyses the takeover process from this novel perspective.
Boards’ resistance to takeovers is decreasing in the premium offered by the bidder
and the ability of a Board to reject a takeover is reduced in the proportion of
shareholders who sell in the offer period: after the bid and before the formal decision
of the Board. However Government pressure may bolster the Board’s resistance.
Sophisticated shareholders therefore face an environment of strategic substitutes: if
enough other shareholders sell the Board will find themselves unable or unwilling to
reject the takeover and so a shareholder prefers to hold her shares so as to gather
the full takeover premium. In contrast, if many other shareholders do not sell early
then the takeover will likely fail. In this case a shareholder would rather sell in the
offer period so as to profit from the raised market price before the stock price returns
to its original value after the rejection of the takeover. In either case sophisticated
shareholders wish to coordinate against each other and selling is akin to a public
good to which no one wishes to contribute, but everyone hopes others will.
In equilibrium both the stock price and stock sales at the interim are deter-
mined endogenously. Thus we have a shareholder-led coordination feedback loop
between stock sales, the interim stock price and the final corporate outcome. This
feedback loop is distinct from the current scholarly focus on the learning feedback
loop.4 The simplest model of this situation would generate multiple equilibria ra-
3Dinc and Erel (2013) include “moral persuasion” and the arbitrary use of financial regulation
as government instruments to deter takeovers of domestic companies from foreign bidders in the
context of economic nationalism.
4See Bond et al. (2012) for a survey.
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tionalising both holding and selling and so prevent analysis.5
We enrich the framework by using a global games approach. We suppose
that the level of managerial resistance is private information about which different
market participants receive a noisy signal. As a result both market makers and
shareholders face an inference problem embedded within the game of strategic sub-
stitutes described above. Solving global games with strategic substitutes is more
challenging than the normal strategic complements framework. Nonetheless we can
demonstrate that a unique threshold equilibrium exists allowing us to study the
takeover process.
The fundamentals of our analysis will be the bid premium, the expected
Board level of resistance, and the influence of shareholder sales on the Board’s
verdict. We study how changes in these parameters affect the main outcomes of
our analysis: the volume of shareholders who choose not to wait for the Board’s
recommendation but rather sell early; the market price these shareholders receive
during the offer period; and ultimately the probability a takeover succeeds.
Our study provides a full comparative statics analysis of the interplay of
these variables. We would draw attention to two key results.
The first result is that we find that limiting the voting rights of new share-
holders, or reducing the directors’ vulnerability to legal challenge arising from their
takeover rejection decision, reduces the probability of a successful takeover but it
increases the number of existing shareholders who choose to sell. The direct effect
of these changes is for the probability of a successful deal to decline. This implies
that the market price of the stock in the offer period will fall. This would seem to
create a tension: the lower probability of a deal encourages shareholders to sell and
profit early; however the lower interim share price deters them from doing so and
5If all other shareholders will hold their stock then the takeover will fail for sure, but in this case
the price of the stock during the offer period is unchanged from pre-bid levels. Hence holding the
stock is an equilibrium. If instead all other shareholders sell early then the takeover will definitely
succeed, which implies the price during the offer period will rise to match the bid price, and so
shareholders gain nothing by waiting: hence selling the stock early is also an equilibrium.
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encourages shareholders instead to hold out for the chance of the full offer premium.
In our analysis this tension resolves itself in favour of selling early and the propor-
tion of shareholders selling during the offer period increases. The reason for this
is subtle: it follows because some shareholders in our model are sophisticated and
so have slightly more precise information than other market participants. This is
natural if the shareholders have greater experience of management and so are better
able to judge their resistance to the takeover. As a result shareholders’ strategies
are more sensitive to new information than the market price, and this implies that
the fall in the interim price is relatively small and so results in early sale.
This result has an immediate corollary. A lively debate in corporate law
discusses the merits of respecting Boards’ discretion to recommend for or against
takeover offers; that is courts respecting the “business judgment rule” in takeover
situations.6 In practice this rule insulates the directors from legal challenge and so
allows the Board to ignore the fact that exiting shareholders have demonstrated that
they do not agree that the firm has an even more valuable future than that offered
by the acquirer. As noted above, pressure to agree to a takeover is also exerted by
the new purchasers of shares. Commentators have expressed concern that such new
shareholders do not have the long-term interests of the company at heart, and so
weakening the voting power of new shareholders is also being actively considered.7
Our analysis highlights a perhaps unexpected consequence of such interventions:
weakening the influence of new shareholders or affording the Board greater powers
of court-protected discretion encourages more existing shareholders to sell early,
thereby increasing the turnaround in the register of the target company. Hence
absent strong respect for new shareholders, or under a wide interpretation of the
business judgment rule, more, not fewer, shareholders will seek to take profits early
6See Bebchuk et al. (2002) and the academic debate that follows.
7The Aspen Institute in the US propose that shareholders should be able to vote only after a
minimum holding period. The European Commission are considering increasing the voting weight
of shareholders who are long-term holders of the stock.(See Brussels aims to reward investor loyalty,
Financial Times, Jan 23, 2013). In the UK the Takeover Panel also considered disenfranchising
new shareholders following the Cadbury takeover.
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and sell out of a stock as soon as a takeover offer is received.
Our second key result studies when political pressure on a Board is likely to
be most effective, and so when it is most likely to occur. We equate the marginal
benefit to a government of encouraging takeover resistance with the extent to which
the probability of a takeover succeeding is reduced. Our result offers a salutary
warning. Jurisdictions which have the greatest respect for shareholders are the ones
in which the marginal benefit to increasing resistance is the greatest. In countries
which pride themselves on shareholder power, perhaps like the UK and the US, the
Board’s decision is most sensitive to the sale decisions of shareholders during the
offer period. Government intervention to raise the expected resistance of the Board
will act to lower the benefit of selling early. We show that the interim price change
will not compensate fully so that the number of shareholders who sell in the offer
period can be reduced. This in turn weakens the pressure on the Board to agree to
the takeover and allows the government to secure a more likely rejection of the bid.
The paper is structured as follows. The literature review follows. The model
is formally presented in Section 2.2, and is solved in Section 2.3 which includes
analysis of the information structure and uniqueness conditions. Section 2.4 then
studies the solution exploring comparative statics, explores the marginal benefit to
outside parties of pressurising the Board, and extends the analysis to endogenise
the bid premium. Section 2.5 considers the empirical predictions of our analysis and
studies the robustness of our model. Section 2.6 concludes with all proofs contained
in the Technical Appendix (starting on page 119).
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our analysis contributes to the study of coordination problems among target share-
holders in takeovers. The seminal analysis of Grossman and Hart (1980) began a
rich research endeavour studying the returns to corporate takeovers when the target
firms’ shareholders are strategic. The core economic issue studied is that dispersed
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shareholders have an incentive to demand rents before agreeing to sell their shares
to a corporate raider, so discouraging profitable takeovers. In the intervening thirty
years our understanding of when raiders can make money has developed consider-
ably (Tirole, 2010, Marquez and Yilmaz, 2008, 2012; Ekmekci and Kos, 2016). Our
work makes distinct contributions to this literature along two dimensions. Firstly
this literature has explored the decision of existing stock holders to either accept or
reject a bidder’s offer. The stock market during the takeover is not modelled and
so the feedback effect between the stock sales during the offer period and the final
corporate outcome is not studied. Secondly these models focus on the shareholders
and so decide not to model the role of the Board of the target firm; thus managerial
resistance has not been theoretically explored in this context.
Investors that acquire stock during the offer period play a critical role in
the coordination problem characterized here. We parsimoniously assume that the
Board’s ability to resist the takeover is tempered by the volume of stock acquired by
new shareholders. Cornelli and Li (2002) show that risk-arbitrageurs make excess
returns by acquiring stock during the offer period because they increase the proba-
bility of the takeover. Corum and Levit (2017) characterize the complementarity of
bidders and hedge fund activists that exert pressure for the takeover to go through.
Our analysis complements the study of these mechanisms by recognizing that they
create a coordination problem among existing shareholders, and that stock sales are
necessary for new shareholders to influence takeover outcomes.
Our paper is related to Levit (2017), which studies the ability of a Board
to educate and advise shareholders as to the desirability of a takeover offer. Levit
models the communication between shareholders and the Board, and characterizes
the interplay between the takeover premium offered by the bidder and the Board’s
ability to influence shareholders. We simplify these elements in a setting where
the Board’s advice is deterministic for the takeover outcome. However we alter the
scope of the analysis in two dimensions. The first is that we drop the assumption
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that a bidder’s offer is available to any shareholder unilaterally. Takeover offers
are typically conditional on the proportion of shareholders agreeing so as to ensure
that the acquirer can secure sufficient control for their purposes; in the case of
private equity purchases full control is required to allow the bidder to avoid minority
shareholding restrictions. We will discuss these arrangements in the model below
and explain why they give the Board’s recommendation significant prominence.
Secondly we introduce the stock market into the analysis thus endogenising the sale
price which a shareholder must accept before a deal is consummated. Thus, the two
papers offer a novel perspective to the study of takeovers and characterize different
mechanisms that influence final outcomes.
Our work is part of the current research effort which studies how stock mar-
kets can alter business decisions and so generate a feedback loop back to the stock
market. We have an entirely innovative channel for this feedback loop. The key
channel driving the existing research might be characterised as a speculator-led
learning feedback loop (Edmans et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; Foucault and Fre-
sard, 2014): managers seek to infer speculators’ information from the stock market
variables of price and order flow. Our feedback channel is instead a shareholder-led
coordination feedback loop: firm shareholders seek to coordinate on enough of them
selling out of a stock that management are pressurised into following a given course
of action. This channel is fundamentally different in the tools required to study it
and in its characteristics. On techniques, as we study a coordination issue we develop
global games techniques to analyse the multiplayer interaction between shareholders;
whereas inference techniques are required in the work on the speculator-led learning
feedback loop. Secondly, to see the different characteristics of the two mechanisms
suppose management consider an action which shareholders believe is a bad idea –
such as potentially rejecting a good takeover offer. Under the speculator-led learn-
ing feedback loop speculators will refrain from buying the stock and this will act to
deliver a low share price; observing the low share price the management will infer
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the bad news and reconsider the action. Under the shareholder-led coordination
feedback loop a sufficient volume of existing shareholders walking away from the
firm will cause management to reconsider the action; the share price plays no direct
role, though it will of course change as shareholders sell.
We adopt the information structure of a global game to study the shareholder
coordination issues (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011; Morris and Shin, 2003). However
our setting differs from most of the previous analyses in that agents’ actions are
strategic substitutes. The case of strategic substitutes has not been as thoroughly
studied as games with strategic complementarities. Hence, while the properties
of equilibria are analysed in Morris and Shin (2005) and Harrison (2003) among
others, we find little application of this case. Nonetheless by using the monotonicity
of the signal distribution functions we can establish the existence and uniqueness of
a threshold equilibrium.
The information structure of the global game is used to motivate trade.
In this aspect our paper is similar to Brav et al. (2016), where the information
asymmetries about the resistance of a managerial Board provide a rationale for
trading. In their setting heterogeneous outside investors receive private signals that
give them an information advantage. We differ from this approach and follow the
standard assumption in the literature of takeovers that shareholders, this is the
supply side of the market, are better informed about the stock value (see Ekmekci
and Kos, 2016 and references therein). In Appendix 2.8.2 we reverse the information
structure to test the implications of this assumption and show that most of our
results are robust. We differ from the traditional Kyle (1985) trading environment
in that our market makers do not observe the order flow. While it is possible to
relax this assumption by introducing a proportion of noise traders, our assumption
does not affect the results qualitatively and provides a more tractable setting.
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2.2 The Model
We consider a target company which has a market value V. The target company is
owned by a continuum of shareholders and represented by a Board. At the beginning
of the game the target receives an offer P > V from the bidder. The actors we model
in the takeover process are therefore the Bidder, the Target Board, the sophisticated
shareholders, and the market makers. We introduce each of these in turn.
2.2.1 The Bidder
If the bidder can acquire sufficient control of the target then she can generate value
of W ≥ P from the target’s assets. In our benchmark analysis we study the target’s
behaviour taking the offer price P as given. This is accurate when the acquirer loses
the ability to unilaterally set P , such as in a competitive bidding or auction context.
We extend the model to endogenise the bid price in Section 2.4.3.
If however the bidder were not to secure sufficient of the target then her
valuation for the target is assumed to be weakly less than V and so she would
not wish to buy the company in this case. Private equity buyers typically require
complete control to allow them to take a target private. In the UK a contractual
offer, equivalent to a tender offer in the US, only becomes binding for all stockholders
when accepted by 90% of the shareholder equity. If the Board recommend the offer
then an alternative legal structure can be used (known as a scheme of arrangement)
in which 75% of stock must accept the offer for it to be binding on all shareholders.8
If the bidder secures less than complete control then she will have to respect minority
shareholder rights. This lowers the freedom the acquirer has to act and so lowers
the value of the firm to the bidder. In reality therefore bids are typically conditional
on the proportion of shares accepting. We reflect this here by assuming that the
bidder’s offer will only stand if she secures acceptance from a large enough proportion
8For more on the rules of takeovers see, for example, “Public Company Takeovers in the United
Kingdom: A Guide for US Private Equity Acquirers”, by Squire & Sanders, or other similar legal
publications.
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of the target shareholders. We will make this precise when we introduce the target’s
shareholders. First however we present the target Board.
2.2.2 The Board
The Board of the target receive the offer at t = 0, and must decide how to respond
to the offer at t = 2. We model the Board as recommending acceptance of the offer
if:
P − V ≥ θ − κ · ρ (2.1)
The left hand side of (2.1), P −V , is the bid premium. The Board’s decision rule is
therefore more complicated than recommending acceptance only if the bid premium
is positive. Our analysis captures, in a parsimonious way, two salient features of the
takeover process.
The parameter θ is a measure of the Board’s resistance to the takeover. The
higher is this parameter, the more reluctant the Board is to recommend the offer to
shareholders. θ may capture the value to the Board of private rents from control;
or it may capture the extent of political pressure to which the Board is exposed.
We assume that θ is private information to the Board. Nature draws θ according to
θ ∼ N(y, 1/τθ) where y is the publicly known expected value, and the precision with
which θ is known is τθ. We will subsequently analyse a Board subject to political
pressure by studying the incentives to a government to move the expected level of
resistance: y.
The term κ · ρ captures the effect of shareholders selling out of the firm
during the offer process on the Board. ρ is the proportion of shareholders who sell
in the interim period between the offer being received and the Board announcing
its recommendation; it is determined endgenously. Equivalently, ρ represents the
shareholder turnover at the interim. The interim period is often referred to as the
offer period. κ > 0 is a scaling factor. The larger the proportion of the shareholders
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who sell during the offer period the harder it is for a Board to subsequently reject
the offer. This explicit role for shareholder action is a hitherto unstudied part of
the takeover process; it is however an important part for at least three reasons:
1. Firstly, Boards are under a fiduciary duty to represent shareholders’ best in-
terests.9 It is a Board’s duty to reject a takeover offer which undervalues the
long-run value of the company. However, the greater the proportion of share-
holders selling out for less than the acquirer has offered, the more vulnerable
individual directors will feel should there be a legal challenge to their rec-
ommendation. Shareholder sales can be interpreted as a vote with their feet
against the Board’s standing (Edmans 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer 2009). It
would be hard to argue that the offer undervalues the long-run value of the
company when a significant number of shareholders are willing to sell at an in-
terim price which will typically be, not only below some aspirational long-run
value, but even below the offered acquisition price.
2. Secondly, as the Chairman of Cadbury publicly argued, in any shareholder vote
on the offer buyers of the shares during the offer period, and so buyers of the
stock at a premium to the pre-merger share price, could be expected to vote for
the acquisition. One might counter that the existing owners of the stock would
also vote for the acquisition. However the buyers of the shares are unlikely to
have the same influence as the sellers. Often times the buyers of shares during
an offer period are risk-arbitrageurs and hedge fund activists who have been
documented as exerting pressure on the Board and increasing the probability
of a takeover deal being consummated (Larcker and Lys 1987; Cornelli and Li
2002; Jiang et al. 2016; Corum and Levit 2017). Alternatively, as we already
noted, policy attention has focused on whether new owners should have their
9In the US, the fiduciary duty developed from the 1919 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. decision,
which determined that a business corporation exists primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
This interpretation has been reconfirmed multiple times since, including, for example, in eBay
Domestic Holdings Inc. v. Newmark.
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voting power reduced for a period, to make them less influential. These two
effects are captured by the scaling parameter κ.
3. Finally, shareholders are not all likely to be equally sophisticated. If sophis-
ticated existing shareholders vote with their feet by selling, so some of the
remaining shareholders will interpret the decision to sell as a loss of confi-
dence in the future of the firm as an independent entity. This will make
such shareholders less likely to follow a Board’s recommendation to reject the
takeover offer. This will make Boards less likely to reject the takeover offer in
the first place.
All of these effects imply that as existing shareholders sell, the weaker be-
comes the basis a Board has for rejecting a takeover offer, and so acceptance becomes
more likely. Our decision rule (2.1) is designed to parsimoniously capture these ef-
fects. The Cadbury-Kraft example of the introduction demonstrated these were key:
“the shift in the shareholder register ... lost the battle for Cadbury.”
The presence of the scaling factor κ captures the strength of the pressure that
shareholders’ sales exert on the Board. The greater is κ the more likely a Board
is to recommend deal acceptance for any given proportion of shareholders selling
during the offer period. Our analysis will therefore allow us to study the impact of
shareholder strength on stock sales at the offer period and on equilibrium takeover
premia.
2.2.3 Shareholders
We assume that a proportion δ of shareholders are sophisticated, these will receive in-
formation and act strategically during the takover game, the remaining shareholders
are na¨ıve. During the offer period (t = 1) each sophisticated shareholder i receives
a private signal xi as to the level of the Board’s resistance. This signal is specific to
each shareholder and is independently drawn from the distribution xi ∼ N(θ, 1/τ).
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Hence τ is the precision of each shareholder’s signal. Upon updating beliefs, each
sophisticated shareholder either sells his stock or holds it until the Board makes
its recommendation. Na¨ıve shareholders do not receive private signals as to the
Board’s type, nor do they consider selling their stock during the offer period. The
shareholder turnover ρ weakening the Board’s resistance —see (2.1), is captured by
ρ = δγ. (2.2)
and is also referred to as stock sales. Here, γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of so-
phisticated shareholders that sell their stock at the offer period and it is determined
endogenously.
We assume that na¨ıve shareholders follow the Board’s advice at t = 2. We
further assume that the proportion of sophisticated shareholders, δ, is less than
the proportion of control required by the bidder to allow her to benefit from the
acquisition. This implies that the bidder cannot acquire sufficient control of the
firm without the target Board’s recommendation. This implies that the takeover
goes through if and only if (2.1) holds. This is broadly representative of takeovers of
large companies, where both shareholder dispersion and the Board’s fiduciary duty
(see footnote 9) yield the vast majority of takeover outcomes to be in line with the
target Board’s recommendation. Several anecdotes suggest that bidders often only
make a direct offer to target shareholders after the Board’s agreement, e.g. Kraft
and Cadbury. More systematically, Baker and Savasoglu (2002) in their study of
1,901 US takeover offers between 1981 and 1996 report that in approximately 80%
of cases, the outcome was in line with the Board’s advice.
Our assumption allows us to set aside the heavily studied shareholder coor-
dination problem considered by Grossman and Hart (1980). Their work had share-
holders hoping to hold on to shares to profit from a better run post-takeover firm.
Our concern is rather shareholders seeking to determine the most profitable moment
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to sell up. Sufficient na¨ıve shareholders also sets aside the potential effects of com-
munication frictions between shareholders and the Board studied in Levit (2017),
and allow us to isolate the influence of early-sales on the final outcome.
If a shareholder decides to hold on to her shares through the offer period,
then her payoff is determined at t = 2. If the Board elect to recommend the offer,
then the deal is consummated and so the shareholder receives the offer price P . If
instead the Board reject the offer then the deal fails and so the shareholder receives
the stand-alone firm value: V .
Alternatively a shareholder may decide to sell her shares during the offer
period, t = 1. In this case the shareholder receives the market price of the stock M .
The bidder’s offer price P is not available unilaterally to an individual shareholder in
advance of the deal being consummated as the bidder’s offer is conditional on enough
shareholders accepting, and this will only be ascertained after the offer period (and
so at t = 2). Hence t = 1 sales can only be at the market price. We detail this next.
2.2.4 Market price of a stock
We model the market in the stock as being provided by a competitive sector of
market-makers. The market makers are constrained to make zero profits and so
stand ready to buy shares at a market price M which allows them to break-even.
This implies that the market price is given by:
M = Pr[Board accept offer] · P + Pr[Board reject offer] · V (2.3)
We make two assumptions that are worth discussing. First, the market makers do
not receive private signals as to the Board’s type. They therefore calculate the
expected probability of the deal being consummated as a function of the publicly
known expected level of Board resistance, y, along with rational expectations of the
behaviour of the shareholders in equilibrium. We believe the assumption is a good
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approximation of reality in which shareholders of a stock who act strategically are
likely to be sophisticated and have been exposed to the management of the firm
over the duration of ownership of the stock. This experience may well allow the
shareholders to ‘parse’ management actions more accurately and so give a more
precise estimate of the Board’s level of resistance.
The second relevant assumption is that market makers do not observe the
order flow, and set a price based on prior beliefs. Otherwise the absence of noise
traders would allow market makers to perfectly infer the Board’s level of resistance
θ and in turn the takeover outcome. As a result the game would yield multiple
equilibria as described in the introduction. It is therefore possible to relax this
assumption at the cost of introducing a proportion of shareholders acting as noise
traders. This modification would reduce the sensitivity of the stock price to the
strategic shareholder game without affecting our qualitative analysis. For the sake
of simplicity we decide to exclude noise trade.
2.2.5 Game timing
For clarity we bring together the entire timeline of the model: At t = 0 the tar-
get company receives an offer P from the Bidder that everyone observes and θ is
privately realised. The offer P is conditional on the bidder acquiring full control.
During the interim t = 1, market makers set a price M which is a function of the
probability that the takeover succeeds. Furthermore, each sophisticated shareholder
i receives a private signal xi, updates her beliefs about θ and then decides whether
to sell or to hold her share. Finally, at t = 2 the Board decides whether to rec-
ommend for or against the offer after observing the proportion of shareholders who
have sold during the interim period ρ, and enough shareholders follow the Board’s
advice to ensure that the takeover only succeeds if it is recommended by the Board.
We ignore temporal discounting between periods for the sake of simplicity. Figure
2.1 depicts the sequence of events.
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The Bidder makes
an offer P , and θ is
privately realised.
t = 0
Market makers set M and so-
phisticated shareholders receive
private signals of θ and either sell
or hold.
t = 1
The Board either
accepts or rejects
the Bidder’s offer.
t = 2
Figure 2.1: Timeline
2.2.6 Equilibrium concept
A strategy in our model is a mapping from the sophisticated shareholder’s signal xi
to a binary decision to either sell or hold the stock during the offer period, t = 1.
We look for a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Definition 13 An equilibrium of our model comprises a strategy for each sophisti-
cated shareholder: xi → {sell, hold} such that:
1. The Board agree to the bidder’s offer if (2.1) holds;
2. The market makers set the interim market price of the stock according to (2.3);
3. The sophisticated shareholders’ strategy constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium for each shareholder.
We will look for Bayesian Nash (x∗, θ∗)−threshold equilibria, and show that
one exists and it is unique.
Definition 14 A Bayesian Nash (x∗, θ∗)−threshold equilibrium is one in which the
sophisticated shareholders and the Board use threshold strategies. These require:
1. Shareholder i sells in the offer period if and only if her signal satisfies xi > x
∗;
2. The Board rejects the bidder’s offer if and only if θ > θ∗.
94
2.3 Equilibrium Solution
2.3.1 Existence and uniqueness of (x∗, θ∗)−threshold equilibrium
Suppose that sophisticated shareholders follow an x∗-threshold strategy: sell in the
offer period if and only if they observe xi > x
∗. Then, for a given realisation of
the Board’s type θ, the proportion of sophisticated shareholders selling corresponds
to the mass receiving signals above the threshold. Equivalently, γ = Pr[x > x∗|θ].
From (2.2) it follows that stock sales at the interim are
ρ = δ [1− Φ (√τε (x∗ − θ))] (2.4)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. We first
show that in this setting the Board’s decision rule is well-defined:
Lemma 15 If sophisticated shareholders follow an x∗-threshold strategy, the Board
has θ∗-threshold equilibrium behavior for τε < 2pi/(κδ)2. Further θ∗(x∗) is uniquely
defined.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
If sophisticated shareholders follow an x∗-threshold strategy, the critical
Board’s type θ∗ must satisfy
θ∗ = P − V + κδ [1− Φ (√τε (x∗ − θ∗))] , (2.5)
where we have substituted the volume of sales ρ in (2.4) into the Board’s decision
rule (2.1) evaluated at indifference. Lemma 15 confirms that equation (2.5) has a
unique solution, and further that the Board will reject the bidder’s offer for all θ > θ∗
and will accept it for all θ < θ∗. We pause here to note that the equilibrium exists if
the shareholders’ information is imprecise enough. This differs from standard global
game analyses in which the agents’ actions are complementary, and arises due to
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the strategic substitutability of the shareholders’ selling decision. We will discuss
these information properties after deriving the equilibrium result in Proposition 17
below.
Now consider the market-makers. These set stock price M during the offer
period based only on the public information y and knowledge of the equilibrium.
Hence, the probability they assign to a takeover success is equal to the probability
that θ lies below the critical θ∗ conditional on the common prior θ ∼ N (y, 1/τθ).
We denote this probability β, so
β = Pr[θ ≤ θ∗] = Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y)) . (2.6)
Combining with (2.3) delivers the stock price during the offer period as:
M = βP + (1− β)V = V + (P − V ) · Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y)) (2.7)
We can now consider the selling strategy of a shareholder i receiving a signal
xi and facing the interim price in (2.7). She updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule so
that θ|xi is normally distributed with mean τθy+τεxiτθ+τε and precision τθ + τε. Thus,
if other shareholders follow an x∗-threshold strategy, then the Board will have a
θ∗-threshold strategy (Lemma 15), and so the expected benefit to selling during the
offer period over holding is:
u(xi, x
∗) = M − (P − V ) Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεxi
τθ + τε
))
− V
= (P − V )
[
Φ (
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))− Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεxi
τθ + τε
))]
(2.8)
where we have substituted in the offer period stock price (2.7). Equation (2.8) shows
that shareholder i’s value of selling is monotonically increasing in the signal received
xi. If u(x
∗, x∗) = 0 has only one solution then we have demonstrated that there
exists a unique Bayesian Nash x∗-threshold equilibrium. Lemma 16 formalises a
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sufficient condition:
Lemma 16 There exists an x∗-threshold equilibrium if τε < 2pi/(κδ)2, and further
this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
We are now in a position to solve our model explicitly:
Proposition 17 Suppose that the precision of private noise satisfies τε < 2pi/(κδ)
2,
then there exists a unique Bayesian Nash (x∗, θ∗)-threshold equilibrium in which all
shareholders sell their shares to the market if they observe a signal above x∗ and
hold them otherwise. The takeover succeeds if, and only if, the takeover resistance is
below the threshold θ∗. The thresholds are characterised implicitly by the following
equations:
θ∗ = P − V + κδΦ (∆ (θ∗ − y)) (2.9)
x∗ = θ∗ − ∆√
τε
(θ∗ − y) (2.10)
where ∆ ≡ τθ√τε
[√
1 + τετθ − 1
]
.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the (x∗, θ∗)−threshold equilibrium is delivered
by Lemmas 15 and 16. The explicit solution is solved for in the Technical Appendix.
The fundamental variables of the model {P − V, κ, δ, y, τε, τθ} determine the
critical Board’s type θ∗ and in turn our main outcomes, namely the probability that
the takeover succeeds (2.6), the interim stock price (2.7) and the stock sales at the
offer period (2.4). To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we make use of expressions
in Proposition 17 to characterise stock sales as a function of the Board’s critical
type:
ρ = δ [Φ (∆ (θ∗ − y)−√τε (θ∗ − θ))] (2.11)
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Note that our model is a global games analysis in which agents’ actions
are strategic substitutes in equilibrium, and not strategic complements as is often
considered (Morris and Shin, 1998; Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011). This follows as
in an (x∗, θ∗)-threshold equilibrium the market makers will anticipate uncertainty
as to whether the Board will accept or reject the bidder’s offer, and so (2.3) implies
that the firm’s share price in the offer period will lie strictly between the pre-bid
price of V and the offered price of P > V . The ideal outcome of each sophisticated
shareholder is therefore to hold on to the shares during the offer period and receive
P when the Board recommend acceptance, as long as enough other shareholders
sell during the offer period to pressure the defensive Board into accepting the offer.
This is a situation of strategic substitutes as if other shareholders were to reduce
the volume of shares they sold during the offer period, then any given shareholder
would wish to increase the volume of shares she sold in the offer period sufficiently
to ensure the Board would still be compelled to agree to the bid.
2.3.2 Information Structure
The public and private information as to the Board’s type is imperfect. The public,
including the market markers, have an estimate of how defensive the Board is which
has precision τθ. Sophisticated shareholders however have a further private signal
of precision τε. Beliefs are therefore dispersed. To better understand the effects of
these assumptions, we study our equilibrium at limiting values.
Shareholders’ information
First consider the limit in which private signals lose all precision (τε → 0) and so are
uninformative. In this case all information asymmetries disappear and sophisticated
shareholders and market makers all share the same belief about the realisation of θ:
the shareholders are therefore indifferent between trading and not. In this case alge-
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braic manipulation confirms that ∆→ 0 as τε → 0.10 Equation (2.11) demonstrates
that exactly half of the shareholders sell during the offer period in equilibrium. The
randomisation arises via the dispersed uninformative private signal.
We have a unique equilibrium if the private information is not too informa-
tive: τε < 2pi/(κδ)
2. At the opposite extreme of τε → 2pi/(κδ)2 precision is held
to finite levels and we will explore the behaviour of our model below. The unique-
ness condition requiring private signals to not be too informative is in contrast to
games of strategic complementarities, where uniqueness is guaranteed for sufficiently
precise private information (Morris and Shin, 2003). In our strategic substitutes
setting if agents can predict with high accuracy what signals others received, then
the uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium breaks down: shareholders wish to
mis-coordinate, selling (holding) if enough other shareholders hold (sell).
Public information
Now consider the limit in which public information loses all precision (τθ → 0).
In this case the market makers cannot refine their estimate of the probability the
Board is sufficiently resistant to block the acquisition. Hence market makers will
anticipate that the takeover has a 50% chance of success (equation 2.6). This im-
plies that the price of the stock during the offer period lies equidistant between P
and V . Shareholders will therefore wish to sell during the offer period if their pri-
vate information leads them to believe the Board have a less than 50-50 chance of
accepting the bid. This is why the critical shareholder threshold x∗ is given by θ∗.
This follows from equation (2.10) and the fact that algebraic manipulation yields
that ∆→ 0 as τθ → 0.
10To see this, use L’Hoˆpital’s rule and let f(τε) = τθ
[√
1 + τε
τθ
− 1
]
and g(τε) =
√
τε. Then
f ′(τε)
g′(τε) =
√
τθτε
τθ+τε
and limτε→0
f ′(τε)
g′(τε) = 0.
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2.3.3 Uniqueness
The condition κ <
√
2pi/
√
τεδ is sufficient to guarantee existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium as defined in Definition 14. Interpreted in this way our unique-
ness condition limits the influence of new shareholders on the Board, or limits the
vulnerability of the Directors to challenge of their business judgment. Thus, it re-
strains the magnitude of the externality of players’ actions. This prevents situations
where, for instance, a highly defensive Board incentivises a disproportionate vol-
ume of shareholders to sell during the offer period, increasing the internal pressure
sufficiently so as to lead to a takeover success.
2.4 Model Analysis
We begin, in Section 2.4.1 with a comparative statics analysis to understand the
model solution; and we use this analysis to enrich the regulatory debate about the
discretionary power of corporate Boards to influence against takeovers as described
in the Introduction. We then use our model to study the marginal benefit to govern-
ments and outside bodies of pressurising Boards (Section 2.4.2). Finally we extend
the model to endogenise the bid price in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Comparative Statics
We conduct comparative statics to study the reaction of the key outcomes in our
model to changes in the main fundamentals: the Bidder’s offer P , the influence
of new shareholders κ, and the Board’s expected level of resistance y. Below we
investigate in turn the impact these fundamentals have on the probability of a
takeover succeeding, the interim stock price, and the proportion of shareholders
who sell-out before the Board make their recommendation.
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Equilibrium response to changes in the bid premium
The bid premium in our model is given by P − V . We have:
Proposition 18 1. The critical Board resistance threshold θ∗ rises in the bid
premium;
2. The critical shareholder signal threshold x∗ rises in the bid premium;
3. The probability of the takeover succeeding rises in the bid premium;
4. The stock price during the offer period rises in the bid premium;
5. For a given level of Board resistance θ, the proportion of shareholders selling
in the offer period falls in the bid premium.
The Board is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bidder’s offer
if equation (2.1) is satisfied with equality. If the bid premium were to rise then
ceteris paribus, it is more likely that the Board will agree to the bid. This acts to
raise the critical threshold θ∗ above which the Board rejects the bid. As the Board
is more likely to accept the bidder’s offer, the critical threshold x∗ above which
shareholders decide to sell-up early is pushed up. That is the shareholders require
a very unfavourable signal as to how defensive the Board is before they will decide
to forgo some of the potential profits from the acquisition and sell during the offer
period. Together we therefore have results 1 and 2.
The result that increasing the bid premium raises the probability of the
takeover succeeding follows from the increase in the Board’s threshold type. As
the probability of a successful deal rises, the market makers raise the price of the
stock during the offer period towards the bid price. The final result trades off two
conflicting effects: on the one hand the probability the takeover will succeed going up
implies that a shareholder sees more value in waiting for the Board to recommend
the offer; on the other hand this raises the price during the offer period and so
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increases the benefit of selling early. This tradeoff resolves itself against selling
early for the sophisticated shareholders due to their informational advantage. Both
the sophisticated shareholders and market markers appreciate that a higher bid
premium raises the probability of the takeover being consummated. However the
information available to the shareholders is more precise and so the sensitivity of the
estimates of the probability of deal consummation to the Board’s critical threshold
is greater for shareholders. It therefore follows that as the Board’s critical threshold
θ∗ rises, the market makers raise the expected probability of a deal, though not as
much as shareholders do on average. And hence the price rise is not sufficient for
many shareholders, and the volume of stock sales at the interim declines.
Equilibrium response to changes in the influence of shareholders’ sales
The parameter κ accounts for the pressure that shareholders’ sales during the offer
period put on the Board to accept the takeover offer. We have:
Proposition 19 1. The critical Board’s resistance threshold θ∗ rises in the in-
fluence of shareholders’ sales during the offer period;
2. The critical shareholder signal threshold x∗ rises in the influence of sharehold-
ers’ sales;
3. The probability of the takeover succeeding rises in the influence of shareholders’
sales;
4. The stock price during the offer period rises in the influence of shareholders’
sales;
5. For a Board of resistance type θ, the proportion of shareholders selling in the
offer period falls in the influence of shareholders’ sales.
The intuition behind Proposition 19 is analogous to that underlying Proposi-
tion 18. In both cases the model alteration (higher bid premium, or higher influence
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of shareholders’ sales) has the effect of, ceteris paribus making it more likely the
bidder’s offer will be accepted. In the prior Section 2.4.1 this was because of the
increase in the bid premium; in this section it is because shareholders who sell have
a stronger effect in destabilising the Board. The critical resistance threshold θ∗ and
the critical shareholder threshold x∗ are therefore both pushed up making it less
likely they will be triggered.
As above these effects conspire to raise both the probability the deal is con-
summated, and the price of the stock during the offer period. Once again this
tension resolves itself against selling the stock. Shareholder turnover declines as the
expectation of sophisticated shareholders for deal consummation is more sensitive
to the shareholder power parameter κ than the market makers’ due to their more
precise information on the Board.
As noted in the introduction, a lively legal debate exists as to whether the
business judgment rule should apply to takeover decisions and insulate the Direc-
tors from challenge. Different legal jurisdictions, even across different states in the
US, differ in how much protection they offer Directors from allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty. The protection afforded by the business judgment rule is captured
in our model by the parameter κ. In particular, lower values of κ represent juris-
dictions where Boards have more discretion and need pay less heed to the apparent
contradiction of them arguing a takeover is bad whilst existing shareholders sell out
at a price below that being offered. Our analysis suggests that empowering Board
discretion in this way leads to a lower rate of takeover success, but perhaps surpris-
ingly, it also leads to more shareholders voting to sell out. As the Board become
more able to ignore shareholders selling in the offer period, the less likely the exist-
ing shareholders are to benefit from the bid price via Board deal acceptance, and
so the more profitable it becomes to secure at least some of the gains by selling out
early.
Shareholders’ early sales also pressure the Board to accept the offer because
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the acquirers are often risk arbitrageurs with a strong interest for the deal to be
consummated. It has often been argued that these short-term investors may not
have the best interests of the target firm at heart. Again, we explained in the Intro-
duction that, policy makers, including from the US and UK, have sought to respond
to this perceived problem by considering implementation of disfranchisement rules
designed to ensure that the outcome of takeover bids is determined more by the
core shareholder base, and less by short-term speculative investors.11 This policy
intervention is also captured by a reduction in κ, and so we again conclude that
while disenfranchising new shareholders would indeed act to lower the probability
of takeovers being successfully completed, a higher proportion of existing sharehold-
ers would decide to sell during the takeover struggle. Hence, although designed to
help long-term shareholders by hurting short-term ones, this policy will not lead to
greater long-term ownership in a takeover setting.
The predictions in Proposition 19 are analogous to those obtained when
studying the equilibrium response to changes in the proportion of sophisticated
shareholders δ. In our setting, an increase in the number of strategic shareholders
is equivalent to increasing the impact and weight of their selling decision during
the offer period. Thus if the proportion of sophisticated shareholders on the register
were to rise, then the probability of the takeover succeeding would rise, as would the
interim stock price. The effect on the volume of stock sales is however ambiguous as
the probability of a given sophisticated shareholder selling declines, but the measure
of sophisticated shareholders rises.
Equilibrium response to changes in expected level of takeover resistance
The parameter y is the prior expected level of the Board’s resistance to accept the
offer. It captures the ex ante expectation of market makers as well as the common
11See for example: The Takeover Panel (2010), Review of certain aspects of the regulation of
takeover bids, consultation paper issued by the Code Committee, London, 1 June 2010; and De-
partment for Business & Innovation Skills (BIS) (2014), Practical and legal issues related to limiting
the rights of short-term shareholders during takeover bids, Note of BIS roundtable, October 2014.
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prior shared by all shareholders. We have:
Proposition 20 1. The critical Board’s resistance threshold θ∗ falls in the prior
expected level of resistance;
2. The critical shareholder signal threshold x∗ rises in the prior expected level of
resistance;
3. The probability of the takeover succeeding falls in the prior expected level of
resistance;
4. The stock price during the offer period falls in the prior expected level of re-
sistance;
5. For a Board of resistance type θ, the proportion of shareholders selling in the
offer period falls in the prior expected level of resistance.
Changes in the ex ante expectation market participants have as to the Board’s
type do not have a direct effect on the Board’s decision: the parameter y is absent
from the Board’s decision condition (2.1). A change in the prior as to the Board’s
type therefore only has indirect effects: in this case through the critical threshold
θ∗ and the number of shareholders who sell up early ρ.
To disentangle the effects, suppose initially that the Board’s critical threshold
did not change in response to a small increase in the ex ante expected level of
resistance, y. In this case as the prior expected level of the Board’s resistance
rises, so the probability the market makers assign to the deal being successfully
consummated falls. In turn this has the effect of lowering the price of the stock
during the offer period. If the critical Board threshold θ∗ had not changed then
the enhanced precision of the shareholders would not play a role in this thought
experiment and so stock sales would fall (equation 2.11). However this in turn
would weaken the pressure on the entrenched Board and so would itself make the
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deal less likely. As a result pressure is created to lower the Board’s critical threshold
θ∗. This yields the first result.
The movement in the Board’s critical threshold now creates opposing forces
on the number of shareholders who exit the company at the interim ρ. We have
already noted less shareholders sell their stock as the market makers lower its price
in the offer period. However this alters the Board’s critical threshold, and the
shareholders’ estimate of the change in the probability of acceptance is more sensitive
due to their better information. Therefore sophisticated shareholders anticipate a
larger reduction in the probability of deal acceptance than the market makers and so
this acts to raise stock sales. The uniqueness condition which limits the influence of
shareholders, or equivalently prevents private information being too precise, ensures
that the first effect dominates: the shareholder turnover declines. To deliver this
result it follows that the critical threshold at which the shareholders sell, x∗ rises in
the prior expected level of resistance, completing the intuition.
2.4.2 The marginal benefit of pressurising Boards
Examples of the British government exerting pressure on Boards to reject takeover
offers include cases from the confectionery industry, as noted in the introduction,
as well as the pharmaceutical, and oil industries.12 Such political pressure is not
confined to the UK, one can find reports in the popular press of governments encour-
aging firms to resist takeovers drawn perhaps from every major economy. Scholars
have sought to clarify why governments should wish to oppose a free market in
corporate control. For example Roe (1994) identifies a systematic alignment of the
politicians’ interests with those of corporate management. In the same spirit, Hell-
wig (2000) argues that the political system can be seen as a stakeholder in its own
12Press coverage includes: Bogdanor, A. (2014). The regulators were right to force Pfizer’s
hand. Financial Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a476fdf0-e5bc-
11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xbkC23LC [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016]. See also Parker,
G. and Christopher, A. (2015). UK government warns BP over potential takeover. Fi-
nancial Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/06a3207e-e901-11e4-87fe-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3xbkC23LC [Accessed 17 Jan. 2016]
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right, while Jensen (1991) regards the treatment of corporate control by the political
system as a reaction to populist rhetoric without an understanding of the systemic
implications.
Here we do not take a stand on why government should wish to influence a
Board’s decision. Instead our focus is on understanding when political pressure is
likely to be most effective, and so when it is most likely to occur. Thus this section
considers the case of a government that seeks to pay a cost to alter y by exerting
political pressure. We therefore hold that a government, or external pressure groups,
cannot mandate exactly how resistant a Board should be; but they can encourage it
to resist. Given the literature cited above we consider that the costs of opposing a
takeover will most likely be incurred if the benefit, in terms of the reduced probability
of the takeover being consummated, is sufficient. Hence we believe a government is
most likely to pay the costs of intervention if dβ/dy is large and negative.
Our first main result on this theme is captured here:
Proposition 21 dβ/dy is negative and monotonically decreasing in κ when public
information is sufficiently noisy, i.e. small τθ.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Proposition 21 implies that a government will have the greatest incentive to
intervene to encourage a Board to ‘have the courage’ to reject a corporate takeover in
economies in which managerial Boards are most heavily affected by shareholder sales.
Thus, the government incentive to intervene when Boards are strongly protected
by the business judgement rule will be weak. However, in jurisdictions in which
the purchasers of new shares are very influential and have their shareholder rights
respected, the incentive to intervene will be strong. This perhaps surprising result
suggests that countries which pride themselves on respecting all shareholders’ rights,
perhaps such as the UK and the US, are the ones in which governments will have
the greatest incentive to intervene by encouraging a Board to become entrenched
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in the face of a politically undesirable takeover. However in the case of the US
the extensive application of the business judgment rule might, in turn, lower the
government incentive to intervene.
To understand this result note that if shareholder sales have a strong influ-
ence, that is κ is large, then the takeover success is highly sensitive to the actions
of the existing shareholders. A small impact on the proportion of the shareholders
selling during the offer period can therefore achieve a substantial reduction in the
deal probability. In proposition 20 we noted that an increase in the prior expected
level of takeover defence had the effect of increasing the critical threshold x∗ for
sophisticated shareholders and so lowering the proportion of shareholders who sell
in the offer period. This lowers the pressure on the Board to agree the deal, and in
economies with greater respect for shareholders (largest κ) the marginal change from
this effect is the most pronounced. As a result the potential gains to government
from intervention to alter expected takeover resistance y are at their greatest.
A second result is available:
Proposition 22 dβ/dy is negative, quasiconvex in P , and reaches a minimum
when β = 1/2.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Proposition 22 implies that increases in political pressure exerted to endorse
takeover defences have the greatest impact on the takeover’s outcome when the
probability of a success is otherwise close to a half. Hence, a government is most
likely to find the cost of increasing political pressure in opposition to a bid worthwhile
if the bidding offer is competitive, but not excessively so, thus implying that the
success of the deal hangs in the balance. A graphical intuition is provided by Figure
2.2, where we plot ∂β∂y as a function of P . The dashed line represents an arbitrary
marginal cost of increasing y, and hence it delimits the corresponding range of
takeover premiums for which the government is willing to exert political pressure.
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It is possible to see that political pressure delivers the greatest impact when the
bidder’s offer is such that β = 12 .
0
-1
-2
V = 10 12
dβ
dy
P
example marginal cost
of political pressure
region of pressure
β = 1
2
Figure 2.2: Numerical illustration of the effectiveness of increasing political pressure
y as a function of the takeover bid P .
An arbitrary cost of increasing pressure is set at−0.8. When dβ
dy
overcomes this cost, the government
increases pressure. The dot indicates P = V + y − κδ
2
, which satisfies β = 1
2
. Parameter values are
V = 10, y = 2, τε = 4, τθ = 5, κ = 3.125 and δ = 0.4, and β is given in (2.6).
2.4.3 Endogenising the bid price
Thus far we have considered an exogenous takeover premium which we believe to be
a good model of a contested takeover in which the bid price is forced above the level
an individual bidder would bid in the absence of competing buyers. Nonetheless,
numerous takeover offers are characterised by only one bidder.
This section studies the case of the takeover premium being strategically set
by a Bidder with no competitors. Hence, the Bidder makes an offer maximizing
his expected profit, which is the product of the surplus from the takeover and the
probability that the takeover takes place. Suppose that the Bidder’s value of the
target company is W > V . The game proceeds as in the benchmark setting with the
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only difference that, at t = 0, the offer P solves the following bidder optimisation
problem:
max
P∈[V,W ]
{Π = (W − P )β(θ∗ (P ))} (2.12)
= max
P∈[V,W ]
{Π = (W − P ) Φ (√τθ [θ∗ (P )− y])}
where θ∗ (P ) is implicitly characterised by equation (2.9). We assume that the bid-
ding firm shares the same information set as the market makers – this prevents
market participants seeking to make inferences as to the target Board’s entrench-
ment from the bidder’s bid price.13 We assume P ∈ [V,W ] for analytical simplicity
and for realism. Nonetheless, in principle an offer P < V can be optimal if the
Board have expected entrenchment y < 0. This would be the case after political
pressure urging a sale for example. We omit those cases where the target Board
is keen to be replaced. The takeover offer determines both the Bidder’s surplus if
the takeover succeeds and the probability that this occurs. The following Lemma
characterises the solution to the Bidder’s problem:
Lemma 23 Suppose the Bidder’s value for the target company is sufficiently large,
i.e. W − V > y − κδ2 +
√
pi/2τθ. Then, Π in (2.12) is quasiconcave and has an
interior maximum at the optimal bid P ∗ which is implicitly characterised by:
P ∗ = W − [1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ [θ
∗ (P ∗)− y])] Φ (√τθ [θ∗ (P ∗)− y])√
τθϕ
(√
τθ [θ∗ (P ∗)− y]
) (2.13)
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
For analytic solutions we restrict to the case in which the surplus available
is large enough. This allows us to show that the Bidder’s profit function is quasi-
concave. The Lemma implies that the optimal bid always satisfies θ∗ (P ∗) > y and
13Other papers in the literature of takeovers have assumed that shareholders have better infor-
mation than the Bidder. Ekmekci and Kos (2016) argue that this can be thought of as a reduced
form of a model in which the Bidder has some information, yet this information is public.
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therefore, the probability that the takeover succeeds conditional on an offer being
made is above one half.
This is a complicated setting which makes analysis difficult. Nonetheless we
can establish a number of comparative statics results with respect to the expected
level of the Board’s resistance, y.
Proposition 24 With a strategic Bidder:
1. The equilibrium bid price P is increasing in the prior expected level of takeover
resistance;
2. The probability the takeover succeeds falls in the prior expected level of resis-
tance;
3. The stock price during the offer period is affected in an ambiguous direction
by the prior expected level of takeover resistance.
Proof. The proofs of parts 1 and 2 are contained in the Technical Appendix. The
proof of part 3 is by virtue of the numerical example in Figure 2.3.
The Proposition indicates the Bidder responds to increases in the prior ex-
pected level of takeover resistance with a bigger bid premium. This increase in the
offer is designed to counter the expected takeover defence and to do enough to en-
courage the sophisticated shareholders to pressure the Board to agree to the bid.
Nonetheless, the positive effect of a higher bid on the probability of a takeover is
ultimately insufficient to outweigh the negative impact of a sufficiently great level
of Board resistance. Hence the takeover becomes less likely.
Figure 2.3 plots both the endogenous takeover bid P ∗ and the interim stock
price M as a function of the Board’s expected type y for a given numerical example.
It is possible to see that the takeover premium increases monotonically in response
to a stronger expected defence, conforming to result 1 of Proposition 24. It is
also possible to see that the price of the stock in the offer period, M , presents an
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Figure 2.3: Optimal takeover bid P ∗ and the corresponding interim period stock
price M as a function of takeover resistance y.
The takeover premium is P ∗ − V whereas the spread from which risk-arbitrageurs aim to make
profit is P ∗ −M . Parameter values are W = 15, V = 10, τε = 4, τθ = 5, κ = .75 and δ = .4.
inverted-U shape relationship with the expected takeover resistance. As we consider
ever higher levels of the Board’s expected resistance, it is not possible for the increase
in the bid price to rise sufficiently to maintain the probability of takeover success.
As a result the probability of offer acceptance eventually falls and so the price of
the stock during the offer period ultimately collapses.
2.5 Empirical predictions and analysis robustness
2.5.1 Empirical predictions
Our analysis offers a number of testable empirical predictions. Some of the most
salient predictions concern the stock sales during the offer period or, equivalently,
shareholder turnover, which get to the heart of the interrelationship between the
Board and the shareholders. Our results also have testable implications relating
Board entrenchment and takeover outcomes. The predictions we would highlight
are:
1. The proportion of shareholders selling during the offer period falls in the bid
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premium.
2. On average a greater proportion of shareholders sell during the offer period
where managerial Boards have more discretionary power to resist takeovers.
3. Bids from uncontested acquisitions for firms with more resistant Boards are
higher on average, and yet have lower completion rates.
The link between the bid premium and stock sales during the offer period
is delivered by result 5 of Proposition 18. The prediction that regimes where man-
agerial Boards enjoy great discretionary power to oppose takeovers, that is regimes
with a low κ, should see more selling during the offer period is delivered by result
5 of Proposition 19. Both of these predictions concern the likely order flow during
the offer period. Data exists on order flows and therefore the first prediction is
potentially practically testable, though we are not aware of a test of the hypothesis
existing. The second test involves comparisons across jurisdictions whilst controlling
for shareholder rights verus the discretionary power of managerial Boards. Alterna-
tively one could also compare takeovers across companies with different corporate
charters within the same jurisdiction. Once again we are not aware of existing
tests of the hypothesis. Constructing measures of shareholder rights is challeng-
ing; though La Porta et al. (1997) offer a blueprint. This second test is therefore
approachable in principle.
The third prediction concerning the expected takeover resistance on acqui-
sition premia, and on the probability of success, is delivered by results 1 and 2
in Proposition 24. A natural way to implement a test is to posit that entrenched
Boards can extract greater rents from their firm in terms of high pay. Bebchuk et al.
(2009) argue that this is a valid inference to make. The prediction would therefore
be a joint hypothesis that uncontested (and therefore strategically priced) bids for
firms where managers are overpaid will be bids for firms whose managers are en-
trenched, and so will result in higher offer premia on average and yet succeed less
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frequently. Our prediction is in line with evidence of a relation between managerial
entrenchment and the probability of deal failure (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2002); though
it is in contrast to results that find no significant effects (e.g. Heron and Lie, 2006;
Bates et al., 2008). Consistent with the hypothesis that Boards resist in the interest
of shareholders, Comment and Schwert (1995) and Bates and Becher (2016) find
that takeover defences increase bidding premia, as we predict.
2.5.2 Alternative Settings and Robustness
This section considers the robustness of our results to two variations of the bench-
mark model.
Cross-Ownership. In some cases target shareholders own stock of the
bidding firm. If the takeover succeeds, these shareholders receive an additional
payoff (either positive or negative) that accounts for the effect of the takeover on the
bidder’s stock. Appendix 2.8.1 studies this setting. We show that despite the change
in the payoff function, the strategic interaction between shareholders and so our
analysis is not materially altered. Intuitively this follows as each shareholder’s buy
or sell decision is negligible on the probability of takeover success as each shareholder
is assumed to be small; thus the strategic decision on whether to buy or sell can be
divorced from changes in the value of the holding in the bidder. As a consequence
Proposition 17 holds, and hence our results continue to hold as stated and are
entirely robust to portfolios of ownership.
Informed External Investors. We assume that sophisticated shareholders
are better informed about the firm they own than other investors. As noted above
this assumption seems to us natural as sophisticated shareholders, having been
owners of the stock for a period of time, will have developed some knowledge of
the preferences and practices of management. This assumption has the implication
that sophisticated shareholders have positive expected returns. However, as noted
in the Introduction, the acquirers of the stock during the offer period are often risk
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arbitrageurs or hedge fund activists which are also likely informed and appear to
make positive profits (see Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001 and references therein).
Appendix 2.8.2 considers an alternative information structure privileging ex-
ternal investors. In this appendix we assume that the potential buyers of stock
receive private signals about the Board’s type. In turn we assume that existing
shareholders and market markers can only act on the common prior. It there-
fore follows that current shareholders will buy or sell in the offer period purely on
whether the external investors are willing to pay above the ex ante expected price
for the stock based on publicly available information. That is outside investors face
completely elastic supply at the market price M .
We solve this alternative formulation in Appendix 2.8.2. This setting is
one of strategic complementarities for external investors, as their expected payoff
from acquiring stock increases with the stock owned by other investors.14 Despite
the new information structure, both the probability of a takeover and the interim
stock value react to changes in the fundamentals as in Propositions 18, 19, and
20. However the relationship between the stock sales during the offer period and
the fundamentals is reversed. If external investors have better information than
current owners of the stock then their inferences when the Board’s threshold type
changes are more sensitive than those of market makers and existing shareholders.
For example, if the bid price rises, this acts to raise the Board’s critical threshold
and make the takeover more likely to succeed. The market price therefore rises, but
further profits can be made by the party with the better information. If this party is
the external investors then they buy more of the stock and so lead to an increase in
the shareholder turnover during the offer period, not a reduction as in Proposition
18.
Whether our benchmark formulation giving an information advantage to ex-
14The complementarities between external investors are similar, in spirit, to those studied in Brav
et al. (2016), which represents the cost of engaging entrenched management to increase firm value.
Our paper shows that in this situation, the game of strategic complementarities for stock acquirers
is a game of strategic substitutes for sellers.
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isting sophisticated shareholders is appropriate is ultimately an empirical question.
As we noted above the empirical evidence on the relationship between the order flow
in the offer period and the fundamentals we study is still in its infancy, and so the
most appropriate formulation remains a matter of conjecture.
2.6 Conclusion
This study combines the following three observations into a formal analysis of
takeovers: firstly managers often oppose takeovers, either due to the private benefits
of corporate control, or because they consider the takeover offer to undervalue the
company; secondly politicians often use pressure on Boards as a tool of industrial
policy; and finally shareholder actions form a key part of the strategic creation of
pressure on Boards and so complete a feedback loop between current shareholder
actions and corporate decisions. Shareholders therefore can sway a Board to accept
an offer – as happened in the case-study of the Kraft-Cadbury merger described in
the Introduction.
Shareholders in our analysis therefore face a novel coordination problem:
during the offer period, and so in advance of the Board having declared its position,
sophisticated shareholders have to decide whether to hold their stock in the hope
that the takeover goes through or to sell out early to partially profit from the elevated
market price of the stock. Selling out raises the pressure on Boards to agree the
takeover; both because they are indicative of a loss of confidence in the independent
life of the firm, and also because new purchasers are almost certain to vote for
acceptance. As a consequence, each shareholder wants to sell her stock when other
shareholders hold it, but to hold it when other shareholders sell. Hence, selling
becomes a public good to which no one wants to contribute. In equilibrium, selling
decisions and takeover success are determined by the bid premium, the external
pressure against the takeover and the influence of new shareholders.
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Solving this model of strategic substitutes in a global games setting presents
novel problems, however a unique threshold equilibrium can be shown to exist and
can be characterised. This allows us to study and draw insights from a model
with a unique pure strategy equilibrium which is not possible without the global
games machinery. The model allows us to develop a unified analysis as to how
outcomes of interest are affected by fundamentals. This allows us to disentangle
two competing effects: increases in the probability a deal will succeed reduce the
incentive for shareholders to sell early which in turn lowers the probability the
deal will succeed. These opposing forces nonetheless are brought into equilibrium;
and the requirements on the informational structure for the analysis to be well
defined deliver a unique resolution of this tension. Thus the probability of a takeover
succeeding rises in both the bid premium and the respect for shareholders – even
though both of these make selling in the offer period less attractive and so in part
lower the pressure on the Board to agree a deal.
Our work provides an entirely new analysis of two policy areas which, in
different ways, play critical roles in takeovers: the discretionary power of managerial
Boards; and external, often political, pressure. Jurisdictions differ on the power that
managerial Boards have to recommend against a takeover. Perhaps unexpectedly,
empowering Boards to avoid takeover outcomes being driven by market speculation
during the offer period increases the number of shareholders that sell out during the
offer period to profit from the increased price. Relatedly, policy makers have sought
to bolster long term ownership by inhibiting the voting rights of short-term owners
of a stock. This has the negative consequence of existing shareholders selling out in
greater volumes during the offer period, which is the exact reverse of the outcome
hoped for in the case of Cadbury by the outgoing chairman. Policy makers have also
often sought to encourage Boards to reject politically unwanted takeovers. We see
that this behaviour is most likely, ceteris paribus, in jurisdictions with the greatest
respect for shareholder rights. The marginal benefit to political pressure, in terms
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of reduction in the probability a takeover is successful, is greatest in countries which
perhaps pride themselves on the fairness of their shareholder rules.
This analysis highlights the strategic importance of shareholder sales during
the offer period, however the empirical predictions generated run ahead of the curve
of empirical work. Though case studies are supportive we look forward to a more
systematic empirical treatment of the themes we have explored.
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2.7 Appendix: Proofs
2.7.1 Proof of Proposition 15
The model requires the Board to refuse to sell if and only if θ ≥ P − V + κρ.
Substituting for ρ = δγ using (2.4) , define the function:
X (θ) , θ + κδΦ (√τε (x∗ − θ))− [P − V + κδ] . (2.14)
X(θ) is the Board’s benefit to rejecting the offer over acquiescing. The Board reject
the offer if and only if X (θ) ≥ 0. The lemma follows if X (θ∗) = 0 has a unique
solution and X (θ) is increasing.
If θ > [P − V + κδ] then X (θ) > 0, if θ < P − V then X (θ) < 0, and so by
continuity X (θ) has at least one root. Observe X ′ (θ) = 1−κδ√τεϕ
(√
τε (x
∗ − θ)) .
Given that maxϕ (·) = ϕ (0) = 1/√2pi the result follows.
2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 16
As ddxiu(xi, x
∗) > 0, there is a unique x∗-threshold equilibrium if u(x∗, x∗) = 0 has a
unique solution. Observe that u(x∗, x∗) < 0 for x∗ ≤ y, and limx∗→∞ u(x∗, x∗) > 0,
hence at least one root exists by continuity and the intermediate value theorem. We
now wish to show at most one solution to u(x∗, x∗) = 0 can exist. Using (2.8) at all
such solutions we have
Φ (
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)) = Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεx
∗
τθ + τε
))
⇒ √τθ (θ∗ − y) =
√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεx
∗
τθ + τε
)
where θ∗ is a function of x∗ and is given in (2.5). Hence define the function
Y (x∗) , √τθ (θ∗ − y)−
√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεx
∗
τθ + τε
)
(2.15)
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As θ∗ ∈ [P − V, P − V + κ] , and so is bounded, Y (x∗) = 0 has at least one solution
using the intermediate value theorem. Note Y ′ (x∗) > 0 if dθ
∗
dx∗ < 0. The latter
follows given κ <
√
2pi
δ
√
τε
. Hence there exists only one solution to Y (x∗) = 0. The
result follows. 
2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 17
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is delivered by Lemmas 15 and 16.
Using the function in (2.15), observe that Y (x∗) = 0 satisfies
x∗ − θ∗ = −τθ
τε
[√
1 +
τε
τθ
− 1
]
(θ∗ − y)
The signal threshold in (2.10) follows immediately. The same condition can be
combined with (2.5) to obtain the critical Board type in (2.9) using the fact that
Φ (x) = 1− Φ (−x).
2.7.4 Proof of Propositions 18–20
We first establish the relationship between the critical boundaries (θ∗, x∗) with re-
spect to the fundamentals in two lemmas. We then establish the remaining proper-
ties in a series of results.
Lemma 25 The threshold θ∗ is positively related to the Bid premium, the extent
of new shareholders’ pressure and the proportion of sophisticated shareholders, and
negatively related to the Board’s expected type, i.e. ∂θ
∗
∂(P−V ) > 0,
∂θ∗
∂κ > 0,
∂θ∗
∂δ > 0
and ∂θ
∗
∂y < 0.
Proof.
1. Bid Premium. Define F (θ∗, P − V ) = θ∗ − RHS (2.9) and use the Implicit
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Function Theorem (IFT) so that ∂θ
∗
∂(P−V ) = −∂F (θ
∗,P−V )/∂(P−V )
∂F (θ∗,P−V )/∂θ∗ . Then,
∂θ∗
∂ (P − V ) =
1
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y]) > 0 (2.16)
under uniqueness. To derive the sign of the denominator note that we can
guarantee that it is positive if κ <
√
2pi/δ∆, as ϕ(·) takes maximum value at
1/
√
2pi. Then, since
√
τε > ∆ the uniqueness condition is sufficient.
2. Internal Pressure. Use the IFT so that dθ
∗
dκ = − ∂F (θ
∗,κ)/∂κ
∂F (θ∗,κ)/∂θ∗ . Then,
dθ∗
dκ
=
δΦ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y]) > 0 (2.17)
3. Sophisticated shareholders. Use the IFT so that dθ
∗
dδ = − ∂F (θ
∗,δ)/∂δ
∂F (θ∗,δ)/∂θ∗ . Then,
dθ∗
dδ
=
κΦ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y]) > 0 (2.18)
4. Board’s Expected Type. Use the IFT so that ∂θ
∗
∂y = − ∂F (θ
∗,y)/∂y
∂F (θ∗,y)/∂θ∗ . Then,
∂θ∗
∂y
= − κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ
∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y]) < 0 (2.19)
Lemma 26 The threshold x∗ is positively related to the Bid premium, the extent
of new shareholders’ pressure, the proportion of sophisticated shareholders and the
Board’s expected type, i.e. ∂x
∗
∂(P−V ) > 0,
∂x∗
∂κ > 0,
∂x∗
∂δ > 0 and
∂x∗
∂y > 0.
Proof. The sign of the partial derivatives with respect to P − V , κ, and δ, follow
from implicit differentiation of (2.10) combined with the observation that
√
τε > ∆.
For the final result note that dx
∗
dy =
∂x∗
∂y +
∂x∗
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂y , where
∂θ∗
∂y is characterized by
(2.19). It follows that the uniqueness condition κ <
√
2pi
δ
√
τε
guarantees dx
∗
dy > 0.
We then have:
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- (a) Bid Premium. Note in (2.6) that dβd(P−V ) =
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂(P−V ) where
∂β
∂θ∗ > 0 and
∂θ∗
∂(P−V ) > 0 - see (2.16). Furthermore,
dM
d(P−V ) =
∂M
∂(P−V ) +
∂M
∂β
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂(P−V ) with
∂M
∂(P−V ) > 0 and
∂M
∂β > 0. Finally, from (2.11),
dρ
d(P−V ) =
∂ρ
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂(P−V ) where
∂ρ
∂θ∗ < 0 because
√
τε −∆ > 0.
- (b) Internal pressure. First, notice in (2.6) that dβdκ =
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂κ where
∂β
∂θ∗ > 0
and ∂θ
∗
∂κ > 0 - see (2.17). Moreover,
dM
dκ =
∂M
∂β
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂κ > 0 since
∂M
∂β > 0. Last,
dρ
dκ =
∂ρ
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂κ < 0 because
∂ρ
∂θ∗ < 0.
- (c) Sophisticated shareholders. From (2.6) it follows that dβdδ =
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂δ where
∂β
∂θ∗ > 0 and
∂θ∗
∂δ > 0 - see (2.18). Further,
dM
dδ =
∂M
∂β
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂δ > 0.
- (d) Board’s Expected Type. The effect on β is dβdy =
∂β
∂y +
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂y < 0 because
∂β
∂y < 0;
∂β
∂θ∗ > 0 and
∂θ∗
∂y < 0. Furthermore,
dM
dy =
∂M
∂β
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂y < 0 because
∂M
∂β > 0. Finally, note in (2.11) that
dρ
dy
=
sign
∆
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
−√τε∂θ
∗
∂y
=
√
τε
(
κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
)
−∆
(
κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y]) + 1
)
= [
√
τεκδϕ(∆ [θ
∗ − y])− 1]
(
∆
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
)
< 0
Where the last inequality follows from the fact that
√
τεκδϕ(∆ [θ
∗ − y]) < 1
under the uniqueness condition.

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2.7.5 Proof of Proposition 21
Notice that
d2β
dκdy
=
d
dκ
(
dβ
dy
)
=
d
dκ
(
−
√
τθϕ(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))
)
= sign −
[(
∂θ∗
∂κ
)
τθϕ
′(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))
]
[1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]
− [√τθϕ(√τθ (θ∗ − y))]
[
δ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y)) +
(
∂θ∗
∂κ
)
κδ∆2ϕ′(∆ (θ∗ − y))
]
where ∂θ
∗
∂κ > 0 by Lemma 25. Furthermore, note both ϕ
′(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)) > 0 and
ϕ′(∆ (θ∗ − y)) > 0 if and only if θ∗ < y. As a result, ∂2β∂κ∂y < 0 for θ∗ ≤ y or
equivalently, for κ ≤ 2δ [y − (P − V )].
Consider κ ∈
(
2
δ [y − (P − V )] ,
√
2pi
δ
√
τε
)
so that θ∗ > y. Using that ϕ′ (x) =
−xϕ (x) we have
d2β
dκdy
=sign
√
τθϕ(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))

(θ∗ − y) (∂θ∗∂κ ) τθ [1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]
+ (θ∗ − y) (∂θ∗∂κ )κδ∆3ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y))
−δ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))

Now using the fact that
(
∂θ∗
∂κ
)
[1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))] = δΦ (∆ (θ∗ − y)) we can write
d2β
dκdy
=sign
√
τθϕ(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))δ∆ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y))
{
(θ∗ − y)
[
τθ
∆
Φ (∆ (θ∗ − y))
ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y)) +
(
∂θ∗
∂κ
)
κ∆2
]
− 1
}
As θ∗ < P − V + δκ we can guarantee that the brace is negative if
(θ∗ − y)
[
τθ
∆
Φ (∆ (θ∗ − y))
ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y)) +
δΦ (∆ (θ∗ − y))
[1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]κ∆
2
]
< 1
We know that this is true if τθ is small enough as limτθ→0 τθ/∆ = 0 and limτθ→0 ∆ =
0.
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2.7.6 Proof of Lemma 22
The relation between θ∗ and y is crucial to characterise the effect of fundamentals.
In expression (2.9) it is possible to see that θ∗ = y ←→ y = P − V + κδ2 . Hence,
∂θ∗
∂y < 0 from Lemma 4 implies that θ
∗ > y ←→ y < P − V + κδ2 . Furthermore,
notice in (2.6) that β > 12 ←→ y < P − V + κδ2 . We use these results as a reference
in our analysis.
Note that
d2β
dPdy
=
∂
∂y
( √
τθϕ(
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))
)
Therefore d
2β
dPdy > 0↔ y < P −V + κδ2 or equivalently, d
2β
dPdy > 0↔ P −V > y− κδ2 .
Hence, dβdy is quasiconvex in P − V with a minimum at P − V = y − κδ2 .
2.7.7 Proof of Lemma 23
As we are maximising a continuous function over a compact set, a solution exists.
We have that the optimal bid P ∗ < W as [dΠ/dP ]P=W = −β (θ∗ (P )) < 0. Now
note that
∂Π
∂P
= −Φ (√τθ [θ∗ (P )− y]) + (W − P )√τθ ∂θ
∗ (P )
∂P
ϕ (
√
τθ [θ
∗ (P )− y]) (2.20)
=
[
(W − P )√τθ
1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ [θ∗ (P )− y]) −
Φ
(√
τθ [θ
∗ (P )− y])
ϕ
(√
τθ [θ∗ (P )− y]
)]ϕ (√τθ [θ∗ (P )− y])
We can guarantee that a solution satisfies P ∗ ≥ V + y − κδ2 , if ∂Π∂P > 0 for
P < V + y − κδ2 . Next, we show that this holds for P < W −
√
pi/2τθ. Use the
following claims:
• Claim 27 θ∗ (P ) < y and β(θ∗ (P )) < 12 if and only if P < V + y − κδ2 .
Proof of Claim 27: Note that ∂θ
∗(P,y)
∂y < 0 and θ
∗ (P, y) = y when P = y+V−κδ2
• Claim 28 Φ(x)ϕ(x) is increasing in x. Hence, maxx
{
Φ(x)
ϕ(x)
}
|x≤0=
√
pi
2 .
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Proof of Claim 28: The result is immediate for x ≥ 0. Consider x < 0. The
result follows by differentiation if ϕ2 (x)−Φ (x)ϕ′ (x) > 0. As ϕ′ (x) = −xϕ (x)
we wish to show ϕ (x) + xΦ (x) > 0. Set y = −x > 0, and using symmetry we
require ϕ (y)− y (1− Φ (y)) > 0 for y > 0. This follows if (1− Φ (y)) /ϕ (y) <
1/y. This inequality is confirmed in Gordon (1941). Furthermore, note that
Φ (0) /ϕ (0) =
√
pi/2.
The combination of Claim 27 and Claim 28 implies that ∂Π∂P > 0 when P <
V + y − κδ2 if
(W − P )√τθ
1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ [θ∗ (P )− y]) −
√
pi
2
> 0 (2.21)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (2.21) is P < W −√pi/2τθ. By setting ∂Π∂P = 0
we obtain the expression in (2.13), where it is possible to see that P ∗ < W−√pi/2τθ.
Now the concavity of Π for P ≥ V +y− κδ2 is sufficient to guarantee a unique
interior solution. Notice that
∂2Π
∂P 2
= −2∂β(θ
∗(P ))
∂P
+ (W − P )∂
2β(θ∗(P ))
∂P 2
(2.22)
where ∂β(θ
∗(P ))
∂P > 0 and
∂2β(θ∗(P ))
∂P 2
=
[√
τθ
∂θ∗
∂P
]2
ϕ′ (
√
τθ [θ
∗ (P )− y]) + ϕ (√τθ [θ∗ (P )− y])√τθ
(
∂2θ∗
∂P 2
)
(2.23)
Given P ≥ V + y − κδ2 , it must be that θ∗ (P ) − y > 0 by Claim 27 and therefore
ϕ′
(√
τθ [θ
∗ (P )− y]) < 0. Moreover, algebra confirms that ∂2θ∗
∂P 2
≤ 0.
Finally, notice that we require V + y − κδ2 < W −
√
pi/2τθ and that P
∗ ∈[
V + y − κδ2 ,W −
√
pi/2τθ
]
. 
2.7.8 Proof of Proposition 24
A) Proof dPdy ≥ 0
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The optimal bid P ∗ satisfies
β (θ∗ (P )) = (W − P )
[
∂β (θ∗ (P ))
∂θ∗
∂θ∗ (P )
∂P
]
= (W − P )
( √
τθϕ
(√
τθ [θ
∗ (P )− y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ (P )− y])
)
(2.24)
Differentiate both sides with respect to y so as to get dLHSdy =
dRHS
dy . Note that
β (θ∗ (P (y) , y) , y). Hence
dLHS
dy
=
∂β
∂θ∗
(
∂θ∗
∂P
dP
dy
+
∂θ∗
∂y
)
+
∂β
∂y
(2.25)
and
dRHS
dy
= −dP
dy
( √
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))
)
+
(W − P )√τθ
[1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]2 ·
·

(
∂θ∗
∂P
dP
dy +
∂θ∗
∂y − 1
)√
τθϕ
′ (√τθ (θ∗ − y)) [1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]
+ϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)) (∂θ∗∂P dPdy + ∂θ∗∂y − 1)κδ∆2ϕ′(∆ (θ∗ − y))

Rewriting we have
dRHS
dy
= −dP
dy
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂P
+
(
∂θ∗
∂P
dP
dy
+
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
·
· (W − P )
√
τθ
[1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]2

√
τθϕ
′ (√τθ (θ∗ − y)) [1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ (θ∗ − y))]
+ϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))κδ∆2ϕ′(∆ (θ∗ − y))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
where Ψ < 0←→ θ∗ > y. Rearranging we get
dRHS
dy
= −dP
dy
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂P
+
(
∂θ∗
∂P
dP
dy
+
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
Ψ
=
dP
dy
(
∂θ∗
∂P
Ψ− ∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂P
)
+ Ψ
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
(2.26)
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Finally, dLHSdy =
dRHS
dy yields
dP
dy
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂P
+
∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂y
+
∂β
∂y
=
dP
dy
(
∂θ∗
∂P
Ψ− ∂β
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂P
)
+ Ψ
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
dP
dy
2 ∂β∂θ∗︸︷︷︸
+
∂θ∗
∂P︸︷︷︸
+
− ∂θ
∗
∂P︸︷︷︸
+
Ψ︸︷︷︸
−

︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
= Ψ︸︷︷︸
−
∂θ∗∂y︸︷︷︸
−
− 1
− ∂β∂θ∗︸︷︷︸
+
∂θ∗
∂y︸︷︷︸
−
− ∂β
∂y︸︷︷︸
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(2.27)
B) Proof dβdy≤ 0
Note that β (θ∗ (P (y) , y) , y). Hence, differentiating both sides of the expres-
sion above we have
dβ
dy
=
∂β
∂θ∗
(
∂θ∗
∂P
∂P
∂y
+
∂θ∗
∂y
)
+
∂β
∂y
We can plug in all corresponding expressions in the RHS with the exception of ∂P∂y .
Then,
dβ
dy
=
√
τθϕ (
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))

(
∂P
∂y
)
− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
−√τθϕ (√τθ (θ∗ − y))
=
√
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))
1− κδ∆ϕ(∆ [θ∗ − y])
[(
∂P
∂y
)
− 1
]
So dβdy =sign
(
∂P
∂y
)
− 1.
Now recall
P = W − [1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ (θ
∗ − y))] Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y))√
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ∗ − y)
)
and let
F (P, y) = P −W + [1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ (θ
∗ − y))] Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y))√
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ∗ − y)
)
so we can use the IFT ∂P∂y = − ∂F (P,y)/∂y∂F (P,y)/∂P . For this we fix P , so we consider P rather
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than P (y) and θ∗ (y) rather than θ∗ (P (y), y).
First, compute ∂F (P,y)∂y :
∂F (P, y)
∂y
=
(A+B)
√
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))+ C
τθ
[
ϕ
(√
τθ (θ∗ − y)
)]2 < 0
where
A ≡ −
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
κδ∆2ϕ′ (∆ (θ∗ − y)) Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y)) < 0
B ≡ [1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y))]
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)√
τθϕ (
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)) < 0
C ≡ − [1− κδ∆ϕ (∆ (θ∗ − y))] Φ (√τθ (θ∗ − y))
(
∂θ∗
∂y
− 1
)
τθϕ
′ (
√
τθ (θ
∗ − y)) < 0
Second, compute ∂F (P,y)∂P :
∂F (P, y)
∂P
= 1 +
− (A+B)√τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))− C
τθ
[
ϕ
(√
τθ (θ∗ − y)
)]2 > 0
using the fact that ∂θ
∗
∂y − 1 = −∂θ
∗
∂P .
Now
∂P
∂y
= − (A+B)
√
τθϕ
(√
τθ (θ
∗ − y))+ C
τθ
[
ϕ
(√
τθ (θ∗ − y)
)]2 − (A+B)√τθϕ (√τθ (θ∗ − y))− C ∈ [0, 1)

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2.8 Appendix B: Robustness
2.8.1 Cross-Ownership
Suppose that a proportion λ of sophisticated shareholders own stock of the Bidder.
These shareholders obtain an additional payoff B ∈ R if the takeover succeeds.
Denote common shareholders those that own stock only in the target company and
bidding shareholders those who also own stock of the Bidder. Then, the volume of
stock sales reads ρ = δ[λγB + (1− λ)γC ].
We derive the equilibrium as in Section 2.3. However, we initially assume that
the two groups of sophisticated shareholders (common and bidding) have different
decision thresholds: x∗C and x
∗
B. An analysis analogous to the Proof of Lemma 15
leads us to conclude that if common shareholders have an x∗C-threshold strategy and
bidding shareholders have an x∗B-threshold strategy, then the Board has θ
∗-threshold
behavior for κ <
√
2pi√
τεδ
. This satisfies
θ∗ = P−V +κδ
(1− λ) [1− Φ (√τε [x∗C − θ∗])]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρC
+ λ[1− Φ (√τε [x∗B − θ∗])]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρB
 (2.28)
The probability of a takeover and the price set by market makers are hence defined
as in (2.6) and (2.7) respectively.
Now consider the benefit to selling over holding for a bidding investor receiv-
ing a signal xiB when other shareholders follow a threshold strategy:
u (xiB , x
∗
B, x
∗
C) =
 (M +B) Pr[θ ≤ θ
∗|xiB ] +M Pr[θ > θ∗|xiB ]
− (P +B) Pr[θ ≤ θ∗|xiB ]− V Pr[θ > θ∗|xiB ]

= M − (P − V ) Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗ − τθy + τεxiB
τθ + τε
))
− V(2.29)
Using the argument of Proof of Lemma 16, for any given x∗C there is only one solution
u (x∗B, x
∗
B, x
∗
C) = 0 if κ <
√
2pi√
τεδ
.
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Note that the payoff B is irrelevant to the bidding shareholder’s decision. As
a consequence, the two types of shareholders face the same problem and therefore
they share the same solution:
u (xiC , x
∗
B, x
∗
C) = u (xiB , x
∗
B, x
∗
C)⇒ u (x∗C , x∗B, x∗C) = u (x∗B, x∗B, x∗C)⇒ x∗B = x∗C
(2.30)
Finally, note that the proportion of sales is equal for common shareholders
and bidding shareholders, i.e. γC = γB. Thus the proportion of each type of share-
holder, captured by λ, becomes irrelevant to the equilibrium result, and Proposition
17 follows.
2.8.2 Informed External Investors
The common prior about the Board’s type is θ ∼ N(y, 1/τθ). While sophisticated
shareholders do not have additional information, there is a continuum of external
investors, e.g. risk-arbitrageurs and hedge fund activists, of mass one where each
investor j receives an iid signal xj = θ+εj with εj ∼ N(0, 1/τε) and updates beliefs
accordingly. The interim stock price M is set by market makers with zero expected
profits. External investors acquire stock at the interim if their value is higher than
M , i.e. if they receive a sufficiently low signal of the Board’s type.
The equilibrium analysis is analogous to that in Section 2.3. For clarity, we
denote our endogenous variables in this section with the subindex I.
Suppose that investors follow an x∗I -threshold strategy: buy in the offer pe-
riod if and only if they observe x < x∗I . Then stock sales equal the mass of investors
that received a signal below the threshold relative to the number of sophisticated
shareholders, ρI = δΦ
(√
τε (x
∗ − θ)). As a result, the Board has θ∗I -threshold equi-
librium behavior. We do not require a uniqueness condition, in contrast to our
benchmark setting, as θ∗I is unambiguously increasing in x
∗
I .
Market makers have zero expected profits and only observe public informa-
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tion. Thus, both the probability of a takeover βI and the interim stock price MI
are characterised by expressions equivalent to (2.6) and (2.7) respectively.
Consider now the strategy of an investor j observing signal xj and hence
with an updated belief θ|xj ∼ N
(
τθy+τεxj
τθ+τε
, 1τθ+τε
)
. If other investors follow an
x∗I -threshold strategy, her expected benefit to buying over not buying is
u(xj , x
∗
I) = (P − V ) Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗I −
τθy + τεxj
τθ + τε
))
+ V −M
= (P − V )
[
Φ
(√
τθ + τε
(
θ∗I −
τθy + τεxj
τθ + τε
))
− Φ (√τθ (θ∗I − y))
]
(2.31)
It is possible to see that the investor’s utility of buying is monotonically decreasing
in the signal received xj . Thus, the game of external investors is opposite to the
game of sophisticated shareholders (characterised in the benchmark model), whose
utility of selling is increasing as a function of the signal they receive. With an
argument analogous to the one developed in Proof of Lemma 16, we find that there
exists a unique solution to u(xj , x
∗
I) = 0 and hence external investors have a unique
x∗I -threshold equilibrium. The equilibrium tuple {θ∗I , x∗I} is characterised in the next
proposition:
Proposition 29 There exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which all
external investors buy shares if and only if they observe a signal below x∗I . The
takeover succeeds if, and only if, the takeover resistance is below the threshold θ∗I .
The thresholds are characterised implicitly by the following equations:
θ∗I = P − V + κδ [1− Φ (∆ (θ∗I − y))] (2.32)
x∗I = θ
∗
I −
∆√
τε
(θ∗I − y) (2.33)
Proof. Analogous to Proof of Proposition 17.
As a result, stock sales at the interim are ρI = δΦ
(√
τε (θ
∗
I − θ)−∆ (θ∗I − y)
)
.
Comparing θ∗I with the threshold in (2.9) it is possible to appreciate that revers-
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ing the information structure switches the mass of strategic decisions influencing
the takeover, i.e. 1 − Φ (∆ (θ∗I − y)). In particular, the proportion of sophisticated
shareholders selling now corresponds to the probability that an investor receives a
signal x < x∗I . This is in contrast to the benchmark model, where the proportion
of sophisticated shareholders selling equals the probability that x > x∗. As a con-
sequence, while the effect of the fundamental variables on both the probability of
a takeover and the interim stock price has the same sign as in the original setting,
their effect on the volume of sales is different. The following can be shown emulating
the method of proof used in the prior analysis:
Proposition 30 Responses of the main outcomes to marginal increases of the model
fundamentals are as follows
Fundamental Effect on outcomes
Pr. Takeover β Interim Price M Stock Sales ρ
Bid premium: P − V + + +
New-shareholder pressure: κ + + +
Expected Board resistance: y − − +
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Chapter 3
Competing under financial
constraints
3.1 Introduction
Firms’ limited access to credit is a widespread phenomenon. Contractual frictions
may generate incentives for borrowers to strategically default on their debt, and
lenders often respond by restraining credit. A firm is financially constrained when
it cannot secure as much credit as it wishes, even though it is willing to pay it
back (Tirole 2010). It is also well known that borrowers’ competitive pressure can
exacerbate financial constraints. In particular, product market competition typically
reduces the profitability of investment, thereby increasing the agency costs of a
financial transaction and further limiting access to credit. The common wisdom is
therefore that financial constraints harm firms’ ability to compete in the product
market (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). In this paper I challenge such view.
The idea here is that credit constraints both affect and are affected by com-
mercial relationships, and the pricing policy of a strategic supplier may depend on
the financing conditions of its customer (retailer). More specifically, input prices
determine the optimal investment level of a retailer and, in turn, whether the re-
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tailer is financially constrained. Furthermore, the retailer’s investment capacity has
an impact on market outcomes and profits, thereby affecting the surplus that can
be extracted by its supplier and thus, the pricing policy. I characterize the interplay
between input prices and retailers’ financial constraints. I show that a financially
constrained retailer faces lower prices, and this can put it at a competitive advan-
tage, increasing profits.
The effect of firms’ debt on their ability to compete has been largely stud-
ied, and different conclusions are reached.1 Notably, Brander and Lewis (1986) and
Maksimovic (1988) show that debt provides an incentive to compete more aggres-
sively in future periods, thereby acting as a commitment device that can increase
profits. In contrast, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that a company’s leverage
may trigger predatory strategies by competitors, inducing the company to default
on its debt and exit the market. Despite divergent arguments, these studies con-
sistently consider leverage to be a signal of the firm’s type as a competitor in the
product market, and therefore it affects equilibrium market outcomes.
In this context, it is natural to consider that firms’ ability to compete affects
their debt capacity, therefore creating and endogenous relation between leverage and
product market competition. I study a trade credit transaction between a supplier
and a (potentially) financially constrained retailer to shed light on this relation.
Trade credit occurs when a supplier allows a customer (retailer) to pay with delay
for goods already delivered. This provides a convenient framework for my analysis
because the lender is also a supplier, and the financial transaction may affect the
commercial relationship. Moreover, evidence shows that trade credit is an important
source of firms’ finance, also in countries with well-developed financial systems (e.g.
Giannetti 2003; Rajan and Zingales 1995).
I model the relation between a retailer that competes in the product market
and a supplier extending trade credit. I follow Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) in
1See Cestone (1999) for a review of the literature on corporate financing and product market
competition.
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assuming that the retailer’s investment in the product market is not contractible,
and limited liability creates an incentive to divert the input without honouring
the debt. As a consequence, the supplier must limit the line of credit to make
repayment incentive compatible, and this may generate financial constraints for the
retailer. Crucially, here the input price is strategically set by the supplier, and credit
is the product of price and quantity of input borrowed. Thus, for a given level of
financial constraints, a higher (lower) input price reduces (increases) the quantity
of input that can be extended in credit. Moreover, both the price and the quantity
of input borrowed affect the relative profitability of diverting, and hence determine
whether the retailer is financially constrained. As a result, financial constraints arise
endogenously in equilibrium.
In my model leverage has no effect on market outcomes in the absence of
contractual frictions. With no financial constraints, the vertical relation between
the supplier and the retailer is characterized by double marginalization, and market
outcomes in the retail market are those of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In contrast,
in the equilibrium with financial constraints the retailer exhausts the line of credit
and double marginalization vanishes. This triggers two key effects for my results.
First, the supplier can extract all retailer’s surplus conditional on debt repayment
being incentive compatible. As a consequence, the profits of the retailer equal its
agency rents. Second, financial constraints act as a commitment device for the
retailer’s production, and the supplier sets an input price that yields the production
of a Stackelberg leader. For intermediate levels of competitive pressure, retailer’s
agency rents exceed the profits that it would make in a setting with no contractual
frictions —double marginalization. Then, financial constraints are profitable for the
retailer.
Whether financial constraints arise in equilibrium depends on market funda-
mentals. I focus on the intensity of the retailer’s competitive pressure. With low
competition, production is relatively profitable and agency costs are small. Then,
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debt repayment is incentive compatible in a setting with double marginalization
and the retailer is not financially constrained. Conversely, high competition in-
creases incentives to divert and, under double marginalization, repayment is not
incentive compatible, leading to financial constraints. Several papers have studied
the effects of supplier’s (lender’s) product market competition on the extension of
trade credit (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1997; McMillan and Woodruff 1999; Fisman
and Raturi 2004; Fabbri and Klapper 2016). However, little attention has been paid
to the effects of the retailer’s competitive pressure. Unsurprisingly, in my model
retailer’s competition reduces the value of credit offered by the supplier because it
lowers the profitability of producing and increases agency costs. This, nonetheless,
need not imply that less input can be borrowed, as the reduction might be driven
by a lower input price.
When contractual frictions lead to financial constraints, they affect market
outcomes through both the retailer’s marginal cost (input price) and its production
capacity (quantity of input extended in credit). The literature has studied the role
of these two on a firm’s own, and rivals’, production choices. A representative
work is Dixit (1980), which shows that a firm can invest in capacity to lower the
relevant marginal cost and increase production, potentially deterring the entrance
of competitors.2 Here, the operating mechanism is totally different because both
marginal cost and capacity are determined by a strategic supplier, which needs
to offer a line of credit so that repayment is incentive compatible. This setting
is close to Fershtman and Judd (1987), who study the incentive contracts that
owners (principals) choose for their managers (agents) in an oligopolistic context. I
analyse the product market effects of an agency problem where a supplier effectively
delegates production to a retailer because it cannot access the market itself.
The strategic role of input prices drives the main results of the paper. Input
2The work of Dixit (1980) is followed by a number of papers studying the effects of capacity on the
product market. These include Kirman and Masson (1986), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Reynolds
(1991). Notably, Leach et al. (2013) study the interaction of debt and capacity commitments.
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price determines both the retailer’s optimal production and the profitability of par-
ticipating in the retail market. Thus, it also regulates the incentives to divert, and
therefore the quantity of input that the supplier can extended in credit while making
repayment incentive compatible. Other work in trade credit has studied the strategic
role of prices in a different context. For example, Smith (1987) and Brennan et al.
(1988) show that price discrimination can be used to reveal the creditworthiness of
different retailers. Daripa and Nilsen (2011) demonstrate that inter-firm credit may
subsidise inventory holding costs, and evaluate input price adjustment as an alter-
native to the extension of credit. However, as noted in Giannetti et al. (2011), it is
still not clear whether a supplier would reduce input prices to a credit-constrained
retailer. I answer this question.
To characterize the endogenous relation between leverage and product mar-
ket competition, I assume that input prices are linear. This yields two different
types of equilibria (constrained and unconstrained) that depend on market funda-
mentals. I conduct comparative statics on the levels of competitive pressure to study
how these determine equilibrium outcomes. Then I study the same model when the
supplier can set non-linear prices. I show that market outcomes are equal to those
of the equilibrium with financial constraints in the main setting (linear prices), but
the retailer need not be constrained. More specifically, the supplier can always ex-
tract all the retailer’s surplus conditional on repayment being incentive compatible,
and the line of credit acts as a commitment device because the retailer exhausts
it. However, the retailer may never be constrained because optimal production is
determined by the marginal price of input, and with a non-linear tariff this is not
relevant for the supplier’s profit maximization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 conducts comparative
statics on the retailer’s competitive pressure and interprets the results. Section 5
considers a setting with non-linear prices. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
I consider the vertical relation between a penniless retailer and an input supplier
who can extend trade credit, and how this relationship is shaped by competition in
the retailer’s product market. The retailer needs to borrow input in order to enter
the product market, which is operated by N other firms that I call incumbents.
Contractual frictions in the vertical relation allow the retailer to divert the input
borrowed without honouring his debt, and this limits the volume of credit that the
supplier can extend while keeping repayment incentive compatible. There are three
dates t = 0, 1, 2. There is no discounting and all agents are risk neutral.
At t = 0 the supplier sets a price ω per each unit of input. The price is
observable to all market participants, who also know that the supplier must incur
a cost cs to produce each unit of input. In Section 5 I relax the assumption that
prices are linear and discuss its implications.
At t = 1 the supplier extends trade credit of up to L units of input to the
retailer. This can be paid for at the end of the game. For simplicity, I assume that
there is no interest on the loan. Moreover, I ease presentation by assuming that (i)
the retailer cannot borrow money from a financial institution, hence the supplier is
the only potential source of credit; (ii) the retailer has zero funds, being forced to
borrow all the input that he wants to invest. Neither of these assumptions affect
the results qualitatively.3 After observing the offer L, the retailer borrows I ≤ L
units of input, incurring a debt ωI. Neither the offer L nor the transaction I are
observable to other parties. The retailer can transform each unit of input into a
unit of output costlessly.
At t = 2 retailer and incumbents simultaneously decide their production.
3(i) In line with Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), money is more divertible than input, so agency
problems are stronger in standard credit transactions than in trade credit transactions. As a
result, suppliers can extend credit in situations where financial institutions are not able to do so.
Introducing standard credit would diminish, but not eliminate, the role of the supplier as a lender.
(ii) With a positive amount of funds, the retailer would have to borrow a smaller quantity of input,
if any, and thus financial constraints would arise for a smaller range of parameters.
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The retail market is characterized by an inverse demand function P (Q) = M −Q,
where Q captures the total quantity of homogeneous product that is sold in it.
In particular, Q =
∑N
i=1 qi + qe, where qi represents the quantity produced by
incumbent i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N} and qe ≤ I the quantity produced by the retailer. All
incumbents have the same production cost c per unit of output.
Crucially, the retailer may divert the input borrowed rather than investing it
in the retail market and honouring the debt. I assume that while both output and
sales revenues are verifiable and can therefore be pledged to the supplier, neither the
input purchase nor the investment decision are contractible. The retailer has limited
liability, so the debt is honoured only to the extent of market revenues. These, in
turn, can only be enjoyed by the retailer after honouring repayment obligations.
Each unit of input diverted generates a private benefit β < min{c, cs}, where the
relatively low revenue reflects the inefficiency of diverting. Furthermore, for the
agency problem to affect equilibrium outcomes I assume that the supplier is not
“too efficient,” so it holds that β + cu > c.
From the previous assumptions it follows that the net profits of the retailer
read
pie = max
{(
M −
∑N
i=1
qi − qe
)
qe − ωI, 0
}
+ β(I − qe). (3.1)
Here, the first term within the maximum operator captures net market profits, and
zero is the lower bound guaranteed by limited liability. The last term in (3.1)
represents the revenues from diversion: β for each unit of input borrowed and not
invested in the retail market, i.e., for I − qe units. Note that if the supplier does
not limit the credit line to L, the retailer’s best response is to borrow an unlimited
amount of input and divert it.
Formally, I consider the following definition of financial constraints:
Definition 31 Let que (ω) denote the optimal retailer’s production in the absence of
incentives to divert for a given input price ω. The retailer is financially constrained
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when it cannot borrow enough input to produce optimally, i.e., L < que (ω).
The definition captures the essence of credit rationing, which Bester and Hellwig
(1987) described as “a would-be borrower is said to be rationed if he cannot obtain
the loan that he wants even though he is willing to pay the interest that the lenders
are asking, perhaps even a higher interest.”4 Notably, Definition 31 shows that
whether the retailer is financially constrained not only depends on the line of credit
L, but also on the optimal investment, and hence on the input price ω.
Parameter β captures input liquidity. This is, the profitability of allocating
input to alternative uses for private benefit. In the presence of contractual frictions,
large β increases agency costs and may lead to tighter financial constraints. Evidence
by Cunat (2007) and Giannetti et al. (2011) suggests that input liquidity is related
to product characteristics. In particular, generic inputs are easy to divert and thus
highly liquid, whereas more tailored inputs have low value in alternative markets,
thereby alleviating agency costs.
The agency problem here is akin to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), who pro-
vide a rationale for trade credit. I extend their setting in two key dimensions that
allow me to study the interaction of financial constraints and product market com-
petition. First, I endogenize input price. By setting ω, the supplier determines both
the retailer’s optimal production in the retail market and his incentives to divert the
input and not honouring his debt. As a result, both the demand for input and the
line of credit L are a function of ω, and financial constraints arise endogenously in
equilibrium. Second, I introduce product market competition in the retail market.
Parameter N captures competitive pressure, which crucially affects the profitability
of investment and in turn, the input price. Assuming that incumbents are identical
simplifies the analysis while preserving the key role of competition.
I assume that the supplier is a monopolist to the retailer, which in turn
represents the only access to the retail market. This is consistent with Petersen
4This quote opens the discussion of the chapter ’Outside Financing Capacity’ in Tirole (2010)
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and Rajan (1997), McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Cunat (2007), who find that
more trade credit is extended where suppliers have low competition. The scarcity
of alternative sources of input increases the value of the commercial relationship for
retailers and lowers the incentives to strategically default on their debt. This reduces
agency costs and enables the extension of trade credit by suppliers. Formally, the
supplier’s market power allows me to study how agency problems affect input prices
and thus the competitiveness of the retailer in the product market.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
I consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this model. I start with a preliminary
result that facilitates subsequent analysis, and then solve recursively:
Lemma 32 In equilibrium, the retailer pays all his debt and does not allocate any
input to alternative uses, i.e., qe = I.
The result is intuitive. The retailer’s profit function (3.1) shows that hon-
ouring the debt is an all-or-nothing decision. This property is shared with Burkart
and Ellingsen (2004), and follows from the assumption that market revenues are
contractible. More specifically, when market revenues are smaller than debt value
ωI, the profitability of investment is zero. Alternatively, the same input might be
diverted, generating a net profit of β > 0 per unit. Thus, either the retailer produces
enough output to enjoy market revenues after repayment, or diverts it all. In equi-
librium, the supplier only extends credit when repayment is incentive compatible.
Therefore, whenever credit is extended, the debt is fully honoured.
Lemma 32 establishes that, besides honouring the debt in full, the retailer
does not borrow any input to allocate it elsewhere. In particular, one may consider
a case where the retailer finds it profitable to use a fraction of input borrowed for
production —and pay the debt, and to allocate the remaining part to an alternative
use, generating a unit revenue of β. Notice that this is never the case because in
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equilibrium the input price must be such that ω ≥ cu, whereas we have cu > β by
assumption. In words, the supplier always sets an input price weakly higher than its
cost, which in turn is higher than the revenues of allocating the input to alternative
uses. Thus, given a contract such that repayment is incentive compatible, it cannot
be profitable for the retailer to buy input and allocate it elsewhere.
3.3.1 Production
At t = 2 retailer and incumbents simultaneously make production decisions. Their
unit costs — ω and c respectively, are known to all market participants. Moreover,
the retailer’s production is limited to I ≤ L, where neither the credit line offered
by the supplier nor the quantity of input borrowed have been observed by the
incumbents.
Incumbent i maximizes net profits pii =
(
M −∑−i q−i − qi − qe) qi − cqi.
Here,
∑
−i q−i represents for the production of all other incumbents. By symmetry,
each of them produces the same quantity, which satisfies the best reply
qi(qe) =
M − qe − c
N + 1
,∀i. (3.2)
Thus, the sum of all incumbents’ production can be represented as Nqi.
From Lemma 32 it follows that retailer’s profits are those obtained by pro-
ducing with a unit cost ω. More specifically, input price and line of credit must
be such that all input borrowed is used for production, i.e., qe = I. As a result,
retailer’s profit function (3.1) collapses to pie = (M −Nqi − qe) qe − ωqe. Moreover,
production levels are upper bounded by the line of credit L. I denote the retailer’s
unconstrained best reply by que (qi). Then, the best reply reads
qe(qi) =
 q
u
e (qi) =
M−Nqi−ω
2 when q
u
e (qi) ≤ L
L when que (qi) > L
. (3.3)
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Response function (3.3) shows that the retailer’s financial constraint effec-
tively acts as a capacity constraint. Given an input price ω, the retailer’s optimal
production is que (qi), and he is financially constrained when q
u
e (qi) > L. The con-
cavity of market profits implies that whenever the retailer is financially constrained,
he exhausts all credit, i.e, qe(qi) = L.
Incumbents do not observe the line of credit offered by the supplier at t = 1,
but they have a conjecture that is correct in equilibrium. As will become clear,
there exists a one-to-one mapping from the publicly observed input price set by the
supplier at t = 0 to the line of credit offered at t = 1. I derive the equilibrium
production policies of market participants for a given L, and then show that the
incumbents’ conjecture is correct. For simplicity, my notation does not differentiate
between the conjecture of L and the actual line of credit.
Lemma 33 Suppose that incumbents’ conjecture of the credit line L is correct in
equilibrium. Then, equilibrium production levels of the retailer and the incumbents
satisfy
q∗e =
 q
u
e =
M−(N+1)ω+Nc
N+2 when q
u
e ≤ L
L when que > L
, (3.4)
q∗i =
 q
u
i =
M−2c+ω
N+2 when q
u
e ≤ L
qci =
M−L−c
N+2 when q
u
e > L
(3.5)
and the corresponding profits are
pi∗e =
 pi
u
e =
[
M−(N+1)ω+Nc
N+2
]2
when que ≤ L
pice = L
[
M−(N+1)ω−L+Nc
N+1
]
when que > L
, (3.6)
pi∗i =
 pi
u
i =
[
M−2c+ω
N+2
]2
when que ≤ L
pici =
[
M−c−L
N+1
]2
when que > L
(3.7)
Optimal production {q∗e , q∗i } is obtained by solving for best replies (3.2) and
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(3.3); the profits functions follow from plugging the corresponding solutions into pie
and pii. I derive the expressions with more detail in the Appendix.
For a given input price ω, production in the unconstrained equilibrium
{que , qui } is that of a standard simultaneous Cournot-Nash game. Here, que corre-
sponds to the optimal production used in Definition 31. For exposition, I no longer
specify that it is a function of ω. Notably, market outcomes in the constrained
equilibrium {L, qci } are those of a game where the financially constrained retailer
becomes a leader that must choose production L. Thus, the constraint can poten-
tially provide a first-mover advantage. However, as will become clear, L is itself a
function of ω, strategically set by the supplier.
Profits functions (3.6) show that, given a price ω and a line of credit L, fi-
nancial constraints can only harm the retailer. Formally, simple algebra reveals that
pice > pi
u
e ←→ L > que . In words, the retailer’s profits in the constrained equilibrium
can only exceed those in the unconstrained one when the retailer is not constrained,
i.e., never. This is not surprising because, everything else equal, financial constraints
can only limit the retailer’s ability to maximize profits. Nonetheless, in equilibrium
both input price and credit line are set by the supplier and depend, in turn, on
whether the retailer is financially constrained. I study these in the next sections.
3.3.2 Line of credit
At t = 1 the supplier offers a credit line L to the retailer, and the retailer borrows
qe ≤ L. The following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium line of credit as a
function of input price and market fundamentals.
Lemma 34 Given input price ω, in equilibrium the credit line L makes the retailer
indifferent between producing and diverting all input without honouring the debt,
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i.e., it satisfies
L∗ =
 L
u = 1β
[
M−(N+1)ω+Nc
N+2
]2
when piue ≥ βque
Lc = M − (N + 1)(ω + β) +Nc when piue < βque
. (3.8)
Moreover, incumbents’ conjecture of L is correct.
In the Appendix I derive (3.8); here I explain why this is the line of credit
in equilibrium. Note first that the retailer’s profits from diverting are maximized
by exhausting all credit, i.e., diverting yields βL. Thus, the retailer is indifferent
when the profitability of producing qe ≤ L equals βL. From the concavity of market
profits, it follows that additional credit would lead the retailer to divert and thus
cannot be profitable for the supplier. In contrast, smaller credit keeps repayment
incentive compatible, but cannot increase supplier profits. More specifically, if the
financial constraint is not binding (que < L), a marginally smaller line of credit has
no effect in equilibrium. If, instead, it is optimal for the retailer to exhaust all
credit (que ≥ L), a smaller L must reduce supplier’s profits whenever his sales are
profitable, i.e., ω > cu. Hence, the supplier cannot do better than offering a credit
line that makes the retailer indifferent between producing and diverting. This is,
therefore, the incumbents’ conjecture.
The credit policy (3.8) follows from solving pie = βL for L both when the
financial constraint is binding and when it isn’t. Figure 3.1 illustrates the two cases.
If piue ≥ βque , the retailer makes higher profits by producing the optimal quantity
of output que than by diverting the input required for such level of production and
not honouring the debt. Then, the retailer is not financially constrained and it is
indifferent between producing and diverting when the line of credit is Lu, which
satisfies piue = βL. Alternatively, when pi
u
e < βq
u
e , if the retailer could borrow the
optimal quantity of input for production, it would rather divert. Then, the supplier
must limit the line of credit to make repayment incentive compatible. The retailer
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0 que Lu
piue
I
βI
pie(qe = I)
(a) Non-binding constraint, piue ≥ βque
0 queLc
piue
I
βI
pie(qe = I)
(b) Binding constraint, piue < βq
u
e
Figure 3.1: Line of credit extended by the supplier for a given input price. In (a)
the constraint is not binding, so the supplier offers Lu units of input and the retailer
borrows que . In (b) the constraint is binding, so the supplier offers L
c units and the
retailer exhaust all credit. Parameter values are M = 10, ω = 2, c = 2, N = 5 and
β = 0.5 in (a), β = 0.9 in (b).
is indifferent when the credit line is Lc, which satisfies pice = βL. Note in Figure 3.1
that Lc = Lu when piue = βq
u
e , so the line of credit is continuous on q
u
e . Thus, the
retailer is financially constrained if and only if piue < βq
u
e . As will become clear, this
depends on the input price ω, which is strategically set by the supplier.
3.3.3 Input price
At t = 0 the supplier sets input price ω to maximize profits piu = (ω− cu)qe, subject
to the credit policy L∗. Crucially, the price not only maximizes supplier’s profits
given a demand for input (production) in either equilibrium, i.e. for que or L
c, but it
also determines the equilibrium itself. For instance, the price maximizing supplier’s
profits for a demand que must be such that the retailer is not financially constrained,
i.e. que ≤ Lu. The following proposition characterizes the supplier’s pricing policy
in equilibrium, which depends on market fundamentals.
Proposition 35 Define the price policies ωu = M+(N+1)cu+Nc2(N+1) and ω
c = M+(N+1)(cu−β)+Nc2(N+1)
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satisfying ωu > ωc; and the policy ω = M−(N+2)β+NcN+1 . Market fundamentals deter-
mine equilibrium outcomes such that
1. For ω > ωu the supplier sets input price ωu; the retailer is not financially
constrained and does not exhaust all credit;
2. For ω ∈ [ωc, ωu] the supplier sets an input price ω = M−(N+2)β+NcN+1 ; the retailer
is not financially constrained but exhausts all credit;
3. For ω < ωc the supplier sets input price ωc = M+(N+1)(cu−β)+Nc2(N+1) ; the retailer
is financially constrained and therefore exhausts all credit.
I derive the price cutoffs of Proposition 35 in the Appendix; here I provide
the main intuition. When the retailer is not constrained (qe = q
u
e ), the supplier
maximizes profits by setting a price ωu. Instead, if financial constraints are bind-
ing (qe = L
c), the supplier’s profits are maximized for ωc. The relation ωu > ωc
shows that the retailer always pays a lower price for input when it is financially
constrained. Notably, these pricing policies maximize supplier’s profits conditional
on the retailer’s financial constraints. However, whether the retailer is constrained
depends on the input price. The previous analysis showed that the retailer is con-
strained when piue < βq
u
e . Here, price ω determines the profitability of producing pi
u
e ,
and therefore whether there is credit rationing in equilibrium. A graphical argument
follows from Figure 3.1. For a given input diversion value β, a small price ω makes
producing relatively profitable, and the retailer is not constrained. Increasing ω
lowers market profits, and financial constraints eventually become binding.
The pricing policy ω satisfies piue = βq
u
e , and is such that the retailer is finan-
cially constrained if and only if ω > ω. When market fundamentals satisfy ωu < ω,
there are no constraints in equilibrium. Intuitively, the supplier’s price policy for
a non-constrained retailer ωu makes repayment incentive compatible for the opti-
mal production que . Thus, unconstrained price and production are an equilibrium.
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Moreover, the price policy for a constrained retailer ωc does not provide incentives
to divert, so financial constraints do not arise in equilibrium. Formally, it holds
both que (ω
u) < Lu(ωu) and que (ω
c) < Lc(ωc). In this equilibrium, market outcomes
are characterized by ωu. Production levels are given by que and q
u
i in (3.4) and (3.5);
and the line of credit is Lu in (3.8).
A similar intuition applies for ωc > ω, which implies that the retailer is
financially constrained in equilibrium. In particular, ωc is such that makes the
retailer constrained, and thus it is an equilibrium. Furthermore, with a price ωu
repayment of debt corresponding to que is not incentive compatible, hence it is not an
equilibrium price. More formally, we have Lc(ωc) < que (ω
c) and Lu(ωu) < que (ω
u).
Here, equilibrium outcomes are characterized by input price ωc and correspond to
retailer’s production Lc in (3.8) and incumbents’ production qci in (3.5).
When fundamentals are such that ω ∈ [ωc, ωu], neither the unconstrained
outcome nor the constrained one are an equilibrium for the associated price policies
ωu and ωc. This is, with ωu debt repayment is not incentive compatible when
producing que ; with ω
c honouring the debt is incentive compatible for a production
que . Then, the supplier sets price ω, which satisfies q
u
e = L
u = Lc. Thus, the
retailer is not constrained, but it exhausts all credit. The result follows from the
distinct responsiveness of optimal production and credit line to the input price. In
particular, lowering the price would lead to a situation where que < L
u < Lc, so the
retailer would not exhaust all credit. However, it would then be optimal for the
supplier to set a higher price ωu rather than a lower one. Similarly, a price higher
than ω yields Lc < Lu < que , thereby making the retailer financially constrained.
But then the optimal price lower, i.e, ωc, not higher.
3.3.4 Equilibrium outcomes
The following Corollary provides an intuitive overview of the main equilibrium out-
comes that is convenient for subsequent discussion.
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Corollary 36 When the retailer does not exhaust all credit, i.e. for ωu < ω, there
is double marginalization over the vertical chain, and market outcomes are those of
a Cournot-Nash.
With financial constraints, i.e. when ωc > ω, the retailer’s production is that
of a Stackelberg leader with a unit cost cu + β, and incumbents act as laggard firms.
Furthermore, supplier’s profits are those of the Stackelberg leader, and retailer’s
profits equal its agency rents, i.e. pice = βL
c.
The first statement is straightforward and highlights that contractual fric-
tions need not affect market outcomes when agency costs are small. The second
statement is proved formally in the Appendix; here I develop the main intuition.
When the retailer is financially constrained (ωc > ω), it exhausts all credit. As a
result, the input price determines the retailer’s production ex ante and provides lead-
ership to the retailer with respect to incumbents, which therefore become laggards.
Moreover, because the retailer exhausts all credit, there is no double marginalization
over the vertical chain. Hence, the supplier effectively delegates production to the
retailer, conceding just enough rents to make repayment incentive compatible, i.e.
β for each unit of input extended in credit. It then becomes optimal to set a price
ω such that the line of credit equals to the production of a Stackelberg leader with
a unit cost cu + β. Here, cu is the actual production cost whereas β is the retailer’s
agency rent per unit of input extended in credit.
3.4 Product Market Competition
I characterize equilibrium outcomes as a function of the number of incumbents
and compare them with those of a game where there are no contractual frictions.
Comparative statics shed light on the interaction between financial constraints and
product market competition. The next Corollary follows directly from Proposition
35:
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Corollary 37 Consider the cutoffs N1 =
M−cu−4β
2β−c+cu , N2 =
M−cu−3β
β−c+cu and N =
M−cu−β
β−c+cu that satisfy N1 < N2 < N . Equilibrium is such that
1. If competitive pressure is low, i.e., N < N1, the retailer is not financially
constrained and does not exhaust all credit;
2. If competitive pressure is moderately low, i.e., N ∈ [N1, N2], the retailer is not
financially constrained but exhausts all credit;
3. If competitive pressure is moderately high, i.e., N ∈ [N2, N), the retailer is
financially constrained and therefore exhausts all credit;
4. If competitive pressure is sufficiently high, i.e., N ≥ N , no credit is extended
and the retailer does not enter the market.
Cutoffs N1 and N2 solve ω
u = ω and ωc = ω respectively for the number
of incumbents. Moreover, cutoff N satisfies ωc = cu. The results are illustrated in
Figure 3.2, where I plot the main equilibrium outcomes as a function of N (solid).
Moreover, I plot the outcomes of a setting where there are no contractual frictions
(dashed). For this benchmark setting, I simply assume that input diversion yields
zero revenues, so the retailer has no incentives to divert. Formally, if β = 0 it always
holds that piue ≥ βque , and the line of credit is unlimited, i.e., Lu →∞.
The characterization of all functions plotted is given in the Appendix. With
low competitive pressure (N < N1) the retail market is relatively profitable and
contractual frictions do not affect market outcomes. Corollary 36 establishes that
the commercial relation between supplier and retailer is characterized by double
marginalization, and production corresponds to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Figure
3.2 shows that input price ωu decreases with competitive pressure N , but not enough
to outweigh the reduced levels of production caused by higher competition, so que
decreases too. More competition also raises agency costs, and therefore reduces
the line of credit Lu. Crucially, Lu decreases at a higher rate than the optimal
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium with contractual frictions (solid) versus equilibrium with
no frictions (dashed). Parameter values for the setting with frictions are M = 10,
cu = 2, c = 2 and β = 0.8. The resulting cutoffs on the number of incumbents are
N1 = 3, N2 = 7 and N = 9. Parameter values for the setting with no frictions are
equal except for β = 0.
production que and as a result, q
u
e = L
u when N = N1. For higher competitive
pressure, double marginalization is no longer an equilibrium because que < L
u.
With a moderately small number of competitors N ∈ [N1, N2] the supplier
sets a price ω so that the optimal production equals the credit line: que = L
u = Lc.
Even though the retailer is not constrained, it acquires input at a lower price ω < ωu
and exhausts all credit. The benefits of this are twofold. First, a smaller marginal
cost. Second, a first-mover advantage with respect to incumbents. Figure 3.2 shows
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that the input price ω is such that the retailer’s optimal production que is invariant
to the number of competitors and in turn, so are his profits. However, this is not
an equilibrium when competition is strong enough (N ≥ N2). Then, the repayment
of debt associated to this relatively large level of production que (ω) is no longer
incentive compatible, and the retailer is financially constrained.
Moderately high competition N ∈ [N2, N) generates to financial constraints.
The supplier sets a small input price than in a setting with no frictions (ωc < ωu),
but the retailer cannot borrow enough to produce optimally, Lc < que (ω
c). Notably,
Figure 3.2 shows that financial constraints can lead to higher production levels and
higher profits for the retailer. From Corollary 36, it follows that this is because
agency rents from producing the quantity of a Stackelberg leader are larger than
the profits in a setting with double marginalization. Figure 3.2 shows that this
holds when the number of incumbents is sufficiently close to N2, but not for higher
competitive pressure.
As the number of incumbents grows, the production of a Stackelberg leader
approaches zero due to the relative inefficiency with respect to incumbents: cu+β >
c. Notably, financial constraints provide a commitment device, but increase the
supplier’s cost of accessing the retail market. When N → N , market revenues
converge to the effective marginal cost for the supplier, cu+β. In particular, ω
c → cu
to pay for the actual production cost, whereas the remaining β is captured by the
retailer as an agency rent. With higher competitive pressure, i.e. N ≥ N , the
supplier can no longer extend credit in a profitable way.
3.5 Optimal Contracts
In this section suppose that the supplier can set a non-linear input price. Notably,
this is equivalent to considering the optimal contract for the supplier. The next
proposition summarizes the main equilibrium outcomes:
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Proposition 38 In equilibrium, when the supplier can set non-linear prices, market
outcomes are such that:
i) The supplier extends in credit a quantity of input L that equals the production
of a Stackelberg leader with a unit cost cu + β;
ii) The retailer exhausts all credit, i.e. qe = L, and has profits that equal its
agency rents, i.e., pie = βL;
iii) The supplier’s profits are those of a Stackelberg leader with a unit cost cu + β.
I argue that Proposition 38 follows directly from previous results. When the
supplier can offer an optimal contract, retailer’s profits from producing must be
equal to its agency rents, i.e., pie = βL. In particular, note that if retailer’s profits
were lower, it would have incentives to divert. Alternatively, if they were higher,
the supplier could charge a bigger price while keeping repayment incentive compat-
ible, and therefore it would not be maximizing profits. From this argument it also
follows that the quantity of input extended in credit must equal retailer’s produc-
tion. Equivalently, in equilibrium the retailer must exhaust all credit. Otherwise, if
qe < L, the supplier would be granting the retailer with unnecessary rents to make
repayment incentive compatible, and thus would not be maximizing profits. This
demonstrates statement ii) of the proposition.
For statements i) and iii) consider the supplier’s optimal production and
profits. Since the retailer exhausts all credit, i.e. qe = L, the credit line acts as
a commitment device in the retail market. Thus, the retailer becomes a leading
producer, and the supplier can both determine its production and extract all its
surplus except for the agency rents. It then follows that the supplier maximizes
profits by extending in credit the input that corresponds to the production of a
Stackelberg leader with a unit cost cu + β, where cu is the actual production cost
and β is the agency cost for each unit of input lent.
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When the supplier can set a non-linear price, contractual frictions always
benefit the retailer. In particular, retailer’s profits equal its agency rents, and these
are null when there exist no incentives to divert. Formally, pie = 0 when β = 0.
Notice also that retailer’s profits depend on contractual frictions (input diversion
value β), but not on the presence of financial constraints. This leads us to a relevant
insight that is captured by the following Corollary:
Corollary 39 With non-linear input prices, the retailer need not be financially con-
strained, despite contractual frictions and regardless of market fundamentals. The
following two-part tariff satisfies this condition:
ωtpt =
1
2
[
(N + 2)(β + cu)− N(M +Nc)
(N + 1)
]
, (3.9)
Ftpt =
1
4
[[M −N(β − c+ cu)− cu − β] [M −N(β − c+ cu)− cu − 3β]] ,(3.10)
where ωtpt represents the unit price and Ftpt the fixed fee.
I derive {ωtpt, Ftpt} in the Appendix. The unit price ωtpt is such that in
a setting with double marginalization, the retailer’s production equals that of a
Stackelberg leader with a unit cost cu+β. The fixed fee Ftpt extracts the remaining
part of retailer’s surplus except for the agency rents, i.e. for βL. Notably, with
this two-part tariff the retailer is never financially constrained because it can always
produce optimally given the input price. In particular, provided that producing is
profitable, optimal production is determined by the marginal cost ωtpt. Here, the
line of credit is such that the retailer can borrow just enough input to produce
optimally.
Corollary 39 reveals a key limitation of the definition of financial constraints
used here (Definition 31), which is seemingly standard. This is that financial con-
straints may not capture the presence of contractual frictions and agency costs, even
though these affect market outcomes. The result highlights that taking production
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costs as given when studying firms’ credit rationing may neglect a crucial element
of the whole picture, namely the fact that these costs are endogenous. The first
part of the paper showed that with linear input prices financial constraints arise en-
dogenously in equilibrium only if agency costs are sufficiently large. In this section I
show that with non-linear prices the retailer might never be financially constrained,
even though market outcomes are affected by financial frictions.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I model an endogenous relation between financial constraints and prod-
uct market competition. I characterize a trade credit transaction where a supplier
lends input to a competitive retailer, and contractual frictions may lead to financial
constraints. By setting the input price, the supplier determines both the retailer’s
optimal demand for input and the quantity of input that can be extended in credit
while making repayment incentive compatible. Credit rationing arises in equilib-
rium when the retailer can not borrow enough to produce optimally for a given
input price.
When the supplier sets linear prices, the retailer is financially constrained if
competitive pressure is strong enough. I show that a financially constrained retailer
faces lower input prices, and it can make higher profits due to its own financial
constraints. Formally, this occurs when its agency rents are larger than the profits
of double marginalization in a setting with no frictions. When non-linear input
prices are considered, the retailer might never be financially constrained despite the
presence of contractual frictions and regardless of market fundamentals. The result
reveals that seemingly standard definitions of financial constraints may neglect a
key part of the picture explaining financial agreements, namely the endogeneity of
production costs.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proof of Lemmas 33-34
Lemma 33. Incumbents observe ω and have the right conjecture of L, so they
know whether que (qi) ≤ L or que (qi) > L. When que (qi) ≤ L, equilibrium production
levels {que , qui } solve the system of best response functions (3.3) and (3.2), which are
derived in the main text. Note that when que (qi) > L, the retailer exhausts all credit
because market profits are quasiconcave in qe with a maximum at q
u
e . Incumbents’
response then is qi(L) =
M−L−c
N+2 .
Profits functions are obtained by plugging in the production levels derived
above so that pi∗e = (M −Nq∗i − q∗e − ω) q∗e and pi∗i = (M −Nq∗i − q∗e − c) q∗i for
retailers.
Lemma 34. The expression for Lu follows from solving piue = βL for L. In partic-
ular, the equation reads
[
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
]2
= βLu. (3.11)
To obtain Lc I solve pice = βL for L. This is,
Lc
[
M − (N + 1)ω − Lc +Nc
N + 1
]
= βLc. (3.12)
Incumbents’ conjecture is correct because the supplier has no incentives to deviate
and offer a different line of credit.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 35 and Corollary 36
Proposition 35. Lemma 32 shows that I = qe, thus supplier’s profits read piu =
(ω − cu)qe. Suppose that the retailer is not financially constrained, so he borrows
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que . Then the supplier sets input price to maximize
piu = (ω − cu)
[
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
]
. (3.13)
The solution is given by ωu in Proposition 35. Similarly, suppose that the retailer
is constrained and thus he borrows Lc. Then the supplier sets a price to maximize
piu = (ω − cu) [M − (N + 1)(ω + β) +Nc] . (3.14)
The solution is given by ωc in Proposition 35.
For prices ωu and ωc to be an equilibrium they must be such that the retailer
is not constrained and constrained respectively. The retailer is constrained when
piue < βq
u
e . There exists a unique solution ω for pi
u
e = βq
u
e > 0 that follows from
solving [
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
]2
=
[
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
]
β. (3.15)
Thus, the retailer is financially constrained if and only if ω > ω. Note that the same
price function is obtained by solving que = L
c, indicating that this price equals the
production in the constrained and the unconstrained equilibria.
Note that ωu > ωc. When ω > ωu > ωc, the retailer is not financially
constrained neither for a price ωu nor for ωc. Thus, in equilibrium there are no
financial constraints and the supplier sets a price ωu. When ωu > ωc > ω the
retailer is financially constrained both with prices ωu and ωc. Thus, in equilibrium
the retailer is constrained and the supplier sets a price ωc.
When ω ∈ [ωc, ωu] neither of the above is an equilibrium. Note that ω
satisfies que = L
u = Lc > 0, i.e.
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
=
1
β
[
M − (N + 1)ω +Nc
N + 2
]2
= M−(N+1)(ω+β)+Nc > 0.
(3.16)
160
Furthermore, we have que < L
u < Lc for ω < ω and que > L
u > Lc for for ω > ω.
Thus, neither a price ω < ω or a price ω > ω can be an equilibrium. With a price
ω = ω the supplier maximizes profits given the input demand and the line of credit
and therefore it is an equilibrium.
Corollary 36. When the financial constraint is binding (ω < ωc) the retailer’s
production is Lc(ωc) or, equivalently,
Lc =
M − (N + 1)(cu + β) +Nc
2
. (3.17)
This also corresponds to the supplier’s input sales. Supplier’s profits are picu =
(ωc − cu)Lc whereas retailer’s profits are given by pice = (M − Nqci − Lc − ωc)Lc.
Plugging both ωc and Lc into the profit functions yields
picu =
[M −N(β − c+ cu)− cu − β]2
4(N + 1)
and pice = βL
c (3.18)
Denote qL the production of a Stackelberg leader with unit cost cu+β. From
(3.2) it follows that incumbents’ best reply reads qi(qL) =
M−qL−c
N+1 . Thus, the leader
maximizes profits piL = (M−Nqi(qL)−qL)qL−(cu+β)qL. The first order condition
yields
q∗L =
M − (N + 1)(cu + β) +Nc
2
. (3.19)
Pluggin this expression into the profit function I obtain
pi∗L =
[M −N(β − c+ cu)− cu − β]2
4(N + 1)
= picu (3.20)
3.7.3 Proof of Corollary 37 and characterization of Figure 3.2
Corollary 37. Consider the expressions for ωu, ωc and ω in Proposition 4. Solving
ωu = ω for N yields the cutoff N1, which satisfies ω > ω
u if and only if N < N1.
Similarly, solving ωc = ω for N yields the cutoff N2, which satisfies ω
c > ω if and
161
only if N > N2.
The cutoff N is obtained by solving for the input price that equals the
marginal cost under financial constraints, i.e. solving ωc = cu for N . The cut-
off also satisfies a null line of credit, so it can be derived by solving Lc = 0 for
N .
Figure 3.2. The full characterization of cutoffs N1, N2 and N , and input prices ωu,
ω and ωc, is given by Proposition 4.
When N < N1, production levels and profits are obtained by plugging ωu
into {que , qui , piue , piui } in Lemma 2, whereas supplier’s profits satisfy piuu = (ωu−cu)que .
The exercise yields
que =
M−(N+1)cu+Nc
2(N+2) pi
u
e = (q
u
e )
2
qui =
M−2c+M+(N+1)cu+Nc
2(N+2)
N+2 pi
u
i = (q
u
i )
2
piuu =
[M−(N+1)cu+Nc]2
4(N+1)(N+2)
When N ∈ [N1, N2], production levels and profits are obtained by plugging
ω into the same functions. I obtain
que = β pi
u
e = (q
u
e )
2
qui =
M−c−β
N+1 pi
u
i = (q
u
i )
2
piuu = β
[
M−β(N+2)+Nc
N+1 − cu
]
When N ∈ (N2, N ], production levels and profits are obtained by plugging
ωc into L
c in Lemma 33 for the retailer’s production; both ωc and L
c(ωc) and into
{qci , pice, pici } and into picu = (ωc − cu)Lc for the remaining functions. It yields
Lc = M−(N+1)(cu+β)+Nc2 pi
c
e = βL
c
qci =
M+N(β−c+cu)−2c+cu+β
2(N+1) pi
c
i =
(
M−c
2(N+1)
)2 − (β−c+cu)24
picu =
[M−N(β−c+cu)−cu−β]2
4(N+1)
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3.7.4 Proof of Corollary 39
The supplier can set an optimal contract where the retailer is not financially con-
strained by offering input at a price such that optimal retailer’s production is q∗L
and extracting his surplus with a fixed fee so that pie = βq
∗
L.
The equilibrium production levels in a setting with no financial constraints
que and q
u
i are provided by (3.4) and (3.5) in the main text. Solving q
u
e = q
∗
L for ω
yields ωtpt in the corollary. This unit price generates the input demand that equals
the optimal production of a Stackelberg leader with unit cost β + cu.
For the supplier to extract all the retailer’s surplus while making repayment
incentive compatible he must set a fixed fee F = (M − Nqui − q∗L)q∗L − (ω + β)q∗L.
The fixed fee equals retailer’s market revenues net of the unit price ωq∗L and the
agency cost βq∗L. Algebra manipulation yields Ftpt. Solving F = 0 for N shows that
the fixed fee is negative when N ∈ (N2, N).
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